Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside
Decision Date | 31 March 1994 |
Docket Number | No. S031593,S031593 |
Citation | 869 P.2d 1142,7 Cal.4th 525,28 Cal.Rptr.2d 617 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 869 P.2d 1142, 145 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2981 SANTA CLARA COUNTY COUNSEL ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and Respondent, v. Steven WOODSIDE, as County Counsel, etc., Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant; County of Santa Clara, Defendant and Appellant. |
Remcho, Johansen & Purcell, Robin B. Johansen, Joseph Remcho, Karen A. Getman and Philip C. Monrad, San Francisco, for defendant, cross-complainant and appellant and for defendant and appellant.
Daniel S. Hapke, Jr., San Diego, Frederick J. Krebs, Washington, DC, O'Melveny & Myers and George A. Riley, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant, cross-complainant and appellant and for defendant and appellant.
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Kevin M. Fong, Edward P. Davis and J. Donald Best, San Jose, for plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent.
Daniel F. Moss, Ann Brick, Edward M. Chen, Matthew A. Coles, Margaret C. Crosby and Alan L. Schlosser, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent.
We are asked to decide whether the right of local government employees to sue a public agency for violations of the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA, Gov.Code, § 3500 et seq.) extends to attorneys who are employed in the office of the Santa Clara County Counsel (County Counsel), or if the duty of loyalty imposed upon these attorneys towards their client, the County of Santa Clara (County), precludes such a suit. We conclude that the MMBA authorizes the suit, and that the suit is not prohibited for any constitutional reason. Further, we conclude that the County is statutorily forbidden from discharging attorneys for exercising their right to sue under the MMBA, although the County is still free to rearrange assignments within the County Counsel's office in order to ensure that it receives legal representation in which it has full confidence. Because we find in favor of the Santa Clara County Attorneys Association on statutory grounds, we do not consider the argument that their right to sue is constitutionally protected.
Petitioner Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Association (Association) consists of approximately 20 out of 40 attorneys (Attorneys) in the County Counsel's office. The County Counsel's office, by statute (Gov.Code, § 26526) and by practice, acts as the primary legal adviser to the County Board of Supervisors. In addition to serving as counsel to the board, deputies in the County Counsel's office advise and represent various administrative departments of the county in matters ranging from land use law to social service benefits. The County Counsel's office is also charged with representing special districts within the county (id., § 27645), representing the state at guardianship proceedings (id., § 27646), and representing superior and municipal court judges (id., § 27647).
In order to understand the relevant circumstances of this case, it is helpful to recount briefly the history of the Association.
In 1973, the Santa Clara County Criminal Attorneys Association, which included deputy district attorneys and deputy public defenders, filed a petition to form an attorney bargaining unit, pursuant to provisions of the MMBA. The County Board of Supervisors (the Board) placed the deputy County Counsel attorneys in the same bargaining unit as these attorneys. At the same time, the County removed the attorneys' status as classified employees who, under the MMBA, have certain restrictions placed on their associational rights. (See Gov.Code, § 3507.5.) However, the following year, the deputy County Counsel attorneys petitioned to be placed in a separate bargaining unit. The stated reason for the petition was that the attorneys, unlike the deputy district attorneys and public defenders, were in a "confidential attorney-client relationship with the Board of Supervisors and county management," and therefore "should not be included with attorneys and others not in such a relationship." The petition was granted, and the Association became a recognized employee association under the MMBA.
There is evidence in the record that in the late 1970's the Association attempted to change the status of its members, in effect proposing to disband them as a bargaining unit in exchange for a salary increase 5 percent greater than those of the deputy district attorneys and deputy public defenders. These latter attorneys objected and the proposal was never adopted.
In 1984, the Association joined the deputy public defenders and deputy district attorneys' unit in a lawsuit against the County. At issue was whether the County was setting the attorneys' salaries in accordance with the comparable wage provisions of County Charter section 709, and whether the County was violating the MMBA, specifically Government Code section 3505's requirement that a public employer "meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment...." The suit was subsequently settled.
This brings us to the events leading to the present lawsuit. In 1989, the most recent memorandum of understanding between the County and the Association expired. The Association refused to accept a wage package already approved by the deputy public defenders. Instead, the Association sought to meet and confer independently with the County and the Board to present its own comparative survey data, to support its position that its members deserved higher salaries than those offered by the County. On August 17, 1989, the Association requested that the Board schedule a hearing to set salaries pursuant to County Charter section 709. The Board did not comply with that request. On September 1, 1989, the Association proposed that the rate of pay for its members be set by binding arbitration. The County again did not respond. In November 1989, the County notified the Association that it intended to give the Attorneys the first phase of the increase negotiated with other attorneys. The County offered to meet and confer with them on the implementation of this increase. On December 8, 1989, the Association proposed nonbinding fact-finding by a neutral third party or any other reasonable procedure that would assist the parties in resolving the comparable wage issue. Once again the County did not respond.
In December 1989, the Board enacted its 4 percent wage increase for the Attorneys. The Association at that point notified the County of its intent to file a petition for writ of mandate to enforce its rights under the MMBA and the County Charter. On December 21, 1989, Steven Woodside, the County Counsel, distributed a memorandum to all deputies in the office, setting forth his position with regard to the impending writ action. After a review of various California Rules of Professional Conduct as well as the American Bar Association model rules, Woodside concluded that "litigation against the County on these issues may not be maintained by lawyers employed by the County unless the lawyers cease employment in the County Counsel's Office or the County consents." Moreover, Woodside took certain steps to segregate Association members from confidential meetings and contacts with the Board.
On December 29, 1989, the Association requested that the County waive the conflict of interest or submit the controversy to a court without the filing of a formal action, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1138. After the County's rejection of this proposal, the Association filed this formal action for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Association alleged that the County had failed to meet and confer on wages, as it is obliged to do under the MMBA, and failed to adjust salaries in accordance with County Charter section 709. Subsequently, the County filed a cross-complaint seeking to enjoin the Association from filing a petition for writ of mandate or, in the alternative, seeking a declaration that prior to filing the petition, the Association be required to make a showing (1) that there is a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, and (2) that harm to the County would be minimal.
The Association asked the court to grant the following relief: (1) to declare that the members of the Association do not have to resign prior to filing a petition for writ of mandate against the County over the wage issue; (2) to declare that such a writ of mandate action does not create a conflict of interest or violate any ethical code which would subject the Attorneys to discipline; (3) for an injunction prohibiting the County from preventing the Attorneys from performing their customary duties, from disciplining or terminating the Attorneys, or from referring the Attorneys to the State Bar for discipline; (4) to reinstate the Attorneys to their full employment responsibilities, including confidential meetings with the Board and other County policymaking officials. It is worthy of emphasis that the underlying merits of the petition for writ of mandate sought by the Association were not before the trial court, and are not before this court. The only issues argued in the court below were whether the Association's contemplated petition was lawful, and whether it could proceed without discipline from either the County or the State Bar. Those are the only questions we decide here.
The trial court found for the Association on most points. It enjoined the County from terminating the Attorneys for filing a writ of mandate action to resolve the salary dispute. It further declared that the members of the Association did not have to resign in order to file the suit, and that the filing of a petition for writ of mandate did not create any conflict of interest in violation of the Attorneys' ethical code. It declined to enjoin the County, however, from reassigning attorneys so as...
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