Santarsiero v. Martin
| Decision Date | 18 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:20-cv-00435-FtM-29NPM |
| Parties | GAY SANTARSIERO, LORI MADDOX, LINDA SQUADRITO, FRANCES FRANCIONE, ARDIS BALIS, AND ANNE MARIE PETRILLI, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN MARTIN, HEATHER MARTIN, LOU FRANCO, ALEX CHEPURNY, VINCE AGRO, ANGIE AGRO, DAN BEGIN, DONNA BEGIN, KATHRYN CARHART, JOHN CARHART, SHERYL FRANCO, and SUSAN PERRIER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court on defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #26) filed on September 1, 2020, to which plaintiffs filed an Opposition Memorandum (Doc. #32) on October 1, 2020. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted, the Amended Complaint is dismissed (mostly without prejudice), and plaintiffs are granted leave to file a second (and final) amended complaint if they choose to do so.
Six pro se Florida plaintiffs1 allege that twelve Canadian defendants - John Martin, Heather Martin, Lou Franco, Alex Chepurney, Vince Argo, Angie Agro, Dan Begin, Donna Begin, Susan Perrier, Kathryn Carhart, John Carhart, and Sheryl Franco (collectively defendants) - have improperly closed all access to the Edgewater Village (Edgewater) condominium complex's common areas and amenities, in violation of the Edgewater Village Association's rules, and have failed to maintain such areas. (Doc. #35-1, pp. 3, 7-8.)2 Plaintiffs further allege that defendants have failed to retain the required flood insurance for Edgewater, have engaged in abusive and harassing conduct directed towards various plaintiffs, and have caused plaintiff Petrilli to sell her condo at a loss of $62,000. (Id., pp. 3-14.) Based on this alleged misconduct, the Amended Complaint sets forth ten claims against some or all defendants: breach of contract (Count I); intentionalinfliction of emotional distress (Count II); harassment (Count III); defamation (Count IV); wrongful conversion of property (Count V); "board action beyond its authority" (Count VI); voter fraud (Count VII); sexual harassment (Count VIII); "failure to provide requested documents/destruction of material documents" (Count IX); and negligence (Count X). (Doc. #5; Doc. #35-1, pp. 13-22.) Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages "in whatever amount in excess of $350,000," and punitive damages "in whatever amount in excess of $1,000,000." (Doc. #35-1, pp. 23-24.)
Defendants seek dismissal of all counts in the Amended Complaint because of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the failure to state claims upon which relief may be granted, various pleading shortcomings, and the failure to comply with a condition precedent to filing suit. (Doc. #26, pp. 1-3.) After discussing subject matter jurisdiction, the Court will address the arguments as to each count in turn.
Subject matter jurisdiction in this case is premised on a form of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. #35-1, ¶¶ 2-4.) Article III of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that the federal judicial power "shall extend to [suits] . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. To implement this constitutional authorization, Congress has provided that "[t]hedistrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between--(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state, . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). "Alienage diversity, like general diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), must be complete; an alien on both sides of a dispute will defeat jurisdiction." Caron v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 910 F.3d 1359, 1364 (11th Cir. 2018). "It is the burden of the party seeking federal jurisdiction to demonstrate that diversity exists by a preponderance of the evidence." Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama, 633 F.3d 1330, 1340 (11th Cir. 2011)(citation omitted). If the Court "determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
The Amended Complaint alleges that complete diversity exists between the parties because all plaintiffs are citizens of Florida, while all defendants are citizens of Canada. (Doc. #35-1, ¶¶ 2, 3.) Reading the Amended Complaint liberally in light of plaintiffs' pro se status, it is plausible that if all counts are actionable at least one plaintiff satisfies the $75,000 threshold amount, as required. See Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000); Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1198 n.31 (11th Cir. 2007).
Defendants argue, however, that complete diversity does not exist because the Edgewater Condominium Association is an indispensable defendant whose presence, as a Florida citizen, will destroy complete diversity of citizenship. (Doc. #26, pp. 3-4.) As discussed below, however, the Condominium Association is not an indispensable party as to any count, and therefore subject matter jurisdiction plausibly appears at present to exist. Contrary to defendants' argument (Doc. #26, pp. 4-5), defendants' ownership of property in Florida, plaintiffs' residency in Florida, and the lack of a pre-filing arbitration proceeding do not impact the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. After review of the sufficiency of the counts, however, the amount in controversy appears to be reduced below the jurisdictional amount as to the remaining counts.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Generally, "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.8(a)(2)). Although this pleading standard "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Pleadings must contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and take the factual allegations therein as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997).
A pro se Amended Complaint is to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than complaints drafted by lawyers, but "this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014); Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1319 n.16 (11th Cir. 2017).
Because this is a diversity action, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), the Court applies Florida substantive law and federal procedural law. Georgia Dep't of Admin. Services v. Zhang, 819 F. App'x 684, 687 (11th Cir. 2020).
Count I asserts a breach of contract claim against "defendants" because they "deprived pro se plaintiffs of their right to the use of the common elements, including the pool, laundry, club house, rest rooms, tennis courts, and the other common elements" and "failed to maintain the common elements." (Doc. #35-1, ¶¶ 55-56.) Plaintiffs assert that they have paid their monthly fees and are therefore entitled to access to and proper maintenance of common areas. (Id. at ¶ 57.) Count I further states that "[i]t is the responsibility of the Condominium Association to make sure that all the common areas (the common elements) . . . are all functioning and well-maintained," citing Florida Statute § 718.303(1). (Id. at ¶ 54.)
Defendants first maintain that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the Edgewater Condominium Association is an indispensable party whose presence would destroy complete diversity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). It is certainly correct that the Association has a continuing duty to maintain the common elements. See § 718.113(1), Fla. Stat. (2019) (); see also Bailey v. Shelborne Ocean Beach Hotel Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1684 (Fla. 3d DCA July 15, 2020); Escadote I Corp. v. Ocean Three Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 45 Fla. L. Weekly D2267 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 7, 2020). That notwithstanding, the basis ofthe claim in Count I is that there was a contractual agreement between plaintiffs and all the defendants which required the defendants to maintain the common areas. Consequently, the Association is not an indispensable party as to this claim.
The problem with the claim, however, is that it fails to properly state a cause of action against the defendants. Under Florida law, a breach of contract claim requires the existence of a valid contract between the parties, a material breach of that contract, and resulting damages. Havens v. Coast Fla., 117 So. 3d 1179, 1181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). Count I fails to identify a contract to which any of the defendants were a party, or how such a contract was breached, or the damages plaintiffs suffered as a result of the breach. Thus, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because they have not properly asserted any of the required elements as to any defendant.
Plaintiffs argue that the named defendants are the proper parties, rather than the Edgewater Association or its board, because the individual defendants wrongfully injured plaintiffs for...
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