Santee v. Santa Clara County office of Education

• Citation: 220 Cal.App.3d 702,269 Cal.Rptr. 605
• Decision Date: 18 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. H005295,H005295
• Parties: , 60 Ed. Law Rep. 543 Rudy SANTEE, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 605

269 Cal.Rptr. 605

220 Cal.App.3d 702, 60 Ed. Law Rep. 543

Rudy SANTEE, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY OFFICE OF EDUCATION, Defendant and Appellant.

No. H005295.

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

May 18, 1990.

Jeffrey D. Janoff, Bostwick & Rowe, San Jose, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Robert B. Burchfiel, Hoge, Fenton, Jones & Appel, San Jose, for defendant and appellant.

ELIA, Associate Justice.

This appeal arises out of the failure of appellants to comply with the claim presentation requirements of the Tort Claims Act (Gov.Code, § 900 et seq.). ¹ Appellants filed an application for leave to present a late claim (late-claim application) with the wrong public entity, which granted the application but later notified appellants that it was the wrong entity. Despite this knowledge appellants did not contact or attempt to file a late-claim application with the correct public entity until well over one year after the wrongful act occurred. The trial court denied appellants' petition for relief from the claim presentation requirements as well as their motion for reconsideration. Appellants argue their late-claim application was timely as a result of its acceptance by the wrong public entity or by reason of their physical or mental incapacity. Appellants also propose the evidence showed they actually filed a timely claim with the correct public entity. As these contentions lack merit we will affirm.

Statutory Framework of Claim Presentation

Since the issues raised in this appeal relate to the claim presentation requirements of the Act, we here set forth its relevant provisions. ² No suit for damages may be maintained against a public entity unless a claim has first been presented to it. (§ 945.4.) A claim relating to a cause of action for personal injury must be delivered to the clerk, secretary or auditor of the public entity or mailed to one of those persons at the public entity's principal place of business (§ 915, subd. (a)) not later than the 100th day (now six months) after the accrual of the cause of action (§ 911.2). A cause of action accrues for purposes of the claim presentation requirements on the same date a similar cause of action against a nonpublic entity would be deemed to accrue for purposes of applying the relevant statute of limitations. (§ 901.) If the claim is not presented within 100 days the injured party must file with the public entity a late-claim application within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.4.) The one-year limit is tolled during such time as the injured party is "mentally incapacitated." (§ 911.4, subd. (b).) The governing board of the public entity is required to grant the late-claim application where (1) the claim was not presented within 100 days due to the claimant's mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect and the public entity was not prejudiced (§ 911.6, subd. (b)(1)), or (2) the claim was not presented within 100 days by reason of the claimant's physical or mental incapacity (§ 911.6, subd. (b)(3)). If the late-claim application is denied, the injured party may petition the superior court for relief from the claim presentation requirements (claim-relief petition). (§ 946.6, subd. (a).) In order to obtain relief, the injured party generally must establish facts which would have entitled him or her to have the late-claim application granted by the governing board of the public entity. (§ 946.6, subd. (c).) In ruling on a claim-relief petition, the "court shall make an independent determination upon the petition. The determination shall be made upon the basis of the petition, any affidavits in support of or in opposition to the petition, and any additional evidence received at the hearing on the petition." (§ 946.6, subd. (e).) Where no testimony is received, the trial court may rule on the basis of the petition and any declarations. (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 545, 553-554, 94 Cal.Rptr. 158, 483 P.2d 774.) The trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion, but a "decision denying relief will be scrutinized more carefully than an order granting relief. [Citation.]" (Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 275-276, 228 Cal.Rptr. 190, 721 P.2d 71.)

Facts and Proceedings

On May 23, 1986 appellants Rudy Santee and Laneen Firth were in an automobile allegedly rear-ended at a stop-light by a school bus owned by Santa Clara County Office of Education (respondent) and operated by one of its employees. On October 3, 1986, over 100 days after the accident, appellants through counsel filed a claim as well as a late-claim application with the Santa Clara Board of Supervisors (Board) rather than respondent. On October 20, 1986 the claims supervisor for the Board accepted the late-claim application but denied the claim itself.

Appellants filed a complaint against respondent on February 13, 1987 but attempted to serve the summons and complaint on the Board rather than respondent. On March 10, 1987 the Board informed appellants' counsel that it would not accept service on behalf of respondent because respondent was a separate public entity. The Board also informed counsel that it would forward a declaration from an assistant county executive confirming the status of the entities. At that time the one-year anniversary of the accident was over two months away. On April 30, 1986 the Board wrote counsel and enclosed the declaration in which the assistant county executive declared that the Board and respondent were separate and distinct public entities. Attached to the declaration was a copy of a detailed 1973 Board resolution transferring to respondent "those functions permitted by law to be exercised by the [Board]...."

Appellants, though, did not contact respondent until October 14, 1987, nearly seventeen months after the accident, by serving it with the summons and complaint. On October 22, 1987 appellants sent respondent a letter with an enclosed copy of the claim and late-claim application which had been presented to the Board over one year earlier. ³ Respondent answered the complaint in November 1987. In December 1987 respondent rejected the October 22, 1987 late-claim application.

In May 1988 appellants filed the instant claim-relief petition based on the above facts. The trial court ultimately denied the petition. Appellants moved for reconsideration on the ground that they had filed a timely claim within one month of the May 23, 1986 accident. The factual basis of the motion was a letter written to appellant Laneen Firth by respondent's claims supervisor. Appellants argued that this letter, which appeared to have been written in response to a claim by Firth, demonstrated that appellants had submitted a timely claim to respondent, thus eliminating the need for either a late-claim application or claim-relief petition. ⁴ The claims supervisor submitted a declaration in opposition stating the routine letter was mailed in response to her receipt of an accident report and not as a result of any claim. Firth submitted a declaration in reply stating she had in fact sent a claim to respondent although she no longer had a copy of it. The court denied the motion for reconsideration.

This appeal is taken from both the order denying the petition and the order denying reconsideration. Additional facts are set forth below where relevant.

Scope of Appeal

An order denying a claim-relief petition is an appealable order because it effectively determines a petitioner's right to relief from the claim presentation requirements. (Code Civ.Proc., § 577; ⁵ Dockter v. City of Santa Ana (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 69, 73-75, 67 Cal.Rptr. 686; Harman v. Mono General Hospital (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 607, 613, 182 Cal.Rptr. 570.) An order denying a motion for reconsideration thereof which raises new facts is also appealable. (Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1, subd. (b); Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 477, fn. 2, 121 Cal.Rptr. 477, 535 P.2d 341; but see Rojes v. Riverside General Hospital(1988) S203 Cal.App.3d 1151, 1160 161, 250 Cal.Rptr. 435 [order denying motion for reconsideration is nonappealable but may be reviewed on appeal from denial of petition].) Therefore, both the order denying the petition and the order denying reconsideration are subject to our review.

The instant proceeding, though, is slightly different from the usual appeal from an order denying a claim-relief petition in that appellants also raised the issue of timely compliance with the claim presentation requirements. Authority diverges on whether the trial court has the power to determine the issue of a claim's timeliness in a claim-relief proceeding. Resolving this preliminary issue clarifies the scope of this appeal.

One line of cases states that the trial court lacks power to determine an issue of timely filing (or the related issue of substantial compliance) because the claim-relief proceeding by definition assumes that a claim was not timely filed. (Ngo v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 946, 950-951, 255 Cal.Rptr. 140; Rason v. Santa Barbara City Housing Authority (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 817, 827-828, 247 Cal.Rptr. 492.) These cases indicate that the issue should be resolved in the main action against the public entity (as opposed to the claim-relief proceeding) either by way of demurrer, summary judgment or trial. (See, e.g., Toscano v. County of Los Angeles (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 775, 783-784, 155 Cal.Rptr. 146.) Another line of cases indicates that the issue of timely filing is not beyond the jurisdiction of the court in a claim-relief proceeding. (Reyes v. County of Los Angeles (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 584, 593-594, 243 Cal.Rptr. 35; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1095, 1100-1101, 215 Cal.Rptr. 699.)

We think the rule stated in the first line of cases...