Santelices v. Cable Wiring
| Decision Date | 06 March 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-7489-CIV.,98-7489-CIV. |
| Citation | 146 F.Supp.2d 1318 |
| Parties | Daniel SANTELICES, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated Plaintiffs v. CABLE WIRING and South Florida Cable Contractors, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Jonathan Evan Kroner, Mediator, Miami, for plaintiffs.
Neil F. McGuinness, Baker & McKenzie, Jill Nexon Berman, Berman Wolfe & Rennert, Miami, FL, for defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Daniel Santelices sues Cable Wiring, Inc. and South Florida Cable Contractors, Inc. pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. Mr. Santelices seeks to recover damages for unpaid overtime allegedly worked while in the defendants' employ.
Mr. Santelices filed his complaint against CWI on December 29, 1998 [D.E. 1]. He amended his complaint, adding SFCC as a defendant, on April 13, 1999 [D.E. 17]. Jurisdiction exists pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. CWI and SFCC each move for final summary judgment on Mr. Santelices' claims. For the reasons explained below, CWI's motion for summary judgment [D.E. 57] is GRANTED, and SFCC's motion for summary judgment [D.E. 60] is DENIED.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary judgment when all "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In Celotex, the seminal case concerning summary judgment, the Supreme Court explained that
the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (emphasis added). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the case. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. For factual issues to be considered genuine, they must have a real basis in the record. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact; the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to come forward with specific facts on each essential element of his claims by showing that there is a genuine issue for trial such that a reasonable jury could find in his favor. See id. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, it is not part of the court's function to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether such issues exist to be tried. See id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court must avoid weighing conflicting evidence and making credibility determinations. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in the nonmovant's favor. See id. Thus, in resolving the defendants' motions, the task is to determine whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Santelices, the nonmoving party, there is evidence on which a jury could reasonably find a verdict in his favor. See id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.1997).
Mr. Santelices alleges that he was employed by CWI and SFCC as a cable installer for one or more workweeks between February and November of 1998 and that he was not properly compensated for hours he worked in excess of forty hours per workweek. CWI is a licensed cable installation vendor for TCI of South Florida. CWI is not related to, controlled by, or legally affiliated with SFCC as a parent or subsidiary company, nor does CWI have an ownership interest in SFCC. On January 1, 1998, CWI entered into an Independent Contractor's Agreement with SFCC ("the CWI-SFCC Agreement" [D.E. 60, Exh. 1] (Jan. 1, 1998)). Under the CWI-SFCC Agreement, SFCC agreed to perform residential cable installations in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties. Mr. Santelices was hired to perform cable installation services pursuant to the Agreement.
The defendants argue that Mr. Santelices was not hired by CWI in any capacity and was not hired by SFCC as an "employee" within the meaning of the FLSA, but was merely an independent contractor for SFCC. The defendants rely on cited excerpts from Mr. Santelices' deposition testimony (which reflects Mr. Santelices' understanding that he was an independent contractor), as well as the testimony of CWI's president Nick Karl, who says that CWI had no knowledge of Mr. Santelices prior to this lawsuit, no direct or indirect contact with him while he performed cable installation services for SFCC, and no control over SFCC's working relationship with Mr. Santelices. The defendants also rely on copies of: (1) Mr. Santelices' Independent Contractor's Agreement with SFCC; (2) Mr. Santelices' 1998 Individual Income Tax Return reflecting his operation of a cable installation business and self-employment; and (3) Mr. Santelices' affidavit of independent contractor status included in a worker's compensation exemption form filed with the State of Florida in July of 1997. The defendants further argue that even if Mr. Santelices were considered an "employee" within the meaning of the FLSA, he has not sufficiently demonstrated that he worked any overtime.
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 as a comprehensive remedial scheme to lessen, if not eliminate, the distribution in commerce of goods produced under deficient labor conditions. See 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). The elimination of low wages and long hours was chosen as the method "to free commerce from the interferences arising from production of goods under conditions detrimental to the health and well-being of workers." Rutherford Food Corporation v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947). The Act imposes a minimum wage for covered employees, 29 U.S.C. § 206, requires that covered employers maintain records of their employees' services, 29 U.S.C. § 211(c), and prohibits employers from employing any worker for a workweek longer than forty hours unless the employee receives compensation for the excess hours at a rate not less than one and one half times the regular rate at which the worker is employed, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
The first question is whether Mr. Santelices can be considered an "employee" of CWI and/or SFCC who is therefore entitled to protection under the FLSA. A determination of employment status under the FLSA is a question of law. See Antenor v. D&S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 929 (11th Cir.1996); Brouwer v. Metropolitan Dade County, 139 F.3d 817, 818 (11th Cir.1998) (citing Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202, 205 (11th Cir.1997)). Subsidiary findings, however, are considered issues of fact. See Patel v. Wargo, 803 F.2d 632, 634 n. 1 (11th Cir.1986).
The FLSA vaguely explains what is meant by the term "employee." Weisel v. Singapore Joint Venture, Inc., 602 F.2d 1185, 1188 (5th Cir.1979). For example, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) defines an "employee" as "any individual employed by an employer." An "employer," in turn, includes "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). To "employ" is defined as to "suffer or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). Whether an employment relationship exists under the FLSA must be judged by the "economic realities" of the individual case and not by traditional common-law principles. See Antenor, 88 F.3d at 929; Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, 676 F.2d 468, 470 (11th Cir.1982). See also Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325-26, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992) (). The touchstone of "economic reality" in analyzing a possible employee/employer relationship for purposes of the FLSA is dependency. The courts look at all of the surrounding circumstances of the "whole activity" to determine whether the putative employee is economically dependent upon the alleged employer. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33, 81 S.Ct. 933, 6 L.Ed.2d 100 (1961); Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 439 (11th Cir. 1994); Harrell v. Diamond A Entm't, Inc., 992 F.Supp. 1343, 1348 (M.D.Fla.1997). Whether or not the parties intended to create an employment relationship is irrelevant. See Donovan, 676 F.2d at 471 (citing Brennan v. Partida, 492 F.2d 707, 709 (5th Cir.1974)). Likewise, merely labeling an individual as an employee or an independent contractor is not dispositive. See ...
To continue reading
Request your trial