Santelli v. Rahmatullah

• Citation: 966 N.E.2d 661
• Decision Date: 29 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 49A04–1011–CT–704.,49A04–1011–CT–704.
• Parties: Mary E. SANTELLI, as Administrator of the Estate of James F. Santelli, Appellant–Plaintiff, v. Abu M. RAHMATULLAH, individually, and d/b/a Super 8 Motel, Appellee–Defendant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

966 N.E.2d 661

Mary E. SANTELLI, as Administrator of the Estate of James F. Santelli, Appellant–Plaintiff,

v.Abu M. RAHMATULLAH, individually, and d/b/a Super 8 Motel, Appellee–Defendant.

No. 49A04–1011–CT–704.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

March 29, 2012.

James R. Fisher, Debra H. Miller, Miller & Fisher, LLC, Indianapolis, IN, Roger L. Pardieck, Karen M. Davis, Susan E. Boatright, The Pardieck Law Firm, Seymour, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Danford R. Due, Scott E. Andres, Due Doyle Fanning, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

William E. Winingham, John G. Shubat, Wilson Kehoe & Winingham LLC, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amicus, Indiana Trial Lawyers Association.

Julia B. Gelinas, Lucy R. Dollens, Frost Brown Todd LLC, Indianapolis, IN, Donald B. Kite, Sr., Gonzalez, Saggio & Harlan LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amicus, Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana.

FRIEDLANDER, Judge.

In this consolidated appeal, Mary Elizabeth Santelli, as the administrator of the Estate of James F. Santelli (the Estate), appeals from the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and order on the Estate's motion to correct error and motion for a new trial, as well as from certain rulings made during the jury trial. Abu Rahmatullah (Rahmatullah), individually and d/b/a Super 8 Motel, also appeals from the trial court's order. The following issues are presented for our review:

1. Can we address on appeal the merits of a motion to correct error that was deemed denied, but then belatedly granted?

2. Does Indiana's Comparative Fault Act (the Act)¹ abrogate the common law "very duty" doctrine?

3. Did the trial court err by allowing the jury to allocate fault to Santelli?

4. Did the trial court err by excluding evidence of a prior shootout with police at Rahmatullah's hotel?

We reverse and remand.²

On October 16 or 17, 2005, Santelli was murdered in the course of a robbery at a motel owned by Rahmatullah. Santelli was a paying guest of the motel, living there while working on a construction project. Joseph Pryor, who had previously been employed at the motel as a general maintenance man, obtained a master keycard to the motel during his brief employment there and kept the keycard after he walked off the job. Rahmatullah's manager at the motel did not perform a criminal background check on Pryor before hiring him. Pryor had an outstanding warrant for his arrest issued on September 21, 2005, for a probation violation. Somehow, Pryor gained entry to Santelli's room and murdered him. Pryor confessed to robbing and killing Santelli and was sentenced to 85 years in prison for those crimes.

On April 5, 2007, the Estate filed a complaint against Rahmatullah arguing that he had breached his duty of care to Santelli by hiring Pryor, giving Pryor a master keycard to the motel without running a criminal history check, and failing to provide proper security in the motel. Rahmatullah asserted a non-party defense, naming Pryor as a non-party defendant.

At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury calculated the Estate's damages to be $2,070,000.00. The jury allocated fault among the parties as follows: 1) One percent to Santelli; 2) two percent to Rahmatullah; and 3) ninety-seven percent to Pryor. Based upon the allocation of fault percentages, the jury entered a verdict in favor of the Estate in the amount of $41,400.00, or 2 percent of the $2,070,000.00 damages sustained by the beneficiary of the Estate.

The Estate filed a motion to correct error and request for a new trial arguing that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to allocate fault among Santelli, Rahmatullah, and Pryor, without also instructing the jury on the very duty doctrine. The hearing on the Estate's motion was held on September 27, 2010. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court asked the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions thereon and scheduled an October 25, 2010 deadline for filing them. That filing deadline was within thirty days of the hearing date, but left only two days for the trial court to issue its ruling on the motion within the time provided for by rule. See Ind. Trial Rule 53.3. At the conclusion of the hearing the following exchange took place:

THE COURT: If you would ... really to be honest with you, I think that a simple order like Mr. Due prepared probably is going to require findings of facts and conclusion because, regardless of the outcome, it's going to be appealed. And if I don't send findings of facts and conclusions, then the Court of Appeals will say that in the opinion that there aren't any and it's much more ... it's much easier for them to deal with it if there are findings of facts and conclusions.

MR. FISHER: May we submit some post-hearing, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I'll give you plenty of time to do it.

MR. DUE: In response to that, Your Honor, because of the way these issues have been raised and in your rulings throughout, I think that there's plenty of information in the record.

THE COURT: For me to comb through the record you mean?

MR. DUE: Well, no, no. No, no, no. I don't think that the Court of Appeals would require ...

THE COURT: Oh.

MR. DUE: ... findings or conclusions in a case like this.

* * *

THE COURT: ... So this is September the 27th. A couple of weeks do you think? Mr. Due, I know you have a very busy schedule.

MR. DUE: Yeah, that would be alright.

THE COURT: Alright. How about ... let's make it the 20th. Yeah. Let's make it the 20th of October because I have another jury starting tomorrow. I won't have time to look at it this week. I mean, even if I got them I wouldn't be able to do much with it. So that gives you plenty of time and give[s] me some time to review your findings of facts and conclusions once I get them. The 20th is a Wednesday. Is that not a good date for you Mr. Pardieck?

MR. PARDIECK: Your Honor, could that be moved out to the following Monday. We have a jury trial starting on the 17th of October.

THE COURT: Okay. The 25th?

MR. PARDIECK: The 25th?

THE COURT: The 25th of October?

MR. PARDIECK: Yes, the 25th. That would be appreciated.

THE COURT: That's fine with me. Alright. Then the findings of facts and conclusions are due on the 25th and then the order will be out just as soon as I can get to it after that.

Motion to Correct Error Hearing Transcript at 24–26. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions thereon, and the trial court issued its order on November 5, 2010. In its order, the trial court granted the Estate's motion in part, setting aside the jury verdict with respect to the allocation of fault. Specifically, the trial court found that the jury's allocation of non-party fault at 97%, in spite of Rahmatullah's negligent conduct, effectively eliminated Rahmatullah's duty to protect customers, and thus, was against the weight of the evidence. The motion to correct error was denied in all other respects.

The Estate filed its notice of appeal from the trial court's order on November 19, 2010, and Rahmatullah filed his notice of appeal on December 6, 2010. The Estate asserted in its notice of appeal that it was appealing from the jury verdict and from the trial court's deemed denial of the Estate's motion to correct error, and from the belated findings and ruling issued by the trial court on the motion to correct error on November 5, 2010. Rahmatullah asserted in his notice of appeal that he was appealing the trial court's belated order granting the Estate's motion to correct error in part, as it was untimely. Rahmatullah later filed a motion to consolidate both appeals, which was granted by this court.

The Indiana Trial Lawyers' Association and Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana were granted leave to file amicus briefs. We now consider this consolidated appeal and the motions filed in this matter.³

1.

Rahmatullah argues that the Estate's motion to correct error was deemed denied when the trial court failed to rule upon the motion within thirty days after the hearing on the motion. Rahmatullah contends that because the motion was deemed denied, the trial court's subsequent order ruling on the motion to correct error is void. By timely appealing that belated order and enforcing the deemed denial, the argument follows, the belated order granting the motion is voidable. Rahmatullah seeks to enforce the deemed denial.

T.R. 53.3 provides in pertinent part as follows:

(A) Time limitation for ruling on motion to correct error. In the event a court fails for forty-five (45) days to set a Motion to Correct Error for hearing, or fails to rule on a Motion to Correct Error within thirty (30) days after it was heard or forty-five (45) days after it was filed, if no hearing is required, the pending Motion to Correct Error shall be deemed denied. Any appeal shall be initiated by filing the notice of appeal under Appellate Rule 9(A) within thirty (30) days after the Motion to Correct Error is deemed denied.

(B) Exceptions. The time limitation for ruling on a motion to correct error established under Section (A) of this rule shall not apply where:

* * *

(2) The parties who have appeared or their counsel stipulate or agree on record that the time limitation for ruling set forth under Section (A) shall not apply; or

(3) The time limitation for ruling has been extended by Section (D) of this rule.

* * *

(D) Extension of time for ruling. The Judge before whom a Motion to Correct Error is pending may extend the time limitation for ruling for a period of no more than thirty (30) days by filing an entry in the cause advising all parties of the extension. Such entry must be in writing, must be noted in the Chronological Case Summary before the expiration of the initial time period for ruling set forth under Section (A), and must be served on all parties. Additional extension of time may be granted only upon application to the Supreme Court as set forth in Trial Rule 53.1(D).

T.R. 53.3(A) explicitly states that if the trial court fails to rule within thirty days of the hearing on the ...