Santiago Collazo v. Franqui Acosta

• Decision Date: 28 August 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 89-363 (JP).
• Citation: 721 F. Supp. 385
• Parties: Manuela SANTIAGO COLLAZO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Pedro FRANQUI ACOSTA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

721 F. Supp. 385

Manuela SANTIAGO COLLAZO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Pedro FRANQUI ACOSTA, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 89-363 (JP).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

August 28, 1989.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Francisco R. González, Hernández Sánchez Law Firm, Santurce, P.R., for plaintiffs.

José R. García Pérez, Federal Litigation Div., Dept. of Justice, San Juan, P.R., Rafael E. García Rodón, García Rodón, Correa Márquez & Valderas, Hato Rey, P.R., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, the Municipality of Vieques, Puerto Rico, and its mayor (in both her personal and official capacities) brought this action against various officials of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico alleging basically that:

It has been the policy of the Municipal Services Administration and its Administrator and Director of Federal Programs to give preference in assignment of funds under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 to members of the Popular Democratic Party and to discriminate against members of other political parties in violation of Plaintiffs Constitutional rights, laws and regulations. Plaintiff Manuela Santiago Collazo is a member of the New Progressive Party of Puerto Rico, and the Municipality of Vieques is administered by members of the New Progressive Party who won in the 1984 and 1988 municipal elections.

Complaint, paragraph 5.

Plaintiffs base their action on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (the HCDA), and the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution. They also allege pendent claims arising under the laws of Puerto Rico.

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds. They first summarily contend that § 1981 only applies to racial discrimination, that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the pendent claims, and that the complaint fails to allege any sort of claim against Puerto Rico's Secretary of Justice.

Defendants further contend that the HCDA does not grant plaintiffs a private cause of action enforceable under § 1983, that plaintiff lacks standing in her individual capacity, and that the Municipality of Vieques is not a "person" entitled to sue under § 1983.

Subsequent to the filing of the motion to dismiss, two motions to intervene as plaintiffs were filed (by the same attorneys who represent plaintiffs) on behalf of two low-income residents of Vieques who are "in great need of housing and or economic development" and on behalf of Mayor Santiago in her capacity as President of the New Progressive Party in the Municipality of Vieques. These were also opposed by defendants on the basis that both the original plaintiffs and the intervenors lack standing.

The Court will first address the threshold issue of standing, both of the plaintiffs and the proposed intervenors, and will then consider the other alleged grounds for dismissal.

I. Standing

The doctrine of standing to sue arises out of the requirement in Article III of the constitution for a "case or controversy" to underlie any assertion of federal court jurisdiction. Each plaintiff must allege a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). "A federal court's jurisdiction ... can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suffered `some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action.'" Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1148, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). The injury must be such that it "fairly can be traced to the challenged action," Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), and the injury must be of the kind "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Id. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc., v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 698 F.Supp. 401, 414-15 (D.P.R.1988).

At least three additional requirements for standing, while not constitutionally based, have been imposed by the Supreme Court. First, "generalized grievances" shared by substantially the whole population do not normally warrant the exercise of jurisdiction. Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217-28, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2930-35, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1955, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. at 2205. Second, even when an injury sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement is alleged, the Court has held that "the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. at 2205. "Finally, the Court has required that the plaintiff's complaint fall within `the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.'" Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475, 102 S.Ct. at 760, quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 830, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970).

As stated in Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206; "one further preliminary matter requires discussion. For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, the Court must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party." Moreover, "standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal." Id. at 500, 95 S.Ct. at 2206.

With this framework in mind, we proceed to consider each plaintiff and proposed intervenor.

A. Municipality of Vieques

The complaint in this case alleges that, between program years 1985-88, the Municipality of Vieques, under a New Progressive Party (NPP) administration, has received less money under the HCDA than other comparable municipalities administered by the Popular Democratic Party (PDP). This alleged economic loss clearly constitutes a "threatened or actual injury." "These palpable economic injuries have long been recognized as sufficient to lay the basis for standing." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1365, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). Discrimination on the basis of the political affiliation of the municipal administration, within the "zone of interests" protected by the first amendment, is alleged as the cause of the injury, thus making it "fairly" traceable to the challenged action. This Court could enjoin future discrimination, should it be proper, which would provide plaintiff a remedy. Moreover, the municipality requests a money judgment against defendants in their personal capacities for the past harm caused by their alleged actions. For this, standing is clear. Therefore, the municipality (and Mayor Santiago in her official capacity, who represents it) has standing to litigate its claims.

B. Santiago in her personal capacity

One oft-stated requirement of standing is that the plaintiff personally suffer the alleged harm or threatened harm. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99, 95 S.Ct. at 2204-05. Santiago alleges in her complaint that she personally has been the target of defendants' political discrimination, satisfying the "own legal rights and interests" strand of the analysis, but nowhere does she allege that this discrimination has harmed her personally. She states that it has affected her ability to perform her duties as mayor, but this relates to her official capacity. She has not alleged that defendants' actions have affected her ability to retain the position of mayor, her salary in that position, or any other aspect of the job which can be considered personal. Nor does she allege that the housing and development aid would benefit her personally. All that she alleges personally is mental and moral sufferings which she values in the complaint at only $1.00. This de minimis claim of moral indignation is insufficient to confer standing. The complaint "fails to identify any personal injury suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of the alleged ... error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III ..." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485, 102 S.Ct. at 765. See Quiles v. Hernández Colón, 682 F.Supp. 127, 129 (D.P.R.1988).

C. Martinez and Garcia

Proposed intervenors Maritza Martinez Solis and Nilsa Garcia Franco are low-income residents of Vieques who contend that they:

are in great need of housing and or economic development, and have been deprived of a reasonable and equitable amount of money from Title I HUD Federal Funds discriminatorily distributed by Defendants, because their Mayor is a member of the New Progressive Party.

Motion to Intervene at 1-2.

Martinez and Garcia have sufficiently alleged injury to themselves (the lack of adequate housing opportunities) resulting from defendants' actions of discriminatorily distributing federal housing funds. While it is not a certainty, these proposed intervenors' chances of obtaining housing assistance would increase if Vieques were provided increased funds. This sufficiently satisfies the "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision" prong of the constitutional standing test. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2743 n. 14, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261, 97 S.Ct. 555, 561, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366-68, 100 S.Ct. 2232, 2240-41, 65 L.Ed.2d 184 (1980).

Moreover, these individuals do not allege a "general grievance" — they allege that they, as low-income residents of...