Santiago-Espinosa v. Wellpath Med.

Decision Date26 July 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 22-2677
PartiesPEDRO SANTIAGO-ESPINOSA v. WELLPATH MEDICAL, CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, P.A. JOE WALSH, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
MEMORANDUM

KEARNEY, J.

An incarcerated man pro se sues a physician assistant and allegedly Commonwealth-affiliated entities for violating his Constitutional rights through inadequate medical treatment of his injured wrist. The man does not plead the physician assistant's personal involvement in violating his rights. He also does not plead the Commonwealth entities promulgated a policy or custom causing violations of his rights. And he pleads non-existent claims for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution. We dismiss the incarcerated man's claims under the Constitution without prejudice to timely file an amended Complaint alleging an individual's personal involvement and the entities' policy or custom regarding his medical treatment. We dismiss the incarcerated man's damages claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution with prejudice.

I. Alleged pro se facts

Pedro Santiago-Espinosa claims he needed a wrist splint to mend his injured right wrist while the Department of Corrections held him at State Correctional Institution Camp Hill (SCI Camp Hill).[1] Mr. Santiago-Espinosa asked unnamed nurses at SCI Camp Hill for the splint “nearly every day.”[2] He also asked the prison's medical department for the wrist splint.[3] Mr. Santiago-Espinosa never received a splint at SCI Camp Hill despite unnamed employees informing him he would receive one.[4] The Department of Corrections later transferred Mr. Santiago-Espinosa to State Correctional Institution Phoenix (SCI Phoenix) in this District.[5] He told an unnamed intake nurse about his need for a wrist splint.[6] She apparently did not provide him a splint and “could not explain why it was taking so long to receive said splint.”[7] Mr. Santiago-Espinosa finally received the splint after eight months of requesting one.[8] X-rays later revealed Mr. Santiago-Espinosa suffered two breaks in his wrist bone.[9] Mr. Santiago-Espinosa claims he needed a screw in his wrist to fix the breaks.[10] He claims he suffers daily pain, difficulty sleeping, and loss of movement in his wrist.[11]

Mr. Santiago-Espinosa pro se sues Physician Assistant Joe Walsh in his individual capacity and Wellpath Medical, Correct Care Solutions, and the Department of Corrections in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[12] Mr. Santiago-Espinosa claims violations of the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.[13] He also claims violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution.[14] He seeks $850,000 in damages.[15]

II. Analysis

Congress requires us to screen Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.[16]Congress in section 1915A requires we “shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”[17] We must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”[18]

We apply the same standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to determine whether a complaint fails to state a claim under section 1915A(b)(1).[19] Our Court of Appeals directs us to be “mindful of our ‘obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings'. . . particularly where the pro se litigant is imprisoned.”[20] We must “remain flexible” and “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.”[21] But pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim” and “cannot flout procedural rules-they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.”[22]

We dismiss Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's Eighth Amendment claim against Mr. Walsh without prejudice because Mr. Santiago-Espinosa does not plead Mr. Walsh's personal involvement in causing his harms. We dismiss Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's Eighth Amendment claims against Wellpath Medical, Correct Care Solutions, and the Department of Corrections without prejudice because he does not plead the entities acted under or promulgated a Commonwealth policy which violated his constitutional rights. We dismiss Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's damages claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution with prejudice because no cause of action for damages exists under the Pennsylvania Constitution.

A. We dismiss Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's claim under the Eighth Amendment against Mr. Walsh without prejudice.

Mr. Santiago-Espinosa claims Mr. Walsh violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Mr. Santiago-Espinosa does not explain his claim under the Eighth Amendment. We construe Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's claim liberally as pleading a claim for denial of adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment.[23] To establish a claim for denial of adequate medical care, Mr. Santiago-Espinosa must plead (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.”[24]

Mr. Santiago-Espinosa must plead Mr. Walsh “personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation or approved of it.”[25] “Personal involvement can be shown through proof of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence.”[26] Mr. Walsh cannot be held liable through respondent superior; Mr. Walsh must have “both contemporaneous knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing and direct supervisory authority over the subordinate actor.”[27] “Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence . . . must be made with appropriate particularity.”[28]

We dismiss Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's Eighth Amendment claim against Mr. Walsh because he does not plead Mr. Walsh's personal involvement. Mr. Santiago-Espinosa pleads only one sentence involving Mr. Walsh: “The [Department of Corrections, Wellpath, Correct Care Solutions], and P.A. Joe Walsh are equally responsible for the failure to treat[] and care for [my wrist].”[29] Mr. Santiago-Espinosa does not plead how Mr. Walsh personally acted to deny Mr. Santiago-Espinosa a wrist splint. Nor does he plead Mr. Walsh's “contemporaneous knowledge” of a subordinate's denial of Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's medical care. Mr. Santiago-Espinosa simply pleads Mr. Walsh is “responsible for” his failure to obtain a wrist splint. A bare pleading a prison official is “responsib[le] for” harms “is irrelevant” unless the plaintiff pleads facts showing why and how the prison official is responsible.[30] Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's allegations do not establish Mr. Walsh's personal involvement.[31] We dismiss Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's Eighth Amendment claim against Mr. Walsh without prejudice to Mr. Santiago-Espinosa pleading facts showing Mr. Walsh's personal involvement.

B. We dismiss Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's claim under the Eighth Amendment against Wellpath Medical, Correct Care Solutions, and the Department of Corrections without prejudice.

Mr. Santiago-Espinosa sues Wellpath Medical, Correct Care Solutions, and the Department of Corrections in their official capacities.[32] We liberally construe Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's claim against these entities as a claim for municipal liability against the Commonwealth under Monell v. Department of Social Services.[33]

The Commonwealth under Monell is liable for the constitutional violations of its employees if the employees acted under “a municipal policy or custom that resulted in [the] alleged constitutional violations.”[34] A plaintiff bringing a Monell claim must: (1) identify a policy or custom that deprived him of a federally protected right, (2) demonstrate that the municipality, by its deliberate conduct, acted as the moving force behind the alleged deprivation, and (3) establish a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the plaintiff's injury.”[35] A policy “is a statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by a government body's officers.”[36] A custom comprises “practices of state officials [which are] so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.”[37]

We dismiss Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's Monell claim against Wellpath Medical, Correct Care, and the Department of Corrections because he does not plead a policy or custom causing violations of his constitutional rights. Mr. Santiago-Espinosa pleads no facts establishing Wellpath Medical, Correct Care Solutions, or the Department of Corrections implemented any policy or custom causing the delay in his obtaining a wrist splint. He simply pleads unnamed prison officials told him he would receive a wrist splint but delayed giving him the wrist splint for eight months. We cannot infer a policy or custom caused this delay. Mr. Santiago-Espinosa must “identify a policy or custom” causing this delay and must plead how the delay violates his Eighth Amendment rights. We dismiss Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's claim against Wellpath Medical, Correct Care, and the Department of Corrections without prejudice to Mr. Santiago-Espinosa pleading facts showing a policy or custom causing violations of his constitutional rights.

C. We dismiss Mr. Santiago-Espinosa's damages claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution.

Mr Santiago-Espinosa also appears to bring damages claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution.[38] Such claims are unavailable. “No Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages under...

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