Santiago v. City of Chi., Case No. 19 C 4652
| Decision Date | 18 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19 C 4652 |
| Citation | 446 F.Supp.3d 348 |
| Parties | Andrea SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Jacie C. Zolna, Myron Milton Cherry, Benjamin Rodgers Swetland, Jeremiah Nixon, Myron Cherry and Associates LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Jennifer Zlotow, Peter Hardt Cavanaugh, City of Chicago Department of Law, Justin Tresnowski, Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
The case involves the City of Chicago's towing and impoundment of vehicles it deems to be abandoned and the City's disposal of impounded vehicles that remain unclaimed by their owners. Andrea Santiago sued the City on behalf of herself and two proposed classes. She asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages for alleged constitutional violations, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, and claims under state law. The City has moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss Santiago's claims.
In considering Santiago's motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the facts in the complaint as true, see O'Boyle v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc. , 910 F.3d 338, 342 (7th Cir. 2018), and takes judicial notice of city ordinances, see Newcomb v. Brennan , 558 F.2d 825, 829 (7th Cir. 1977).
Santiago is a senior citizen who uses a wheelchair. Starting around 2006, she owned a van (a 1998 GMC Savana 1500) with special equipment that enabled her to enter and exit it in her wheelchair. The van was her primary mode of transportation. She regularly parked it on a public street near her home because her garage did not have enough space for her to get in and out of the van while in her wheelchair.
On or around June 5, 2018, a City employee placed a sticker on the van's window stating that the van was considered abandoned and would be towed if it was not moved within seven days. At that time, the van was legally parked on a public street near Santiago's home, as usual, and it had disability license plates and a valid City sticker. The City never sent Santiago a notice by mail warning her that the van might be towed.
A few days later, according to a claim Santiago later submitted to the City, one or more of Santiago's family members saw the sticker, removed it, and moved the van to a different location on the same street.1 According to Santiago's claim, her daughter then placed three pieces of paper in the van's windows providing her contact information and stating that the van belonged to a disabled senior citizen and was not abandoned.
On June 13, 2018, the City's towing vendor, United Road Towing, towed and impounded Santiago's van. On or around June 15, 2018, the City mailed Santiago a "notice of vehicle impoundment." Compl., dkt. 1-1, ¶ 20.
A few days later, Santiago's daughter saw that the van was missing. According to Santiago's claim filed with the City, her daughter called the City and the police. The City did not provide her with any information, and the police told her that the van had not been reported as towed. Eventually, however, the City informed Santiago's daughter that the van had been towed. At some point (it is not clear when), Santiago's daughter tried to retrieve the van from the impound lot. According to the claim Santiago submitted to the City, someone (it is not clear who) told her daughter that she needed a notarized letter to retrieve the van because she was not its registered owner. Meanwhile, the City assessed Santiago fees for the costs of the van's towing and storage. Santiago does not allege that she ever paid those fees.
Santiago stated in her claim that when her daughter obtained a notarized letter, she was told (again, it is not clear by whom) that the letter was unacceptable and, instead, she needed to complete (and, apparently, get notarized) a particular form, which she had not been provided on her first visit to the impound lot. Santiago's daughter also was told (it is not clear by whom) that the City had disposed of the van. The City sold the van to United Road Towing who, in turn, sold it to a salvage yard where it was stripped and crushed.
Santiago received none of the proceeds from the van's sale or resale. The only notice the City mailed Santiago was the aforementioned "notice of vehicle impoundment." Id. ¶ 20. The City never mailed her an additional notice regarding the impending disposal of her van.
In October 2018, Santiago filed a claim with the City seeking compensation for her vehicle and the wheelchair lift equipment installed in it. The City denied the claim in May 2019.
Since the City's towing and disposal of her van, Santiago has obtained a replacement vehicle. She continues to park it on her street in the same manner as her previous van. The complaint states that Santiago "fears that the City will again tow, impound, and dispose of her vehicle without notice." Id. ¶ 21.
Santiago alleges that the towing and disposal of her vehicle is "not an isolated incident" but rather is the City's "standard operating procedure." Id. ¶ 23. Citing an investigation by Chicago's local National Public Radio affiliate, her complaint states that "the City towed 93,857 vehicles in 2017 alone, of which 32,155 remain unclaimed" and that, in 2017, the City sold "just under 24,000 [unclaimed] vehicles" to third parties, including to United Road Towing. Id. ¶ 4. Santiago alleges that, "as a matter of practice," the City does not "provide notice" to owners of vehicles it has designated as abandoned before towing their vehicles. Id. ¶ 23. She also alleges that, "as a matter of practice," the City sends only one notice to owners whose impounded vehicles may be disposed, which she contends is contrary to the requirements of city ordinances, which the Court will describe momentarily. Id.
In Illinois and in the City, it is unlawful for a person to abandon a vehicle on public property. 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-201(b) ; Chi. Mun. Code § 9-80-110(a). In the City, a vehicle is deemed abandoned if it is in a "state of disrepair" that makes it "incapable of being driven in its present condition"; "has not been moved or used for more than seven consecutive days and is apparently deserted"; or "has been left on the public way without state registration plates or a temporary state registration placard for two or more days." Id. If a vehicle has been abandoned, police officers and employees of the City's Department of Streets and Sanitation may "issue a notice of parking violation" and authorize the towing and impoundment of the vehicle. Id. § 9-92-030. Neither the state statute nor the city ordinance states how long the City must wait before towing an abandoned vehicle from the public way or whether it must provide the owner with notice before towing it. See 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-201(b) ; Chi. Mun. Code §§ 9-92-030, 9-80-110(a).2
Within ten days after a vehicle has been impounded, the City's Departments of Police or Streets and Sanitation must ascertain, if possible, the owner's name and must send him or her a notice of impoundment. Id. § 9-92-070(a). Unless the owner is personally served with the notice, the notice must be sent by certified mail if the vehicle is registered with the Secretary of State; if the vehicle is not registered, the notice must be sent to the most recent registered owner by first class mail. Id.
Illinois law permits municipalities to dispose of abandoned vehicles that remain unclaimed by their owners. See 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/4-208 (); id. 5/4-209 (disposal of unclaimed vehicles more than seven years of age and disposal of abandoned or unclaimed vehicles without notice). The Illinois Vehicle Code provides that cities with populations greater than 500,000—in other words, Chicago—may dispose of abandoned vehicles that remain unclaimed for more than eighteen days after the provision of an initial notice if vehicle's possessor has sent an additional notice by first class mail to the vehicle's registered owner, lienholder, or legally entitled person. Id. 5/4-208(a). Further, abandoned vehicles that are older than seven years must be kept for at least ten days to determine "the identity of the registered owner, lienholder, or other legally entitled persons" and contact him or her by mail, public service, or in person. Id. 5/4-209(b). After that ten-day period, if the possessor of the vehicle has not received "disposition information" from the registered owner, lienholder, or legally entitled person, the "law enforcement agency having jurisdiction will authorize the disposal of the vehicle as junk or salvage." Id.
The relevant Chicago ordinance provides that whenever an abandoned vehicle "remains unclaimed ... for a period of 18 days after notice has been given," the Superintendent of Police or Commissioner of Streets and Sanitation shall authorize its "disposal or other disposition," so long as, "during that 18-day period," the Department of Police or the Department of Streets and Sanitation has "sent an additional notice by first class mail to the registered owner, lienholder, or other legally entitled person." Chi. Mun. Code § 9-92-100(a). The ordinance also states that the registered owner of an abandoned vehicle may request one fifteen-day extension before the vehicle's disposal. Id. The ordinance does not expressly provide for different procedures for vehicles that are seven or more years old as compared to for newer vehicles. See id.
In June 2019, Santiago filed this lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois on behalf of herself and two putative classes. The first proposed class is composed of all individuals and entities who have had vehicles towed by the City due to its identification of the vehicles as abandoned (the Tow Class). The second is composed of individuals and entities who have had vehicles disposed of by the City after being towed by or through its Department...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Davis v. City of Chi.
...temporal bounds, as Santiago contends; the Court did not mention the word ‘property’ once in its decision." Santiago v. City of Chi., 446 F.Supp.3d 348, 363 (N.D. Ill. 2020). Therefore the Santiago plaintiff could not "invoke the Fourth Amendment to challenge the City's procedures for dispo......
-
Santiago v. City of Chicago
...to an individual's interest in retaining her property and cannot be invoked by the dispossessed owner to regain her property. Santiago, 446 F.Supp.3d at 363. Santiago makes no new arguments against dismissal of claim and states that she merely realleges the claims to preserve them for furth......