Santiago v. Kerestes

• Decision Date: 07 August 2013
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 1:CV-11-1319
• Parties: WILLIAM SANTIAGO, Petitioner v. JOHN KERESTES, et al., Respondents
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

WILLIAM SANTIAGO, Petitioner

v.JOHN KERESTES, et al., Respondents

CIVIL NO. 1:CV-11-1319

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date: August 7, 2013

(Judge Caldwell)

MEMORANDUM

I. Introduction

William Santiago, currently confined at SCI-Greene, Waynesburg, Pennsylvania, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition challenges Santiago's 2005 conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania, for the first-degree murder of William Barnes. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison. Named as respondents are John Kerestes, the superintendent at SCI-Mahanoy, Frackville, Pennsylvania, where Santiago was incarcerated at the time he filed his petition, and the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

The petition makes the following claims of trial-counsel ineffectiveness: (a) counsel promised the jury they could see newspaper articles containing facts about the case that could have been used by inmate witnesses who testified against Petitioner but failed to insure that the articles were sent out with the jury during their deliberations; (b) he failed to object to an erroneous jury instruction that told the jury they should not viewthe testimony of an accomplice with disfavor because it comes from a corrupt or polluted source; (c) he failed to object to the trial court's erroneous explanation of transactional immunity given to a prosecution witness; and (d) he failed to object to the trial court's erroneous colloquy with Petitioner concerning his Fifth Amendment right not to testify which led Petitioner not to testify when he would have if given proper advice. Second, the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion to suppress evidence seized from his house. Third, the trial court violated due process in allowing Shannon Ritter and Shanika Simms to testify as the prosecution disclosed Ritter only on the eve of trial and Simms was not disclosed until after trial had begun.

II. Standard of Review

We can only grant relief for violations of federal law, not state law. Swarthout v. Cooke, _ U.S. _, _, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011). And our habeas review of the state courts' resolution of Petitioner's claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2). Under subsection (d)(1), we may grant the writ if the state courts' adjudication of the claims was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent or an unreasonable application of that precedent. A state court judgment is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent when it is "diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed" to "clearly established" decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). "A state-court decision will also be contrary to" Supreme Court "precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishablefrom a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the] precedent." Id. at 406, 120 S.Ct. 1519-20.

"[A] state court ruling is considered an 'unreasonable application' if the state court unreasonably applies the correct legal rule to the particular facts, unreasonably extends a legal principle to a new context, or unreasonably refuses to extend the principle to a new context where it should apply." McMullin v. Tennis, 562 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2009)(cited cases omitted). "The unreasonable application test is an objective one - a federal court may not grant habeas relief merely because it concludes that the state court applied federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2005)(cited cases omitted). If "'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision," habeas relief cannot be granted. Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, _, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)(quoted case omitted).

Under subsection (d)(2), we may grant the writ if the state courts' adjudication of the claims "resulted in a decision that was based on a unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). "A state court decision is based on 'an unreasonable determination of the facts' only if the state court's factual findings are 'objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.'" Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 846 (3d Cir. 2013)(quoted case omitted), petition for cert filed, No. 13-45 (U.S. July 8, 2013). State-court fact finding "is presumedto be correct." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The petitioner has "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." Id.

III. Discussion

A. Claims of Trial Counsel Ineffectiveness

1. Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective in Failing to Send Newspaper Articles Out With the Jury

Petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective when he broke a promise he made to the jury in his opening statement that they could see newspaper articles containing facts about the case. The articles were relevant to the defense strategy that the jailhouse informants who testified against Petitioner could have obtained their information from the articles.¹ Petitioner argues that his lawyer's ineffectiveness was shown when the jury asked to see the articles but were told they could not because defense counsel had agreed that they not be sent out with the jury.

We provide some factual background. In his opening, trial counsel said that the jailhouse informants could not be believed and that they obtained their information about the case from the newspapers:

The primary witnesses in this case are in jail or in trouble. You'll hear, we'll show you a blow up that the Dispatch and the Daily record covered this case, the local newspapers, and that the inmates at YCP [York County prison], have access to it. You'll hear that. And they all are attuned. They are tunedin. They want to know what's going on. Why? Because they want to get their rear ends out of jail. You'll hear that.

. . . .

The gist of it is they all - all the snitches have the general story. And I'll show you a blow up of where they got it. They got it from the newspaper. That's what you'll hear.

(Doc. 24-2, ECF pp. 153, 154).

Trial counsel followed up on this point when cross-examining Shannon Ritter. Ritter admitted that newspapers were available at the prison. (Doc. 24-3, ECF p. 136). Fred Goff admitted he had used information he had found in the newspaper. (Doc. 24-3, ECF p. 72).

In his closing, counsel also referred to the newspaper articles:

So Mr. Goff is starting to mix up the facts. You'll see, assuming you take this back, the local newspapers published pictures and details right after this, two articles, okay? You'll hopefully get to see these things. These things include - these articles include the probable cause affidavit that I had the detective put in yesterday. The probable cause affidavit is what summarizes the arrest.

And, remember, I took a lot of time going through all these jailhouse snitches to say you guys have access to newspapers.

. . . .

The bottom line is nothing that these people said, nothing, could not have been read from the newspaper or heard on TV, nothing, including Freddie Goff.

(Doc. 24-3, ECF pp. 173-74).

Defense counsel introduced two newspaper articles into evidence (Doc. 24-3, ECF pp. 166, 167; Doc. 24-4, ECF pp. 4-9, newspaper articles), but declined to have them go out with the jury. He stated he was "fine with them not going back, the two articles, because it talks about the mothers' clash in court and some other things that aren't relevant." (Doc. 24-3, ECF p. 215).

During their deliberations, the jury requested the articles. The court denied that request, noting, in part, that the articles were offered "not to show the content, but to say that newspapers are available at the jail and information about this case was in them." (Doc. 24-3, ECF p. 219).

At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified about his strategy concerning the newspaper articles.² He acknowledged he said in his opening that he would use the articles to show the informants had access to information about the case. (Doc. 24-5, ECF p. 122). He also said that access to the newspapers was one of the defense theories about "how a lot of these snitches knew anything about the case," and that he brought the articles out on cross-examination. (Id., ECF p. 123).

In its PCRA opinion, the superior court rejected the claim that counsel was ineffective in not sending the articles out with the jury. First, the court agreed with the trial court that counsel had a valid reason for not doing so because the articles contained prejudicial information, for example, that Petitioner was in jail on an unrelated charge.(Doc. 24-6, ECF p. 78, Commonwealth v. Santiago, No. 1346 MDA 2009 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2010). Second, trial counsel's strategy, as revealed in the PCRA hearing, was to elicit the jailhouse informants' access to the articles on cross-examination. (Id.). Taking these two considerations together, trial counsel had a reasonable basis for not giving the jury an opportunity to see the articles during their deliberations. (Id.).

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Strickland sets forth a two-prong test to establish ineffectiveness. First, counsel's performance must be deficient. Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 102 (3d Cir. 2005)(citing Strickland). Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the defense. Id. (quoting Strickland). A petitioner must "show 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Id. at 105 (quoting Strickland).

We cannot say that the superior court's ruling was contrary to...