Santiago v. Lane, 85 C 5087.

• Decision Date: 26 August 1988
• Docket Number: No. 85 C 5087.,85 C 5087.
• Citation: 697 F. Supp. 300
• Parties: Jose SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. Michael P. LANE, Michael O'Leary, Billy Johnson, James Thieret, and Richard Guebert, Jr., as administrator of the Estate of Donald McDonough, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

697 F. Supp. 300

Jose SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. Michael P. LANE, Michael O'Leary, Billy Johnson, James Thieret, and Richard Guebert, Jr., as administrator of the Estate of Donald McDonough, Defendants.

No. 85 C 5087.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

August 26, 1988.

Edward Lewis, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Thomas A. Morrissey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gen. Law Div., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

NORDBERG, Judge.

I. Introduction

On March 22, 1984, prison inmate Jose Santiago was stabbed and robbed by two other prison inmates at the Stateville Correctional Center (Stateville). He agreed to participate in the prosecution of the inmates who stabbed and robbed him, and, on April 11, Stateville officials transferred him to the Menard Correctional Center (Menard) for his safety. On April 18, the first day plaintiff was put into Menard's general prison population, he was stabbed in his unlocked cell by other prison inmates.

On May 24, 1985, plaintiff filed this action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants' failure to protect him at Stateville and at Menard amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. On September 4, 1987, the court appointed counsel for plaintiff. Represented by court-appointed counsel, plaintiff then filed a seven-count amended complaint. In various counts, plaintiff sues prison officials and employees in their official and individual capacities.¹ He sues Michael P. Lane, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections; Michael O'Leary, warden of Stateville; Billy Johnson, Chief of Security (Major) at Stateville; James Thieret, warden of Menard; and Richard Guebert, Jr.² All defendants have now moved for summary judgment on all counts pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 56. For the reasons discussed, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and rules that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

II. Summary Judgment

The purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether a trial will be necessary —"whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Although the moving party has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, he may discharge this burden by "`showing'—that is, pointing out to the District Court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see id. at 2553 ("A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on files, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."); see also Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987) (recent Supreme Court cases favor more liberal granting of summary judgment motions).

Once the moving party sufficiently has demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue, the opposing party must set forth specific facts in affidavits or otherwise show there are disputed material facts that must be decided at trial. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983). If the nonmoving party has the burden of proof in the case, the evidence he or she presents in opposing the motion for summary judgment must be sufficient to meet that burden. Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 1512 (standard for granting summary judgment same as that for granting directed verdict; court therefore must ask "`whether there is evidence upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.'") (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448, L.Ed.2d 867 (1872)).

Because the defendants brought this summary judgment motion, the Court must examine the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Bowyer v. United States Dept. of Air Force, 804 F.2d 428, 430 (7th Cir.1986).

III. Facts

On March 22, 1984 at Stateville, a supervisor at the commissary was escorting plaintiff back to his cell from the commissary. Troeung Dep. at 73. On the way, two inmates attacked, stabbed and robbed plaintiff of a gold chain necklace. Plaintiff required hospitalization for multiple stab wounds to his head and chest. Compl., Ex. A. On April 11, 1984, as a consequence of plaintiff's cooperation with the authorities in identifying his attackers and participating in their prosecution, plaintiff was transferred to Menard for his safety.

Plaintiff spent the first seven days at Menard in an Orientation Unit so that prison officials could determine his security needs. During this period, Warden Thieret determined that Santiago "may require protective custody" during his stay at Menard. Thieret Dep. Ex. 1; Reception Classification Transfer Gallery Report. However, Santiago never requested and therefore was not given protective custody. On April 18, 1984, after seven days in the Orientation Unit, plaintiff was moved to East Cell House, cell 816. East Cell House, cell 816, is in Menard's general population. McDonough Dep., at 22. Within hours of his placement, two unidentified inmates threatened Santiago and unknown persons stole personal property from his cell.

Plaintiff quickly informed the Chief of Security at Menard, Major McDonough, of these threats and of his fears for his safety. Santiago Dep. at 176. Again, however, Santiago did not request protective custody. Major McDonough talked with plaintiff for approximately 45 minutes about the threats and his fears for his safety. Santiago Dep. at 177. McDonough then escorted Santiago back to his cell. Santiago Dep. at 182. On the way to the cell, McDonough discussed the plaintiff's safety with a known Latin King gang leader in East Cell House and asked the gang leader if the Latin Kings had a "problem" with Santiago. McDonough Dep. at 87. The gang leader said "no Latin King was going to hurt him. He's got no problem with us." McDonough Dep. at 86. Shortly after the Major left plaintiff in his cell, the inmates were called to evening meal. Santiago told his cellmate that he was not going to evening meal, and he asked his cellmate to close the cell door behind him. Santiago did not lock his cell door. He claims that, seconds later, several inmates attacked him in his cell with homemade knives and pipes. The attack resulted in serious injuries, including an eye injury which permanently impaired Santiago's vision.

IV. Analysis

Santiago contends that defendants inflicted cruel and unusual punishment on him by failing to protect him. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that failure to protect a prison inmate from attacks by other inmates can constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392 (7th Cir.1988); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987); Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335 (7th Cir.1985). However, a negligent failure to prevent such attacks does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) ("An express intent to inflict unnecessary pain is not required.... To be cruel and unusual punishment, however, conduct ... must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety.... It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause....").

The Seventh Circuit has therefore required prison inmates to show that defendant prison officials, guards, and other prison employees acted with "deliberate indifference" to the inmate's need for protection. Exactly what amounts to "deliberate indifference" is not perfectly settled. Compare Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir.1985) (criminal recklessness), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986) with Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339-40 (7th Cir.1985) (gross negligence); see, e.g., Richardson, 839 F.2d at 394-95 (citing both Duckworth and Benson, and applying Benson's gross negligence standard).

There is considerable doubt whether Benson's gross negligence standard should apply. Duckworth fully explains why gross negligence is not enough to constitute punishment (let alone cruel and unusual punishment), 780 F.2d at 652-53, and the Supreme Court has approvingly cited to Duckworth for its criminal recklessness standard.³ Whitley, 106 S.Ct. at 1085; see Childers v. Lane, No. 85 C 7770 (N.D.Ill. May 2, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file) (discussing Whitley and Duckworth). Nevertheless, because the Seventh Circuit has most recently applied the Benson gross negligence standard, Richardson, 839 F.2d at 395, and because this Court finds that the decision on defendants' motion will not be affected by the difference between the standards, the Court will apply the Benson gross negligence standard to the facts in this case.

The Seventh Circuit explained the Benson gross negligence standard as follows:

It has long been established ... that negligence,

...