Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:19-cv-32 |
| Parties | REBECA SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. MEYER TOOL, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Litkovitz, M.J.
Plaintiff Rebeca Santiago brings this action against defendant Meyer Tool Inc., alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) ("EPA"), and the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("FMLA"), as well as various state law statutes. This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff's Title VII gender discrimination claim (Count 1) and wrongful termination in violation of Ohio public policy claim (Count 6) (Doc. 14), plaintiff's response in opposition (Doc. 15), defendant's reply memorandum (Doc. 17), and plaintiff's sur-reply (Doc. 23).
Plaintiff began working as a machine operator for Meyer Tool in or about 1997. (Complaint, Doc. 1 at ¶ 7). Plaintiff alleges that as a result of her gender, she was assigned less-desirable shifts and assignments than her male counterparts, worked through lunch, was blamed for other workers' errors, and received lower pay not reflective of her seniority. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-11). Plaintiff also alleges that her male supervisor, Edwin Finn, made her the subject of sexual jokes and made unwanted sexual advances towards her for years. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 17). In 2016, plaintiff alleges that she was denied a raise by Finn, yet other workers who completed the same or substantially similar work received a raise. (Id. at ¶ 13).
Plaintiff also alleges that she has HIV/AIDS. (Id. at ¶ 14). During her tenure with Meyer, she was approved to take intermittent disability leave under the FMLA. (Id. at ¶ 15). In July 2014, plaintiff's doctor completed a medical certification form documenting plaintiff's severe headaches/migraines. (Id. at ¶ 16). On July 20, 2017, Finn informed plaintiff that she was fired for producing non-conforming parts. (Id. at ¶ 19). Plaintiff alleges that other employees who produced non-conforming parts were not terminated and that the majority of machine operators at Meyer are white males. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21).
Plaintiff subsequently filed two charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). On October 31, 2017, plaintiff filed a charge alleging discrimination based on disability. (Id. at ¶ 22, Doc. 13-21). On July 13, 2018, plaintiff filed a second charge alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title VII and the EPA. (Id. at ¶ 23, Doc. 13-3).
On October 23, 2017, one week and one day before filing the first charge, plaintiff submitted an EEOC inquiry questionnaire. (Doc. 15-1 at 1-4). On this form, in response to the question, "Why do you think you were discriminated against?," plaintiff checked the box for "Disability." (Id. at 2). In response to the question, "Who was treated better than you?," plaintiff wrote that "Ruth Clark and many more" were treated better than her because they"deviated dozens of parts and still work there after many years." (Id. at 3). When asked to indicate how these people were different from her, plaintiff checked boxes for "age," "color," "disability," "national origin," "race," and "sex." (Id.). Plaintiff also indicated on the questionnaire that Finn was responsible for the discriminatory action. (Id.).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings made pursuant to Rule 12(c) is governed by the same standards applicable to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 437 n.5 (6th Cir. 2007) (). "For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
To withstand a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, "a complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some viable legal theory." Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). "The factual allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead 'sufficient factual matter' to render the legal claim plausible, i.e., more than merely possible." Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009)). A "legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation" need not be accepted as true, nor are recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc.,579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Defendant argues that plaintiff failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies on her Count 1 gender discrimination claim. (Doc. 14 at 3-5). Defendant argues that while plaintiff's first EEOC charge was filed within 300 days of her termination and is therefore timely, it fails to mention gender discrimination and fails to put the EEOC on notice that plaintiff perceived herself to be a victim of gender discrimination. (Id. at 4-5). Defendant asserts that plaintiff's second EEOC charge, which mentions gender discrimination, was not filed within 300 days of her termination and is therefore untimely. (Doc. 14 at 3-5).
In response, plaintiff argues that her EEOC Intake Questionnaire, filed on October 23, 2017, and her first charge of discrimination, filed on October 31, 2017, should be construed together as one timely charge of gender discrimination. (Doc. 15 at 6-7) (citing Woods v. FacilitySource LLC, No. 2:13-cv-621, 2015 WL 247980, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 20, 2015), aff'd, 640 F. App'x 478 (6th Cir. 2016); Dimas v. Michigan Dep't of Civil Rights, No. 4:02-cv-178, 2004 WL 1397558, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2004); Nadel v. Time Warner Cable LLC, No. 1:15-cv-447, 2016 WL 5478511, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2016) (Litkovitz, M.J)). Plaintiff argues that the answers contained in her EEOC questionnaire, coupled with the timely charge filed one week and one day later, are sufficient to give the EEOC notice of her gender discrimination claim. (Id. at 8).
In reply, defendant maintains that plaintiff's first EEOC charge and intake questionnaire, even if taken together as one filing, do not demonstrate that plaintiff exhausted heradministrative remedies because no "objective observer" would believe that the filing constitutes a charge of gender discrimination. (Doc. 17 at 2-3) (citing Russ v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 720 F. App'x 229, 237-38 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502, 508-09) (6th Cir. 2011) (in turn quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 398 (2008)). Defendant argues that plaintiff's EEOC intake questionnaire fails to make specific claims of gender discrimination in the narrative portion and plaintiff's first charge fails to mention plaintiff's gender or make a single allegation of gender discrimination. (Id. at 3).
In her sur-reply, plaintiff maintains that her questionnaire should be taken into consideration with her subsequently-filed EEOC charge, which together "constitute a request for the EEOC to act." (Doc. 23 at 3). Plaintiff relies heavily on the undersigned's decision in Nadel, 2016 WL 5478511, at *6, in support of her argument.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a precondition to filing a Title VII lawsuit. Lockett v. Potter, 259 F. App'x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing McFarland v. Henderson, 307 F.3d 402, 406 (6th Cir. 2002); Benford v. Frank, 943 F.2d 609, 612 (6th Cir. 1991)). As a general rule, a plaintiff must first file a timely charge with the EEOC before pursuing an employment discrimination action under Title VII. Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 2010). See also Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1486 (6th Cir. 1989) () (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973)). The EEOC charge "shall be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form as the [EEOC] requires." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The EEOC charge must be "sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generallythe action or practices complained of." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b); Williams, 643 F.3d at 508.
"The general rule is that a plaintiff may file suit . . . in regard to the claims . . . within the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." Crowder v. Railcrew Xpress, 557 F. App'x 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Scott v. Eastman Chem. Co., 275 F. App'x 466, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under this "expected scope of investigation test," it is not necessary that the EEOC actually investigate the claim later brought by the plaintiff or that the plaintiff specifically state the claim in the EEOC charge. Id. (citing Scott, 275 F. App'x at 471). The "expected scope of the investigation test" requires a plaintiff to...
To continue reading
Request your trial