Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co.
Decision Date | 02 July 1992 |
Docket Number | CA No. 87-2799-T. |
Citation | 794 F. Supp. 29 |
Parties | Monica SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. SHERWIN-WILLIAMS COMPANY, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Jonathan Shapiro, Stern & Shapiro, Neil T. Leifer, Stephen J. Kiely, Thornton & Early, Boston, Mass., Judith E. Somberg, Johnson & Somberg, Jamaica Plain, Mass., Arthur Bryant, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.
Thomas V. Urmy, Jr., Shapiro, Grace & Haber, Mary Morrissey Sullivan, Sullivan, Sullivan & Pinta, Lawrence Gerard Cetrulo, Burns & Levinson, Peter S. Terris, Palmer & Dodge, Thomas J. Griffin, Jr., Goodwin, Proctor & Hoar, Rory John Fitzpatrick, Rory Fitzpatrick, Meghan H. Magruder, John C. Solomon, Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, Mass., Janie S. Mayeron, G. Marc Whitehead, Ellen Maas, Michael L. Nilan, Popham, Haik, Schnobrich & Kaufman, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minn., Kirsten K. Robbins, Kirkland & Ellis, Washington, D.C., Paul Michael Pohl, Charles H. Moellenberg, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, for defendants.
Plaintiff Monica Santiago brought this tort action against several defendants1 alleging that their manufacture of lead pigment for use in lead paint caused her injury. In an earlier opinion, this court refused to apply market share liability theory in the context of lead paint poisoning. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F.Supp. 186 (D.Mass.1992) (Santiago I). Presently at issue is whether plaintiff may pursue her claims under either a concert of action or an enterprise liability theory.
The gravamen of plaintiff's claim is that defendants implicitly agreed to produce, market and promote lead pigment, and to refrain from warning of known health risks associated with the product. The parties' motions for summary judgment are before the court.
Massachusetts law recognizes the concert of action theory of tort liability.2 Under this theory, a defendant who has an agreement with another to perform a tortious act or to achieve a tortious result, may be liable to a plaintiff, even if that defendant was not the cause-in-fact of the injury. Payton, 512 F.Supp. at 1035 (citing Gurney v. Tenney, 197 Mass. 457, 466, 84 N.E. 428 (1908)). Plaintiff need not prove the existence of an agreement by direct evidence. See Nelson v. Nason, 343 Mass. 220, 222, 177 N.E.2d 887 (1961) (drag racing). Rather, an agreement may be inferred if the conduct of the defendants suggests a tortious implied meeting of the minds. Payton, 512 F.Supp. at 1035; Nelson, 343 Mass. at 222, 177 N.E.2d 887.
Defendants argue that, since plaintiff cannot identify any one defendant as the cause of her harm, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ( ). Plaintiff responds that Massachusetts' version of concert of action relaxes the identification requirement.
The classic paradigm of concerted action is a drag race where one driver is the cause-in-fact of plaintiff's injury and the fellow racer is also held liable for the injury. See, e.g., Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 691 F.Supp. 1045, 1047 (E.D.Mich.1988).3 Courts typically apply the theory when "a particular defendant is already identified as causing the plaintiff's harm, and the plaintiff desires to extend liability to those acting in league with that defendant." Sabean v. Marshall's Inc., No. 55978, slip op. at 14 (citing Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, 47, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826, 105 S.Ct. 107, 83 L.Ed.2d 51 (1984)); see also Zafft, 676 S.W.2d at 245 ( ).
Massachusetts courts have recognized concert of action liability only under the narrow circumstances of a drag race. See Orszulak v. Bujnevicie, 355 Mass. 157, 243 N.E.2d 897 (1969); Nelson v. Nason, 343 Mass. 220, 177 N.E.2d 887 (1961). Other courts have generally held that the concert of action theory is inapplicable when the plaintiff cannot identify at least one defendant as the cause-in-fact of injury. In other words, under concert of action "the requirement of causation remains intact." Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F.Supp. 593, 595 (M.D.Fla.1982); see also Marshall, 691 F.Supp. at 1047 ( ); Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 47 ( ); Burnside v. Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa.Super. 264, 505 A.2d 973, 984 (1985) ( ); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 173 Ill.App.3d 1, 122 Ill.Dec. 835, 852, 527 N.E.2d 333, 350 (1988) (), rev'd on other grounds, 137 Ill.2d 222, 148 Ill.Dec. 22, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990).4
There is some authority for accepting a less stringent standard with respect to application of the concert of action theory. See Kathy J. Owen and C. Vernon Hartline, Jr., Industry-wide Liability: Protecting Plaintiffs and Defendants, 44 Baylor L.Rev. 45, 52 (Winter 1992) (courts have extended concert of action theory "to adapt to the difficulties of identification problems confronted in the rapidly developing area of strict products liability").5 In Abel v. Eli Lilly and Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, 176 (1984), for example, the court allowed a DES plaintiff to proceed under concert of action, even though she could not identify the defendant that was the cause-in-fact of her injury. Other courts have indicated that concert of action may operate to bypass the traditional identification requirement. See, e.g., Hymowitz, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 945, 539 N.E.2d at 1073 (); Farmer v. Newport, 748 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Ky.App.1988) ().
These cases, however, are distinguishable. Abel and Hymowitz both involved DES plaintiffs, who could demonstrate a signature injury. See Santiago I, 782 F.Supp. at 193 ( ). In Farmer, the plaintiffs sued manufacturers for negligence in making mattresses that were combustible. There, however, the plaintiffs were able to identify one of the mattress manufacturers. 748 S.W.2d at 164.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has indicated that it would relax the identification requirement only in circumstances that would limit a defendant's liability to the harm it actually caused. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 188 (1982). See also Santiago I, 782 F.Supp. at 191-92 ( ). Under concert of action theory, however, liability is joint and several. See, e.g., Marshall, 691 F.Supp. at 1048; Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 79 N.Y.2d 289, 582 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375, 591 N.E.2d 222, 224 (1992); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 72 Haw. 416, 823 P.2d 717, 726 (1991). If applied here, therefore, a lead pigment manufacturer could be held liable for 100 percent of plaintiff's injury, even if it did not actually cause her injury. Under plaintiff's proposed application, Marshall, 691 F.Supp. at 1048; see also Smith, 823 P.2d at 726 ( ). Applying concert of action here would "expand the doctrine far beyond its intended scope." Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 141, 607 P.2d 924, 933, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 285, 66 L.Ed.2d 140 (1980).
This court concludes, therefore, that in the absence of an identifiable tortfeasor, plaintiff may not pursue her concert of action claim.
Enterprise liability is a variation of concert of action.6 Its application to lead pigment manufacturers is a matter of first impression. Under this theory, an entire industry may be held liable for its collective wrongdoing. See Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) ( ). In Hall, the court explained the application of enterprise liability:
Plaintiffs ... will have to demonstrate defendants' joint awareness of the risks at issue in this case and their joint capacity to reduce or affect those risks. By noting these requirements we wish to emphasize their special applicability to industries composed of a small number of units. What would be fair and feasible with regard to an industry of five or ten producers might be manifestly unreasonable if applied to a decentralized industry composed of thousands of small producers.
Id. at 378.7 See also Vigiolto v. Johns-Manville Corp., 643 F.Supp. 1454, 1457 (W.D.Pa.1986) (...
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