Santiago v. Tristate Realty LLC
| Decision Date | 17 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Index 502976/19 |
| Citation | 2021 NY Slip Op 32703 (U) |
| Parties | Lillian Santiago, Plaintiff, v. Tristate Realty LLC, Tristate Realty Holdings LLC. 106 West 83RD Street LLC, Blue Square Construction LLC, Acacia Network Housing, Inc., and Bronx Addiction Services Integrated Concepts System, Inc. a/k/a (Basics), Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Unpublished opinion
DECISION/ORDER
The following e-filed papers read herein:
NYSCEF Doc Nos.
Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause/ Petition/Cross Motion and Affidavits (Affirmations) Annexed
Opposing Affidavits (Affirmations)
29-40, 42
Reply Affidavits (Affirmations)
43
Upon the foregoing papers, defendants Acacia Network Housing, Inc. (hereafter Acacia) and Bronx Addiction Services Integrated Concepts System, Inc. a/k/a (BASICS) (hereafter BASICS) move pre-answer (in motion sequence [mot. seq.] two) for an order pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (a) (7), dismissing all of the claims asserted against them in the complaint. For the reasons which follow, the motion is granted.
On February 11, 2019, plaintiff Lillian Santiago (Santiago) commenced this action against defendants Tristate Realty LLC Tristate Realty Holdings LLC and 106 West 83rd Street LLC (collectively, the Tristate Defendants) by filing a summons and a complaint. The complaint alleges that on January 23 2017, Santiago suffered personal injuries due to a hazardous premises condition when she fell on the interior stairs at the premises at 106 West 83rd Street in Manhattan. On or about January 23, 2020, Santiago commenced a second, nearly identical, action in this court against Acacia and BASICS, as well as against defendant Blue Square Construction, which essentially asserted the same allegations as the this, the first, complaint. On October 27, 2020, the Tristate Defendants moved to consolidate the second action into this action, which relief was granted by a January 21, 2021 decision and order.
On June 21, 2021, Acacia and BASICS filed a pre-answer motion for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) and (a) (7), dismissing all of the claims asserted against them in the complaint. Acacia and BASICS argue that Santiago has failed to state a cause of action against either of them, and that their documentary evidence demonstrates that the Workers' Compensation Law bars Santiago's personal injury claims.
Acacia and BASICS assert that an injured employee's eligibility to collect Workers' Compensation benefits is the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for work-related injuries, as a matter of law. Acacia and BASICS further claim that the Workers' Compensation Law bars employees from seeking damages from entities that are either their employer, their special employer, or an "alter ego" of their general employer. Acacia and BASICS assert that they qualify as plaintiff's employer and its alter ego. Their counsel avers that when one entity controls another, or when the two entities operate as a single integrated entity, including where two entities share the same Workers' Compensation insurance policy for employees, they are considered alter egos.
Acacia and BASICS contend that the plaintiff's incident occurred while Santiago was performing tasks within the scope of her employment. Acacia and BASICS submit copies of Santiago's W-2 forms reflecting that Acacia was her employer at the time of the incident. Acacia and BASICS also submit evidence that Santiago was awarded benefits from the Workers' Compensation Board in a May 10, 2017 decision which identifies the insured as BASICS. Acacia and BASICS also submit a copy of an insurance policy declaration reflecting that BASICS and Acacia were both covered by the same Workers' Compensation policy under which Santiago received her benefits. Acacia and BASICS submit an affidavit from Jose Rodriguez (Rodriguez), Acacia's Chief Legal Officer, in support of their dismissal motion.
Acacia and BASICS argue that since Santiago was employed by Acacia, as demonstrated by her W-2 forms, and since BASICS was responsible for Acacia's finances and operations, including procuring and maintaining its Workers' Compensation insurance as well as handling employee's Workers' Compensation claims, these two entities were alter egos of each other within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Law. Acacia and BASICS also argue that as Santiago has already received Workers' Compensation insurance benefits for the incident, that her receipt of such benefits is her exclusive remedy, barring this suit. Alternatively, Acacia and BASICS claim that Santiago was a "special employee" of BASICS in addition to being a general employee of Acacia.
Santiago, in opposition, asserts that a question of fact exists as to whether Acacia or BASICS was Santiago's employer at the time of the incident, although she acknowledges that her pay stubs reflect that Acacia was her employer and that the New York State Workers' Compensation Board identified BASICS as the insured in connection with her Workers' Compensation claims. Santiago contends that Acacia and BASICS have failed to establish that they are alter egos of each other because they did not submit evidence that they exercised day-to-day control over each other's operations. Santiago also asserts that depositions have yet to be conducted and that dismissal would be premature before she has the opportunity to depose witnesses with knowledge of the relationship between Acacia and BASICS.
Santiago further notes that Acacia and BASICS are both New York not-for-profit corporations, but were formed twenty years apart and for different purposes, and argues that the distinction between separate corporate entities should not be ignored. Santiago asserts that Acacia and BASICS have not demonstrated that they control one another or that they operate as a single integrated entity. Santiago also argues that the mere fact that two entities are covered by the same Workers' Compensation insurance policy does not conclusively establish that they are alter egos. Santiago asserts that additional facts, such as whether one of the two entities is a subsidiary of the other or there exists common control, must be revealed before this court determines that there is an alter ego relationship between them.
The Tristate Defendants, in opposition, similarly contend that questions of fact exist as to whether Acacia or BASICS was Santiago's employer at the time of the incident and whether they are alter egos. The Tristate Defendants, like Santiago, assert that there is no proof that Acacia and BASICS exercised control over each other's daily operations, which is necessary for alter ego status. The Tristate Defendants also contend that the record indicates that both Acacia and BASICS employed Santiago, since the Workers' Compensation Board's records indicate that BASICS was Santiago's employer, but Santiago's W-2 forms reflect that she was employed by Acacia.
The Tristate Defendants also argue that Acacia and BASICS' dismissal motion is premature and assert that the only testimonial evidence submitted in support of the dismissal motion is Rodriguez's "self-serving" affidavit which asserts that the two entities are alter egos. The Tristate Defendants argue that the facts asserted in Rodriguez's affidavit are solely within the knowledge of Acacia and/or BASICS, and thus, depositions are necessary to obtain information about their day-to-day operations. The Tristate Defendants also argue that the fact that Acacia and BASICS are covered by the same Workers' Compensation insurance policy does not conclusively establish their alter ego status.
Acacia and BASICS, in reply, argue that additional discovery is unnecessary because the documentary evidence they submitted utterly refutes Santiago's allegations. Acacia and BASICS contend that Santiago has essentially admitted that Acacia is her employer and there is no dispute that the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier for both Acacia and BASICS' paid Santiago's benefits. They assert that Santiago's reference to their incorporation dates is misplaced, since there is no legal requirement that alter egos be formed at the same time. Acacia and BASICS also assert that Acacia is actually a subsidiary of Acacia Network, Inc., a non-party, which was created to provide temporary shelter, housing, and ancillary social services to the homeless in New York City, and that BASICS was created to handle the finances for both of those entities. Acacia and BASICS claim that the fact that they were both insureds on the same Workers' Compensation policy is sufficient to find that they are alter egos for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law.
In considering a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff (Arrington v New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 442 [1982]). However, a complaint containing factual claims that are flatly contradicted by documentary evidence should be dismissed (Well v Rambam, 300 A.D.2d 580, 581 [2002]; Kenneth R. v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 229 A.D.2d 159, 162 [1997], cert denied 522 U.S. 967 [1997]). To properly support a motion for dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), the contents of the proffered documentary evidence must be “essentially undeniable" (Fontanetta v John Doe 1, 73 A.D.3d 78, 85-85 [2010], citing Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3211:10, at 21-22). Examples of such “essentially undeniable" documentary evidence include judicial records, mortgages, deeds contracts, written agreements and notes (Fontanetta, 73...
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