Santiago v. Wood, s. 88-5313
| Decision Date | 03 July 1990 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 88-5313,88-6196,s. 88-5313 |
| Citation | 904 F.2d 673 |
| Parties | 53 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 595, 54 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,062, 17 Fed.R.Serv.3d 49, 60 Ed. Law Rep. 1103 Elsa Alemany SANTIAGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mrs. Blanche WOOD, Principal, Henry Flagler Elementary, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Elsa Alemany SANTIAGO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mrs. Blanche WOOD, Principal Henry Flagler Elementary, Mrs. Dorothy Farias, Asst. Principal, Henry Flagler Elementary School, Mrs. Carol Bernstein, Supervisor of School Libraries, Dade Co. Public Schools, Mr. Frank de Varona, Area Director, South Central Area, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Non-Argument Calendar. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Elsa Alemany Santiago, Miami, Fla., pro se.
Phyllis O. Douglas, The School Board of Dade County, Florida, Miami, Fla., for defendants-appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before KRAVITCH, ANDERSON and CLARK, Circuit Judges.
Ms. Elsa Alemany Santiago, a Cuban born resident of Miami, Florida, brought this Title VII action against several administrators of the Dade County Public Schools alleging that she had been discriminated against based on her national origin. According to the complaint, Ms. Santiago was hired by the Dade County Public Schools in 1970 as a media specialist. During the first 12 years of her employment, she enjoyed her work and received favorable evaluations. However, in 1982, she was transferred to Henry Flagler Elementary School, where she was subjected to repeated criticism. She filed several grievances with the union, and was thereafter subjected to retaliatory action, intimidation, and harassment. She was eventually forced to take a leave of absence, which has apparently become permanent. The defendants answered, denying the crucial allegations of the complaint, arguing, among other things, that the case should be dismissed because the named defendants were not employers within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e and therefore were not proper party defendants.
Ms. Santiago moved for appointment of counsel. The district court granted this motion, but apparently was unable to secure counsel willing to represent her.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that they were entitled to a judgment on two grounds: (1) the EEOC charge filed by Ms. Santiago named Henry Flagler Elementary School, rather than the defendants, as the discriminator, and none of the defendants received notice of the EEOC proceedings; and (2) the School Board of Dade County, Florida, which was not named as a defendant, was Ms. Santiago's employer, and the individuals named as defendants were not employers within the meaning of Title VII.
The district court granted summary judgment on the grounds that the named defendants were not employers within the meaning of Title VII. The court did not address the defendants' alternative ground for summary judgment, that they were not named in and did not have a notice of the EEOC charge.
The district court's order of summary judgment was entered on the docket on January 5, 1988. On January 21, 1988, 11 days thereafter (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays) Ms. Santiago filed and served a "Motion to Vacate and Reconsider Order Granting Summary Judgment and Leave to Amend Complaint to Name Indispensable parties...." She argued that the School Board of Dade County had notice of her Title VII action, and that her case therefore should not have been dismissed merely because she mistakenly named the wrong defendants. She requested leave to amend her complaint to add the School Board of Dade County and Henry Flagler Elementary School as defendants, and to add a section 1981 claim. 1
The defendants opposed Ms. Santiago's motion, arguing that she had failed to meet the deadline for filing a Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion and had failed to allege any grounds for relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Ms. Santiago replied, explaining that the district court's order granting summary judgment was erroneously mailed to her previous address, and she therefore did not receive the order or notice of the final judgment until January 12, 1988, leaving her little time to prepare her motion.
The district court construed Ms. Santiago's motion as a Rule 60 motion because it was filed more than ten days after entry of final judgment. The court denied the motion, noting that the defendants had raised the defense that they were not employers within the meaning of Title VII in their answer, and that Ms. Santiago had had since that time to amend her complaint.
Thereafter, Ms. Santiago filed a motion with the district court requesting appointment of counsel on appeal. The district court denied the motion, noting its previous difficulty in obtaining counsel for her. Within ten days of this order, Ms. Santiago filed and served a motion to vacate the order, which the district court denied.
This case involves the consolidated appeals of the district court's orders denying appellant's motion to vacate the judgment and to amend the complaint and her motion to appoint appellate counsel. Ms. Santiago argues that she is proceeding pro se, and that her case should not have been dismissed merely because she mistakenly named the wrong defendants. She argues that the district court should have granted her relief from the judgment and allowed her to amend her complaint to name the School Board of Dade County, the proper defendant. The defendants argue that Ms. Santiago was on notice that she had named the wrong defendants, but nevertheless failed to move to amend her complaint prior to entry of judgment. They argue that she therefore was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b), and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her leave to amend her complaint.
Although Ms. Santiago did not make her motion to amend the complaint to add the proper defendant until after the court had entered judgment, we find that under the circumstances of this case the court abused its discretion in failing to allow the amendment. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants on the basis that the Dade County School Board had not been named as a defendant, citing Rogero v. Noone, 704 F.2d 518 (11th Cir.1983). 2 In his order denying Ms. Santiago's motion to amend, the district court found that because the defendants raised the defense that they were not "employers" within the...
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