Santise v. Harris, Civ. No. 80-131.
Citation | 501 F. Supp. 274 |
Decision Date | 17 November 1980 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 80-131. |
Parties | Catherine SANTISE, Plaintiff, v. Patricia Roberts HARRIS, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Yacker, Granata & Cleary, P. C. by Louis E. Granata, Matawan, N. J., for plaintiff.
William W. Robertson, U. S. Atty. by Judy Sello, Asst. U. S. Atty., Newark, N. J., for defendant.
This is an action brought under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final determination of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (H.E.W.),1 which denied Catherine Santise's application for disability benefits. The plaintiff has exhausted all of the necessary administrative proceedings and the H.E.W. Appeals Council held on November 8, 1979, that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (A.L.J.) rendered on July 31, 1979, was correct and represented "the final decision of the Secretary." (T.2).
The A.L.J. concluded that Ms. Santise was not disabled through his application of the grid system for finding disability established by H.E.W. regulations that went into effect on February 26, 1979. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513 and 20 C.F.R. Subpart P., Appendix 2. These regulations require an A.L.J. to reach findings of fact as to four specific aspects of a claimant's case, namely residual functional capacity, age, education, and previous work experience. After finding facts as to these four items, the A.L.J. must line his conclusions up on the appropriate grid and if he finds an exact match then the grid tells him whether the claimant is disabled or not disabled. It is only when an exact match cannot be found on the grids than an A.L.J. may consider other factors and reach his own conclusion on the issue of disability. 20 C.F.R., Subpart P., App. 2 § 200.00. In the present case the A.L.J. fit four of his factual conclusions into the grid, found an exact match and therefore reached the conclusion mandated by the grid that Ms. Santise was not disabled. Although this issue was not raised by the parties, I have concluded that this mechanistic approach to disability decisions is not in accordance with the Act and that H.E.W. may not rely on its grids in reaching a determination of no disability. Accordingly, I have ordered a remand for further proceedings.
For the purposes of this decision I have assumed, without deciding, that the A.L.J.'s conclusions are properly based on "substantial evidence." See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). The following factual conclusions reached by the A.L.J. are relevant to my decision:
Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d at 407. To put it simply, H.E.W.'s reliance on a grid, drawn in advance to cover a wide variety of individual cases, does not satisfy its obligation of basing its conclusion on substantial evidence. An abstract chart in a reference book, keyed to only four factors, does not provide the claimant with the individualized consideration of the facts of her own particular case that she is entitled to under the Act. Nor can a chart be cross-examined, nor can the claimant do anything to rebut it. An A.L.J. is required by the regulations to decide in accordance with the chart. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513. As a student commentator has recently written in another context:
Rigidity provides uniformity, but uniformity does not necessarily provide justice. Situations which appear similar usually contain some unique characteristics. Decision making done in accordance with a rigid adherence to rules cannot take these differences into account. When the unique characteristics of a particular situation alter the effect of a decision in some fundamental way, rigid application of a rule creates injustice.
Note, Sentencing Women: Equal Protection in the Context of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 6 Women's Rights L.Rep. 85, 94 (1980). I am satisfied that the Act does not permit the A.L.J. to determine the ultimate fact of whether a claimant is disabled through a rigid adherence to H.E.W.'s grid.
"Although an agency's interpretation of the statute under which it operates is entitled to some deference, `this deference is constrained by our obligation to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose and history.'" Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2369, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979) quoting Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20, 99 S.Ct. 790, 800 n.20, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979). Here the newly promulgated regulations are at odds with the established judicial interpretation of the Act, which requires individualized treatment of each claim. See, e.g., Dobrowolsky v. Califano, supra. In the present case the A.L.J. did not even have the benefit of a vocational expert's report in making his decision. Prior to the promulgation of the new regulations it had been held that lack of a vocational expert's report was in and of itself a sufficient basis for remand to H.E.W. Garrett v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1972); Alvarez v. Califano, 483 F.Supp. 1284, 1288 (E.D.Pa.1980). I am not holding that lack of such a report requires remand. I believe, however, that the fact that the A.L.J. in the present case was able to reach an opinion in accordance with H.E. W.'s grid, without any need to even consider the subject matter that a vocational expert might testify to, is indicative of the change in law rather than...
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