Santopietro v. City of New Haven

• Decision Date: 27 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 15355,15355
• Citation: 239 Conn. 207,682 A.2d 106
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Raymond SANTOPIETRO, Jr., et al. v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al.

Page 106

682 A.2d 106

239 Conn. 207

Raymond SANTOPIETRO, Jr., et al. v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al.

No. 15355.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 1, 1996.

Decided Aug. 27, 1996.

Robert A. Solomon, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Katerina Rohner, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Christopher M. Vossler, with whom, on the brief, was Linda Gray MacDonald, Hartford, for appellees (defendants).

Before CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

BORDEN, Associate Justice.

This appeal arises out of injuries incurred by a spectator at a softball game. The issues are whether: (1) the plaintiffs' failure to file a motion to set aside the verdict limits the scope of our appellate review to plain error; (2) the trial court improperly directed a verdict in favor of the defendant umpires; and (3) the trial court improperly granted a motion in limine to preclude evidence of bystander emotional distress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Certain facts are not in dispute. On October 16, 1988, the plaintiffs attended a softball game played at East Shore Park in New Haven by teams belonging to an organized league. The defendants David Brennan and Bruce Shepard served as the umpires for that game. The defendant Mark Piombino was a participant in the game.

The plaintiff Raymond Santopietro, Jr., observed the softball game from a position behind the backstop and was not on the field of play. The plaintiff Raymond Santopietro, Sr., was approximately ten to fifteen feet from his son watching another game being played on an adjacent field.

In the sixth inning, Piombino came to bat in the game that Santopietro, Jr., was watching and hit a fly ball. In frustration, he intentionally flung his bat toward the backstop. Somehow the bat passed through the backstop and struck Santopietro, Jr., in the head. As a result, Santopietro, Jr., suffered a fractured skull and other serious injuries.

Both Santopietro, Jr., and Santopietro, Sr., ¹ appeal ² from the judgment of the trial court, Hon. John C. Flanagan, state trial referee, in favor of the defendants ³ rendered following the court's granting of a motion in limine precluding the claim of Santopietro, Sr., for bystander emotional distress, and following a directed verdict in favor of Brennan and Shepard on Santopietro, Jr.'s claim of negligence. Thereafter, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Santopietro, Jr., against Piombino. ⁴ The plaintiffs did not file a postverdict motion, either to set aside the directed verdict in favor of Brennan and Shepard, or in any way raising again the ruling of the court on the motion in limine regarding the claim of Santopietro, Sr., for bystander emotional distress. The trial court rendered judgment for Brennan and Shepard, and for Santopietro, Jr., against Piombino. This appeal followed.

Santopietro, Jr., claims that the trial court improperly directed a verdict for Brennan and Shepard on his claim against them. Santopietro, Sr., claims that the trial court improperly ruled against his claim for bystander emotional distress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in both respects.

I

Before addressing the merits of the plaintiffs' claims on appeal, we consider our scope of review regarding those claims. Because the plaintiffs did not file a motion to set the verdict aside, our scope of review would, under our prevailing precedent of Pietrorazio v. Santopietro, 185 Conn. 510, 515-16, 441 A.2d 163 (1981), be limited to determining whether the trial court's actions constituted "plain error" requiring reversal of the judgment. The plaintiffs argue, however, that we should overrule Pietrorazio, and review their claims unburdened by the plain error doctrine. We agree.

We are mindful of the doctrine of stare decisis, especially when it involves the interpretation of a statute, as Pietrorazio does. "Stare decisis gives stability and continuity to our case law. This court, however, has recognized many times that there are exceptions to the rule of stare decisis.... A court, when once convinced that it is in error, is not compelled to follow precedent.... If, however, stare decisis is to continue to serve the cause of stability and certainty in the law--a condition indispensable to any well-ordered system of jurisprudence--a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it.... This is especially true when the precedent involved concerns the interpretation or construction of a statute.... Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955); see Kluttz v. Howard, 228 Conn. 401, 406, 636 A.2d 816 (1994); White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 335-36, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) General Electric Employees Federal Credit Union v. Zakrzewski, 235 Conn. 741, 744, 670 A.2d 274 (1996). We conclude that this is a case in which cogent reasons and inescapable logic require that Pietrorazio be overruled.

Pietrorazio was a medical malpractice action in which the jury returned a verdict for the defendant physicians. The plaintiff patient appealed, claiming that: (1) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (2) several evidentiary rulings of the trial court were erroneous. Pietrorazio v. Santopietro, supra, 185 Conn. at 511, 441 A.2d 163. The plaintiff had not, however, filed a motion to set aside the verdict in accordance with Practice Book § 320 ⁵ and General Statutes § 52-228b. ⁶ Id. at 512, 441 A.2d 163. We held that "[o]ur conclusion that a motion to set aside a verdict is essential for a full review of claims of error in civil jury cases seeking money damages limits our consideration of the issues raised ... to ascertaining whether there has been 'plain error.' Practice Book § [4185]." ⁷ Id., at 515, 441 A.2d 163. Pursuant to that "limited study" of those rulings, we affirmed the trial court's judgment. ⁸ Id., at 517, 441 A.2d 163.

Central to our conclusion in Pietrorazio was our interpretation of § 52-228b. See footnote 6. We recognized that, prior to the enactment of that statute in 1965, it had been thought that a motion to set aside a verdict was essential to obtain appellate review of a claim of evidentiary insufficiency to support a verdict. ⁹ Id., at 513, 441 A.2d 163. We also recognized that commentators had opined that such a motion was not necessary to obtain appellate review of other trial court rulings, because in their view it would be redundant to require such a motion in those contexts. Id., at 514, 441 A.2d 163.

We concluded, however, that the "enactment in 1965 of General Statutes § 52-228b, which declares that '[n]o verdict in any civil action involving a claim for money damages shall be set aside except on written motion by a party to the cause ...' is applicable to this case and is controlling." Id. We stated that "[t]he evident purpose of the statute is to provide an opportunity for the trial court to pass upon claims of error which may become the subject of an appeal." Id. We declared that "[t]he statute was designed to afford the trial court a full opportunity to redress any errors which may have occurred at trial before the appellate process is begun." Id., at 515, 441 A.2d 163.

We also noted several policy reasons for requiring a motion to set aside the verdict as a prerequisite for full appellate review of rulings other than those involving the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. These were, in general, that: (1) the trial court's opinion on such a motion may dissuade a party from pursuing an unmeritorious appeal; (2) the trial court's perceptions of the trial may be helpful to the appellate court in evaluating the effect of the trial court's ruling on the verdict; and (3) even when a claim of error has been fully preserved at trial, its articulation during trial will not be as clear and thorough as when it is presented in a posttrial motion. Id., at 514-15, 441 A.2d 163.

From the statutory language, the previously described understanding of the purpose of the statute, and these policy considerations, we concluded that the statute must be read to circumscribe our scope of appellate review of claims of trial court error that had not been made the subject of a motion to set aside a verdict. Id., at 515, 441 A.2d 163. We also noted, however, that pursuant to Practice Book § 4185, we could nonetheless address such claims under the plain error doctrine. Id., at 515-16, 441 A.2d 163.

We subsequently reiterated our reliance on the statutory language and supporting policy considerations as the continued justification for the Pietrorazio rule. In Saporoso v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 221 Conn. 356, 362-63, 603 A.2d 1160 (1992), we noted "the breadth of the first sentence of the statute, which provides that '[n]o verdict in any civil action ... may be set aside except on written motion....' (Emphasis added.) There is no ambiguity in that language to justify a distinction between motions to set aside for insufficient evidence and those based on rulings during the course of the trial. In applying a statute this court is bound by its terms and cannot read into its plain language exceptions that the legislature has not created." We also noted four policy considerations for the rule: (1) it permits the trial court to reconsider its rulings in the less hectic atmosphere of posttrial proceedings, and to grant a new trial if required, without the necessity of an appeal; (2) it gives the court an opportunity to explain its rulings more clearly than is possible during trial; (3) it gives the parties an opportunity to present their arguments more persuasively and clearly than is ordinarily possible during trial; and (4) it may induce settlement of the litigation by forcing the parties to reevaluate their positions in light of the verdict. Id., at 363, 603 A.2d 1160.

We now conclude that our statutory analysis was flawed. We conclude that the text of the statute neither compels nor...