Santos-Santos v. Puerto Rico Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 24 October 2014
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. 11-1072 (PAD)
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
• Parties: WILMARY SANTOS-SANTOS Plaintiff v. PUERTO RICO POLICE DEPARTMENT et al. Defendants

WILMARY SANTOS-SANTOS Plaintiff v. PUERTO RICO POLICE DEPARTMENT et al. Defendants

CIVIL NO. 11-1072 (PAD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

October 24, 2014

MAGISTRATE JUDGE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Wilmary Santos-Santos, a policewoman, first filed a Complaint against defendants Reynaldo Torres-Centeno (Director of the Caguas Strike Force of the Police of Puerto Rico (PRPD)), Gregorio Merced-Vázquez (Director of the Police of Puerto Rico (PRPD) in the Caguas Region), William Ruiz-Borras (commander of the Caguas Criminal Investigation Corps Division (CIC)), Miguel A. Santiago-Rivera (Director of the Caguas Criminal Investigation Corps), the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rico Police Department on January 212, 2011 (Docket No. 1 at 5-6) alleging retaliatory and discriminatory actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(1); violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Conspiracy Claims under42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1988, violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (which is not applicable in this case, see 5 U.S.C. § 2302, and violation of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Docket No.1, pp. 1-2). Supplemental claims were also included in the complaint. Defendants answered the complaint (Docket No. 11) and raised an affirmative defense that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that co-defendants had acted at all times according to law, in good faith and within the established framework of their authority and duties. (Docket No. 11, p. 7, ¶¶ 1, 6).

Subsequently, defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 25) for the court to dismiss the complaint because plaintiff lacked the factual grounds to support her claims (Docket No. 25, p. 1). On August 9, 2012, the motion was partially granted in a painstakingly written order (Docket No. 58), leaving only the Title VII and Act 115 allegations as the only surviving claims. The Title VII retaliation claims brought against individual defendants Gregorio Merced-Vázquez, Reynaldo Torres-Centeno, William Ruiz-Borrás and Miguel A. Santiago-Rivera in their personal capacities, and the Title 115 claims brought against William Ruiz-Borrás were eventually dismissed as well. (Docket No. 83).

Following the court's instructions of August 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment on August 27, 2012, relatedto the claims under Title VII and Act 115 (Docket No. 68) stating that defendants' had not met their burdens for the court to grant a summary judgment in their favor (Docket No. 68, pp. 23-24) since there was existing issue regarding the reasons given by defendants for plaintiff's transfer (Docket No. 69, pp. 2-13).

On May 6, 2014, the court authorized the defendants to file a Second Motion for Summary Judgment based on the new authority of Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).

On June 9, 2014, defendants filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 133), based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, which provides that the "but-for" causation standard must be applied to retaliation claims. Consequently, the defendants argue that plaintiff has defeated her claim for retaliation by contending two separate, discrete and distinctive conducts from her that caused the retaliation suffered by her. (Docket No. 133, p. 3). In her Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 141) plaintiff alleged that such interpretation was a misconstruction of the central holding in Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (Docket No. 141, p. 14); since the plaintiff does not need to prove that engaging in the protected activity was the sole factor motivating the adverse employment action, "but that 'but for' the protected activity she would not have faced adverse employment action." (Docket No. 141, p. 16). Plaintiff also makesa claim that even though defendants might provide a basis for "the rationale behind the treatment [...] when the facts support plausible but conflicting inferences on a pivotal issue in the case" a motion for summary judgment cannot be granted. (Docket No. 141, p. 16).

Having considered the statements of the parties and their argument, I recommend that the motion for summary judgment be granted and that the court enter the following

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Plaintiff Wilmary Santos-Santos started working for the Puerto Rico Police Department on February 1, 1994. (Docket No. 26, p. 30, ¶134; Docket No. 69, p. 16, ¶134-135).

2. On January 15, 2008 she co-signed a complaint issued by agent Sofia Figueroa Rossy against Sergeant Simara Torres on grounds of sexual harassment. (Docket No. 127, p. 5), upon which she started receiving hostile treatment and negative attitudes from Simara Torres and co-defendants Reynaldo Torres Centeno, Gustavo Collazo and Miguel Santiago. (Docket No. 127, p. 6).

3. In 2009 she began working for the Strike Force Division in the Caguas precinct. (Docket No. 1, pp. 7-8, ¶16). That same year, defendant Lt. Torres Centeno recommended her for a promotion to the rank of Sergeant. (Docket No. 141, p. 5).

4. In March 2010 fellow coworkers, agents María Mercedes Figueroa and Andy Acevedo, wrote memos complaining against comments made by plaintiff to agent Acevedo's common-law wife, agent and coworker Sofía Figueroa regarding a supposed affair between the two of them. (Docket No. 134, p. 13, ¶41 and 43, pp. 16-17, ¶ 55-56). Defendants claim that said comments caused a disruption among the relationship between the members of the team (Docket No. 134, p. 12, ¶39), including concerns about their safety since they were all police officers and therefore armed. (Docket No. 134, pp. 14 and 21, ¶ 46 and 72).

5. Lt. Reynaldo Torres Centeno, director of the Caguas Strike Force, drafted a memo addressed to Lt. Col. Gregorio Merced, director of the Caguas area, asking him to investigate. (Docket No. 134, p. 20, ¶ 69). Lt. Col. Merced interviewed various agents and determined that due to the disruption caused, the safest alternative was to transfer plaintiff back to the C.I.C. from where she had been brought. (Docket No. 134, pp. 20-21, ¶ 70-72).

6. In April 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint to Lt. Col. Merced, against co-defendant Lt. Torres Centeno, regarding his and other officers' illegal use of official vehicles for personal matters and other illegal activities. (Docket No. 141, p. 2 and Docket 142; pp. 7, 11; ¶ 49, 77).

7. On May 2, 2010 plaintiff had been assigned to the front desk and was excluded from a Strike Force meeting and an operative action coordinated by Lt.Torres. (Docket No. 141, p. 7). Defendants claim that she had never been chosen nor assigned to the operation, and had merely participated in related activities beforehand. (Docket No. 134, pp. 7-9, ¶18-26).

8. On May 14, 2010 Lt. Col. Gregorio Merced and Lt. Reynaldo Torres Centeno signed an order transferring plaintiff back to the C.I.C. (Docket No. 134, p. 20, ¶67 and Docket No. 141, p. 7).

9. Plaintiff filed a complaint against her transfer claiming that upon joining the Strike Force, the group was informed that if any member was to be removed they would be returned to the division they originally came from. In plaintiff's case this was the Special Arrests Division, and not the Property Division she had now been assigned to. (Docket No. 69, p. 14, ¶ 116). Defendants note that the Special Arrests Division had no need for extra personnel (Docket No. 134, p. 30, ¶113), contrary to the needs of the Property Division (Docket No. 134, p. 29, ¶111).

10. Upon joining the Property Division, plaintiff requested to be assigned to the night shift, with the understanding that she would have weekends off. (Docket No. 141, p. 8). However, changes to her schedule led to her having to work during some weekends. Plaintiff claims that she was the only officer whose schedule was altered in such a way, contrary to the pre-existing arrangement (Docket No. 141, p. 10), while defendants claim that there is no law or regulationof the Puerto Rico Police Department that recognizes the right to have weekends off if an officer works the night shift. (Docket No. 134, pp. 31-32, ¶ 121).

11. Following her official complaint and the press reports covering it, plaintiff claims that she has continued to suffer from various incidents of retaliation. (Docket No. 141, p. 12).

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A summary judgment can only be granted "if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Gerald [v. University of Puerto Rico], 707 F.3d [7], at 16 [(1^st Cir. 2013)." Hicks v. Johnson, 755 F.3d 738, 743 (1^st Cir. 2014). To properly defeat a motion for summary judgment "[o]nce a properly supported motion has been presented, the opposing party has the burden of demonstrating that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the Court's denial of the motion for summary judgment. For issues where the opposing party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute. See Suárez v. Pueblo Int'l., Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1^st Cir. 2000)." Maisonet v. Genett Grp., Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141-42 (D.P.R. 2012). "'[C]onclusory allegations, empty rhetoric, unsupported speculation, or evidence which, in the aggregate, is less than significantlyprobative' will not suffice to ward off a properly supported summary judgment motion. Rogan v. City of Boston, 267 F.3d 24, 27 (1^st Cir. 2001)." Nieves-Romero v. United States, 715 F.3d 375, 378 (1^st Cir. 2013); see Rivera v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Authority, 4 F. Supp. 3d 342, 348 (D...