Santos v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Com'rs

• Decision Date: 27 September 2018
• Docket Number: Civil No. CCB-09-2978
• Parties: Roxana Orellana SANTOS v. FREDERICK COUNTY BOARD OF COMISSIONERS, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

346 F.Supp.3d 785

Roxana Orellana SANTOS

v.FREDERICK COUNTY BOARD OF COMISSIONERS, et al.

Civil No. CCB-09-2978

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Signed September 27, 2018

John C. Hayes, Jr., Brian James Whittaker, Nixon Peabody LLP, Kimberly J. Jandrain, Coburn and Greenbaum PLLC, David D. West, Washington, DC, Colleen Marie Normile, CASA de Maryland, Hyattsville, MD, Diana Sagorika Sen, JoAnna Elise Cuevas Ingram, Jose Luis Perez, LatinoJustice PRLDEF, New York, NY, for Roxana Orellana Santos.

Daniel Karp, Sandra D. Lee, Karpinski Colaresi and Karp PA, Baltimore, MD, Michael Meriwether Hethmon, Immigration Reform Law Institute, Washington, DC, for Frederick County Board of Commissioners, Charles Jenkins, Jeffrey Openshaw, Kevin Lynch.

MEMORANDUM

Catherine C. Blake, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Roxana Orellana Santos sued several municipal and federal defendants for civil rights violations stemming from her arrest and detention based on a civil immigration warrant on October 7, 2008. Initially, defendants were granted summary judgment on all claims. Ms. Orellana Santos appealed as to the two arresting deputies, the Sheriff, and the Frederick County Board of Commissioners ("BOCC"). The Fourth Circuit held that her seizure was unconstitutional, but because the Deputies and Sheriff were eligible for qualified immunity in their individual capacities, it affirmed in part the summary judgment ruling. The claims made against the Deputies and Sheriff in their official capacities and against the BOCC were remanded for determination of municipal liability. Now pending are Ms. Orellana Santos's motion for summary judgment as to Counts III and IV (ECF No. 182) and the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment on all counts (ECF No. 183). The issues in this case have been fully briefed, and oral argument was heard on July 10, 2018. For the reasons stated below, Ms. Orellana Santos's motion for summary judgment will be granted on the issue of the County's liability for the final policy decision made by the Sheriff.

BACKGROUND

The factual and procedural background of this case has been discussed at length in prior opinions, so this abbreviated summary includes only facts directly relevant to the pending motions. See Santos v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. Of Comm'rs , 725 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013)cert. denied , 572 U.S. 1015, 134 S.Ct. 1541, 188 L.Ed.2d 557 (2014) ; June 6, 2016 Mem. Order (ECF No. 162); Aug. 26, 2015 Mem. Op. (ECF No. 148); Feb. 7, 2012 Memo. (ECF No. 98).

On February 5, 2008, the Frederick County Sheriff's Office ("FCSO"), through Sheriff Charles Jenkins, entered into an agreement under 9 U.S.C. § 1357(g) with federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") to have certain FCSO employees assist in immigration enforcement. (See Ex. H, Memo. Of Agreement, ECF No. 183-11.) Only those personnel trained and certified under the agreement were permitted to participate in immigration enforcement. Deputies Openshaw and Lynch were not participants in the program. The Deputies were, however, subject to a General Order issued by Sheriff Jenkins, entitled "41.2 Patrol Operations," and dated June 23, 2008, permitting patrol deputies to stop individuals "when the deputy has in their possession or is aware of an outstanding arrest warrant for the individual." (Pl.'s Appx., Ex. 4 to Jenkins Dep. (Dec. 5, 2016) at PA067, Section 41.2.3(B), ECF No. 182-3.) The deputies could become aware of an outstanding warrant by running a check in the National Crime Information Center database ("NCIC"). (Pl's Appx., Jenkins Dep. (Dec. 5, 2016) at PA036. 44:17-21, ECF No. 182-3.) This database contains criminal arrest warrants, as well as ICE civil immigration removal warrants.¹ When a NCIC check identified a warrant, Sheriff Jenkins testified that "[c]ommon practice would be to detain that individual while you confirm the warrant." (Pl.'s Appx. Jenkins Dep. (Dec. 5, 2016) at PA039, 56:12-17, ECF No. 182-3; see also Pl.'s Appx, Lynch Dep. (Feb. 23, 2017) at PA398, 20:2-6, ECF No. 182-3.) Deputy Openshaw testified that once an active warrant is confirmed by dispatch, they are required to arrest the individual. (Pl.'s Appx, Openshaw Dep. (Feb. 23, 2017) at PA380, 14:10-15:12, ECF No. 182-3 ("If you come in contact with somebody who has an active warrant, once you identify that that person has an active warrant you have to take action."); Pl.'s Appx, Openshaw Dep. (Jan. 1, 2011) at PA392, 78:19-21, ECF No. 182-3 ("Unfortunately, once we verified that she had a warrant my hands are tied. I mean I have to take action.").)

On October 7, 2008, while on patrol, Deputy Sheriff's Jeffrey Openshaw and Kevin Lynch of the Frederick County Sheriff's Office stopped and asked Ms. Orellana Santos for identification. After approximately twenty minutes, Ms. Orellana Santos moved to leave, but Deputy Openshaw indicated that she should stay while he waited to see whether a civil ICE warrant for removal was active.² Ultimately, the deputies arrested and detained Ms. Orellana Santos on the basis of that civil warrant. Ms. Orellana Santos was brought to a Maryland detention center, turned over to ICE, and ultimately held in a jail in Cambridge, Massachusetts until her supervised release on November 13, 2008. See generally Santos , 725 F.3d at 457-58 ; June 6, 2016 Mem. Order at 1-2.

On November 10, 2009, Ms. Orellana Santos filed this lawsuit alleging civil rights violations related to her arrest and detention. (Compl., (ECF No. 1).) Initially, summary judgment was granted for the defendants on all claims. (Feb. 7, 2012 Order, ECF No. 99.) Ms. Orellana Santos appealed her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deputies Openshaw and Lynch, Sheriff Jenkins, and the BOCC. (Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 111.) The Fourth Circuit held that "absent express direction or authorization by federal statute or federal officials, state and local law enforcement officers may not detain or arrest an individual solely based on known or suspected civil violations of federal immigration law." Santos , 725 F.3d at 465. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit ruled that "the deputies violated Santos's rights under the Fourth Amendment when they seized her after learning that she was the subject of a civil immigration warrant and absent ICE's express authorization or direction." Id. at 468. The Circuit also held that qualified immunity barred claims against the Deputies and the Sheriff in their individual capacities. It remanded the remaining official capacity claims against the Deputies and the Sheriff, and the claim against the BOCC, to this court for determination of "whether the deputies' unconstitutional actions are attributable to an official policy or custom of the county or the actions of a final county policymaker." Id. at 470. The district court then permitted an amended complaint and allowed discovery.

The claims that remain before the court are as follows: count I for "Unlawful Seizure" against Deputies Openshaw and Lynch in their official capacities, count II for "Unlawful Arrest" against Deputies Openshaw and Lynch in their official capacities, count III for "Supervisory Liability" against Sheriff Jenkins in his official capacity, and count IV for "Entity Liability" against the BOCC. All claims are made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Third Am. Compl. (ECF No. 150); see also June 16, 2016 Mem. Order.) The plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment as to counts III and IV, against Sheriff Jenkins in his official capacity and the BOCC respectively, on August 25, 2017. (ECF No. 182.) The defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment on all counts and opposition to plaintiff's motion on September 22, 2017. (ECF No. 183.)

ANALYSIS

I. Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (emphases added). "A dispute is genuine if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ " Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd , 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am. , 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012) ). "A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’ " Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). Accordingly, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]" Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 134 S.Ct. 1861,1866, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam), and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (citations omitted); see also Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts , 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015). At the same time, the court must "prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc. , 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt , 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993) ).

II. Municipal Liability

Municipalities may be held liable for constitutional violations committed by their employees or agents when an official custom, policy, or practice of the municipality, or the decision of a final policymaker for the municipality, is responsible for causing the deprivation. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). There are various avenues by which a plaintiff might attempt to establish the requisite municipal action needed to sustain Section 1983 liability. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469, 480-84, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). One such...