Santos v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs
| Decision Date | 26 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO.: WDQ-09-2978 |
| Parties | ROXANA ORELLANA SANTOS, Plaintiff, v. FREDERICK COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Roxana Orellana Santos sued the Frederick County Board of Commissioners (the "Board") and others1 for civil rights violations arising from her arrest and detention in relation to a civil deportation warrant.2 The Honorable U.S. District Judge Benson E. Legg resolved all claims against Santos; she appealed. ECF Nos. 99, 111.3 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the FourthCircuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for consideration of Santos's municipal and official-capacity claims. ECF No. 115.4 Pending are the Municipal Defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, or for summary judgment, ECF No. 132, and Santos's motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, ECF No. 136. No hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the following reasons, Santos's motion will be granted in part and denied in part; the Municipal Defendants' motion will be denied as moot.
Santos is originally from El Salvador and now resides in Frederick County, Maryland. ECF No. 136-1 ¶ 2. Jenkins, who was elected in 2006, is the Sheriff of Frederick County; Openshaw and Lynch are Deputy Sheriffs. Id. ¶¶ 3-5, 9. The Board "fully funds" the Frederick County Sheriff's Office ("FCSO"), "which operates under a set of law enforcement policies, practices[,] and customs directed and affected by Frederick County." Id. ¶ 6. The Board trains, supervises, anddisciplines FSCO officers in connection with their law enforcement duties. Id. ¶ 129.
Under § 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g),6 the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") may execute agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies. Id. ¶ 16. Those agreements permit "selected [state and local] officers [to] receive certification to carry out certain functions of federal immigration officers." Id. The "§ 287(g) program" is intended "to address serious criminal activity . . . by foreign nationals." Id. ¶ 17. In 2008, the FCSO "became the first local agency in Maryland to participate in the § 287 program." Id. ¶ 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). On February 5, 2008, Jenkins, on behalf of the FCSO, signed a Memorandum of Agreement with ICE regarding the § 287(g) program (the "§ 287(g) MOA"). Id. ¶ 18. The Deputies were not trained or certified to participate in the § 287(g) program. Id. ¶ 19.
On October 7, 2008, the Deputies were on routine patrol near a food store on Buckeystown Pike in Frederick Maryland. Id. ¶¶ 35, 61. Santos sat behind the store eating her lunch. Id. ¶ 33. The Deputies approached Santos. Id. ¶¶ 35, 37. The Deputies asked Santos several questions, including whether shehad a passport. Id. ¶¶ 40-44. Santos did not have a passport with her; she gave the Deputies her Salvadoran national identification card. Id. ¶¶ 44, 48. Openshaw "appeared to use his radio while [] Lynch watched [] Santos." Id. ¶ 50. Santos asked "whether there was a problem"; Openshaw said, "no," and gestured for her to remain seated. Id. ¶ 51. After some time, Santos "stood up . . . and reached down to collect her purse." Id. ¶ 54. When she stood up, the Deputies handcuffed her and "place[d] her in the backseat of the cruiser." Id. ¶ 55. The Deputies arrested Santos on the basis of a federal civil immigration warrant in the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") database. Id. ¶ 56. On November 11, 2008, Santos was released from custody "for humanitarian reasons." Id. ¶ 58. Santos has not been charged with a crime. Id. ¶¶ 59-60.
"A recent report" evaluating the implementation of the § 287(g) program by participating jurisdictions--including Frederick County--found that several arrests had been made "by officers neither trained nor certified under the [§]287(g) program, even though the arrests were identified as part of the [§]287(g) program." Id. ¶ 28. Santos alleges that Jenkins has "failed to train and supervise FCSO deputies that are not certified under the [§] 287(g) MOA to ensure proper use of the NCIC database" and to "ensure that they were not seizing or arresting individuals based solely on civil immigrationviolations or civil immigration warrants." Id. ¶¶ 67-68. "Jenkins was or should have been aware that only FCSO deputies authorized pursuant to the [§]287(g) MOA could enforce federal immigration law." Id. ¶ 113.
Jenkins updates the Board "about federal immigration enforcement by the FCSO." Id. ¶ 130. Jenkins and the Board allegedly created or promulgated a policy, practice, or custom under which local law enforcement officials engage in unlawful conduct. Id. ¶¶ 106, 131. Jenkins and the Board were allegedly deliberately indifferent to the potential constitutional violations resulting from the lack of adequate training about the § 287(g) program and enforcing federal immigration law. Id. ¶¶ 107, 132.
On November 10, 2009, Santos filed a § 1983 complaint against the Defendants. ECF No. 1.7 On January 29, 2010, Santos amended her complaint. ECF No. 12.8
On August 25, 2010, Judge Legg dismissed without prejudice Santos's § 1983 claims against Jenkins, Openshaw, and Lynch because she had alleged that those defendants were acting under color of federal law,9 and granted her leave to file a second amended complaint containing Bivens claims against those defendants. ECF Nos. 50, 51.10 Judge Legg stated that he was "inclined to bifurcate" the claims against the Board and the ICE agents, but deferred ruling on that issue until he had heard from counsel. ECF No. 5 0 at 8. On September 30, 2 010 Judge Legg ordered "limited discovery" to determine whether Jenkins, Openshaw, and Lynch had been acting under federal law when relevant events occurred. ECF Nos. 57 (); 58 at 22:15-17 () (Judge Legg: "[Santos] can only file a second amendment complaintalleging Bivens claims if they can allege that the officers were acting pursuant to Federal law and Federal authority."); id. at 27:3-13 (Judge Legg suggesting that before Santos amends her complaint to convert her § 1983 claims to Bivens actions, her counsel should depose Jenkins and the Deputies to determine whether they were operating under state or federal law).
On February 4, 2011, pursuant to a conference call held that day, Judge Legg ordered, inter alia, that "[a]ll supervisory liability claims will be bifurcated" and "discovery and subsequent motions will encompass only claims against the individual defendants." ECF No. 66. He further ordered Santos to file a second amended complaint by February 18, 2011. Id. On February 9, 2 011, Judge Legg approved Santos's stipulation of dismissal of the ICE agents. ECF No. 72. On February 18, 2011, Santos filed a second amended complaint. ECF No. 75.11
On February 7, 2012, Judge Legg granted the Deputies' motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 99. Judge Legg found that (1) the Deputies had not unreasonably seized Santos in violation of the Fourth Amendment as alleged in counts one and two; (2) the Deputies had not racially discriminated against Santos in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as alleged in count three; and (3) there was no evidence of a conspiracy as alleged in count four. ECF No. 98 at 7-17. Judge Legg also dismissed counts five to seven against the Board and Jenkins because Santos had not established constitutional violations by the Deputies. Id. at 17. On July 11, 2012, Judge Legg denied Santos's motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 110.12 On August 9, 2012 Santos timely appealed to the Fourth Circuit. ECF No. 111.13
2. The Fourth Circuit's Opinion
On August 7, 2013, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case to this Court. ECF No.115. The Fourth Circuit found that the Deputies had violated Santos's Fourth Amendment rights "when they seized her solely on the basis of the outstanding civil ICE warrant" because they "were not authorized to engage in immigration law enforcement" under § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357. Id. at 27. However, the Fourth Circuit found that qualified immunity barred Santos's individual claims against the Deputies because, when they detained Santos, "it was not clearly established that local law enforcement officers may not detain or arrest an individual based solely on a suspected or known violation of federal civil immigration law." Id. at 36.14 However, because the Deputies had violated Santos's constitutional rights and as qualified immunity does not bar claims against municipalities, the Fourth Circuit found that Judge Legg erred in dismissing Santos's official-capacity claims and claims against the Board. Id. at 39.15 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit remanded the suit to"determine whether the [D]eputies' unconstitutional actions are attributable to an official policy or custom of the county or the actions of a final county policymaker." Id. at 39.16
3. Proceedings on Remand
Also on August 7, 2013, the case was reassigned from Judge Legg to this Court. See Docket. On October 9, 2013, the Court approved the parties' joint request to stay proceedings pending the outcome of the Municipal Defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. ECF No. 125. On March 24, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the Municipal Defendants' petition. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Santos, 134 S. Ct. 1541, 188 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2014).
On October 17, 2014 the parties filed status reports. The Municipal Defendants stated, inter alia, that they intended to file a dispositive motion and that Santos had consented to their request to file within 60 days. ECF No. 129 at 2-3. Santos stated, inter alia, that a dispositive motion is premature and additional discovery is needed because of previous...
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