Santos v. Taste 1 Grp., LLC, Case No. 3:14-cv-383-J-34JBT
| Decision Date | 17 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:14-cv-383-J-34JBT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | KEVIN J. SANTOS, JR., Plaintiff, v. TASTE 1 GROUP, LLC, et al., Defendants. |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Final Default Judgment ("Motion") (Doc. 44). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Motion be GRANTED, that final judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the total amount of $17,499.54, and that Plaintiff have 30 days from entry of the Court's order on this Report and Recommendation to file a motion for attorneys' fees and costs.
Plaintiff brought the instant action pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., against Taste 1 Group, LLC ("Taste"), its owner Chris Dallo ("Dallo"), and Randy Salazar ("Salazar"), alleging the following claims: "Minimum Wage Violation Under FLSA (Against Defendants Taste and Dallo)" ("Count I"), "Recovery of Overtime Compensation (Against Defendants Taste and Dallo)" ("Count II"), and "Breach of Contract (Against all Defendants)" ("Count IV").2 (Doc. 1 at 7-11.)
Count IV, containing the only claim against Salazar, was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. (Docs. 46 & 47.) Default has been entered against Taste (Doc. 43) and Dallo (Doc. 11). Plaintiff now seeks a default judgment against both remaining Defendants on Counts I and II. (Doc. 44.)
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a two-step process for obtaining a default judgment. First, when a defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend a lawsuit, the clerk of court is authorized to enter a clerk's default against the defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, after receiving the clerk's default, the plaintiff must apply to the court for a default judgment, except in limited circumstances when application may be made to the clerk. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). A default judgment may be entered "against a defendant who has beendefaulted for not appearing and who is neither a minor nor an incompetent person." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). A default judgment may be entered "against a defendant who never appears or answers a complaint, for in such circumstances the case never has been placed at issue." Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 1130, 1134 (11th Cir. 1986).
All well-pleaded allegations of fact are deemed admitted upon entry of default, but before entering a default judgment, the court must ensure that it has jurisdiction over the claims and that the complaint adequately states a claim for which relief may be granted. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); see also GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp. v. Maitland Hotel Assocs., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1359 (M.D. Fla. 2002) () (citations omitted). A sufficient basis must exist in the pleadings for the judgment entered. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. A defendant "is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law." See id.; see also Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978) ().
Rule 8 provides that a complaint must include (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demandfor judgment for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A complaint meets the requirements of Rule 8 if, in light of the nature of the action, the complaint provides factual allegations, that are assumed to be true, sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ().
A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions," which simply "are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 664, 678. Thus, in ruling on a motion for final default judgment, the Court must determine whether a sufficient factual basis exists in the complaint for a judgment to be entered. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206.
Finally, when a plaintiff seeks the entry of a default judgment against an individual defendant, the plaintiff must comply with Section 521 of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act ("SCRA"), which requires, inter alia, the filing of an affidavit by the plaintiff:
Upon review of the Complaint, the Motion, and other relevant filings, the undersigned recommends that default judgment be entered against both Defendants on Counts I and II. The Court has federal question jurisdiction over these counts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Additionally, Plaintiff has established that Taste and Dallo were properly served, and defaults have been entered against them.3 (Docs. 11 & 43.) Further, as discussed below, each count adequately states a claim for which relief may be granted. The undersigned will address Counts I and II collectively.
To prevail on a claim for payment of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA, plaintiff must establish the following:
See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction (Civil Cases) 4.14 (2013).
The Complaint sufficiently alleges that Plaintiff was employed by Defendants during the relevant time period. Under the FLSA, an "employee" is "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). An "employer" "includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee," 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), and the term "employ" "includes to suffer or permit to work," 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). The Complaint contains the following allegations regarding the employer-employee relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants:
(Doc. 1 at 2-4.)4
The undersigned recommends that these allegations are sufficient to establish that an employer-employee relationship existed between Plaintiff and both Defendants. As to Dallo specifically, "[w]hile there is no requirement that an individual must be a corporate officer in order to be an employer under the FLSA, to be individually liable, an officer must either be involved in the day-to-day operationor have some direct responsibility for the supervision of the employee." Hernandez v. Anderson, Case No. 5:14-cv-577-Oc-39PRL, 2015 WL 3514483, at *4 (M.D. Fla. June 4, 2015) (citation and quotations omitted). The undersigned recommends that the above allegations regarding Dallo are sufficient to establish that Dallo was involved in the day-to-day operation of Taste and had some direct responsibility for the supervision of its employees. Therefore, Dallo and Taste are jointly and severally liable for Plaintiff's damages as his employers.
With respect to coverage under the FLSA, plaintiff must establish either (1) "individual coverage," meaning that the employee was "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce," or (2) "enterprise coverage," meaning that the employee was "employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 206(a); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); Thorne v. All Restoration...
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