Santos v. Warden
Decision Date | 05 April 2017 |
Docket Number | CV144005961 |
Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
Parties | Alexis Santos #356184 v. Warden |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
The petitioner, Alexis Santos, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his criminal defense attorney provided him ineffective assistance in violation of the state and federal constitutions, and seeking to have his convictions vacated. Specifically, the petitioner claims, in his Amended Petition filed July 22, 2016, that his right to effective legal representation was denied in that his counsel, attorney Tashun Bowden-Lewis, committed a number of errors at trial.
The petitioner claims that his right to effective legal representation at trial was denied in that his underlying trial counsel was constitutionally deficient in the following ways:
The respondent denies the allegations. The court heard the trial of this matter on the merits on September 13, October 24 and December 21, 2016. The petitioner called eight witnesses: himself, attorney Bowden-Lewis, Tanya Lombardo, Jeffrey Cianciolo, Claribel Santos, Dayanara Santos, expert mental health witness David Mantell and expert legal witness Kenneth Simon. Despite repeated diligent attempts, the petitioner was unable to secure the testimony of Daisy Cruz. The petitioner entered into evidence a number of exhibits. The respondent called no witnesses and offered three exhibits. Based upon the credible evidence presented, the court finds the issues for the respondent and denies the petition.
On September 24, 2012, in the Waterbury judicial district, in the matter of State of Connecticut v. Alexis Santos, docket number UWY-CR11-401131, following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of four counts of sexual assault first degree, in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(2), four counts of risk of injury to a minor, in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(2), and one count of risk of injury to a minor, in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(1). In Docket Number UWY-CR11-402391 the petitioner was convicted of one count of sexual assault first degree, one count of risk of injury to a minor in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(2), one count of risk of injury to a minor in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(1), and one count of sexual assault fourth degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a(a)(1)(A). On November 30, 2012, the trial court, Crawford, J., sentenced the petitioner to a total effective sentence of 20 years of incarceration followed by 20 years of special parole.
The petitioner appealed the underlying criminal judgment and on March 24, 2014, the Appellate Court affirmed the conviction per curiam . State of Connecticut v. Alexis Santos, 148 Conn.App. 907, 86 A.3d 1099, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 944, 89 A.3d 351 (2014). On February 7, 2014, the petitioner initiated this matter by the filing of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner was assisted at trial by a Spanish-language interpreter.
The allegations against the petitioner by victim M.H. include sexual contact by digital penetration on one occasion as well as non-sexual physical abuse. The allegations against the petitioner by Y.H. include repeated penile-vaginal, penile-anal and penile-oral sexual abuse.
The standard of proof in civil actions, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is " properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394, 440 A.2d 952 (1981).
" While the plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference that may be legitimately drawn from the evidence, and has the same right to submit a weak case as a strong one, the plaintiff must still sustain the burden of proof on the contested issues in the complaint and the defendant need not present any evidence to contradict it." Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 211, 439 A.2d 949 (1981). The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential elements of their cause of action by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Gulycz v. Stop & Shop, 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, 615 A.2d 1087, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 923, 618 A.2d 527 (1982). Failure to do so results in judgment for the defendant. Id.
The Proceedings
" The fact-finding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of the circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cavoli v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198, (2005). " It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony . . . it is the quintessential function of the factfinder to reject or accept certain evidence . . ." (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M ., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). " The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact]." Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123, 438 A.2d 842 (1981). " [N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to the testimony." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530, 378 A.2d 580 (1977). " The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party." Smith v. Smith, supra, 183 Conn. 123. " The determination of credibility is a function of the trial court." Heritage Square, LLC, v. Eoanou, 61 Conn.App. 329, 333, 764 A.2d 199 (2001).
It is well established that " [i]t is within the province of the trial court, when sitting as the fact finder, to weigh the evidence presented and determine the credibility and effect to be given the evidence . . . Credibility must be assessed . . . not by reading the cold printed record, but by observing firsthand the witness' conduct, demeanor and attitude . . . An appellate court must defer to the trier of fact's assessment of credibility because [i]t is the [fact finder] . . . [who has] an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and the parties; thus [the fact finder] is best able to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to draw necessary inferences therefrom." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v Lawrence, 282 Conn. 141, 155, 920 A.2d 236 (2007) (See also Dadio v. Dadio, 123 Conn. 88, 92-93, 192 A. 557 (1...
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