Santosky v. Kramer
| Decision Date | 24 March 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-5889,80-5889 |
| Citation | 71 L.Ed.2d 599,455 U.S. 745,102 S.Ct. 1388 |
| Parties | John SANTOSKY II and Annie Santosky, Petitioners v. Bernhardt S. KRAMER, Commissioner, Ulster County Department of Social Services, et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Under New York law, the State may terminate, over parental objection, the rights of parents in their natural child upon a finding that the child is "permanently neglected." The New York Family Court Act (§ 622) requires that only a "fair preponderance of the evidence" support that finding. Neglect proceedings were brought in Family Court to terminate petitioners' rights as natural parents in their three children. Rejecting petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of § 622's "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard, the Family Court weighed the evidence under that standard and found permanent neglect. After a subsequent dispositional hearing, the Family Court ruled that the best interests of the children required permanent termination of petitioners' custody. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' appeal to that court.
Held:
1. Process is constitutionally due a natural parent at a state-initiated parental rights termination proceeding. Pp. 752-757.
(a) The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. A parental rights termination proceeding interferes with that fundamental liberty interest. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. Pp. 752-754.
(b) The nature of the process due in parental rights termination proceedings turns on a balancing of three factors: the private interests affected by the proceedings; the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18. In any given proceeding, the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the public and private interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants. The minimum standard is a question of federal law which this Court may resolve. Retrospective case-by-case review cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a class of proceedings is governed by a constitutionally defective evidentiary standard. Pp. 754-757.
2. The "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard prescribed by § 622 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 758-768.
(a) The balance of private interests affected weighs heavily against use of such a standard in parental rights termination proceedings, since the private interest affected is commanding and the threatened loss is permanent. Once affirmed on appeal, a New York decision terminating parental rights is final and irrevocable. Pp. 758-761.
(b) A preponderance standard does not fairly allocate the risk of an erroneous factfinding between the State and the natural parents. In parental rights termination proceedings, which bear many of the indicia of a criminal trial, numerous factors combine to magnify the risk of erroneous factfinding. Coupled with the preponderance standard, these factors create a significant prospect of erroneous termination of parental rights. A standard of proof that allocates the risk of error nearly equally between an erroneous failure to terminate, which leaves the child in an uneasy status quo, and an erroneous termination, which unnecessarily destroys the natural family, does not reflect properly the relative severity of these two outcomes. Pp. 761-766.
(c) A standard of proof more strict than preponderance of the evidence is consistent with the two state interests at stake in parental rights termination proceedings—a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the child's welfare and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings. Pp. 766-768.
3. Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence. A "clear and convincing evidence" standard adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions necessary to satisfy due process. Determination of the precise burden equal to or greater than that standard is a matter of state law properly left to state legislatures and state courts. Pp. 768-770.
75 App.Div.2d 910, 427 N.Y.S.2d 319, vacated and remanded.
Martin Guggenheim, New York City, for petitioners.
Stephen Scavuzzo, Washington, D. C., for respondents, pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.
Under New York law, the State may terminate, over parental objection, the rights of parents in their natural child upon a finding that the child is "permanently neglected." N.Y.Soc.Serv.Law §§ 384-b.4.(d), 384-b.7.(a) (McKinney Supp.1981-1982) (Soc.Serv.Law). The New York Family Court Act § 622 (McKinney 1975 and Supp.1981-1982) (Fam.Ct.Act) requires that only a "fair preponderance of the evidence" support that finding. Thus, in New York, the factual certainty required to extinguish the parent-child relationship is no greater than that necessary to award money damages in an ordinary civil action.
Today we hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands more than this. Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.
New York authorizes its officials to remove a child temporarily from his or her home if the child appears "neglected," within the meaning of Art. 10 of the Family Court Act. See §§ 1012(f), 1021-1029. Once removed, a child under the age of 18 customarily is placed "in the care of an authorized agency," Soc.Serv.Law § 384-b.7.(a), usually a state institution or a foster home. At that point, "the state's first obligation is to help the family with services to . . . reunite it. . . ." § 384-b.1.(a)(iii). But if convinced that "positive, nurturing parent-child relationships no longer exist," § 384-b.1.(b), the State may initiate "permanent neglect" proceedings to free the child for adoption.
The State bifurcates its permanent neglect proceeding into "fact-finding" and "dispositional" hearings. Fam.Ct.Act §§ 622, 623. At the factfinding stage, the State must prove that the child has been "permanently neglected," as defined by Fam.Ct.Act §§ 614.1.(a)-(d) and Soc.Serv.Law § 384-b.7.(a). See Fam.Ct.Act § 622. The Family Court judge then determines at a subsequent dispositional hearing what placement would serve the child's best interests. §§ 623, 631.
At the factfinding hearing, the State must establish, among other things, that for more than a year after the child entered state custody, the agency "made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship." Fam.Ct.Act §§ 614.1.(c), 611. The State must further prove that during that same period, the child's natural parents failed "substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child although physically and financially able to do so." § 614.1(d). Should the State support its allegations by "a fair preponderance of the evidence," § 622, the child may be declared permanently ne- glected. § 611. That declaration empowers the Family Court judge to terminate permanently the natural parents' rights in the child. §§ 631(c), 634. Termination denies the natural parents physical custody, as well as the rights ever to visit, communicate with, or regain custody of the child.1
New York's permanent neglect statute provides natural parents with certain procedural protections.2 But New York permits its officials to establish "permanent neglect" with less proof than most States require. Thirty-five States, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands currently specify a higher standard of proof, in parental rights termination proceedings, than a "fair preponderance of the evidence." 3 The only analogous federal statute of which we are aware permits termination of parental rights solely upon "evidence beyond a reasonable doubt." Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-608, § 102(f), 92 Stat. 3072, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1976 ed., Supp.IV). The question here is whether New York's "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard is constitutionally sufficient.
Petitioners John Santosky II and Annie Santosky are the natural parents of Tina and John III. In November 1973, after incidents reflecting parental neglect, respondent Kramer, Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated a neglect proceeding under Fam.Ct.Act § 1022 and removed Tina from her natural home. About 10 months later, he removed John III and placed him with foster parents. On the day John was taken, Annie Santosky gave birth to a third child, Jed. When Jed was only three days old, respondent transferred him to a foster home on the ground that immediate removal was necessary to avoid imminent danger to his life or health.
In October 1978, respondent petitioned the Ulster County Family Court to terminate petitioners' parental rights in the three children.4 Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard specified in Fam.Ct.Act § 622. The Family Court Judge rejected this constitutional challenge, App. 29-30, and weighed the evidence...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Hodgkins v. Peterson
...Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.") (quotations omitted); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (termination of parental rights; "The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, an......
-
Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Authority
...between a parent and child can rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554-55, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978); Moore v. City of East Clevela......
-
Bucio v. Sutherland
... ... D.H., 120 Ohio St.3d at 548, 901 N.E.2d at 216 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). Unlike the statutory purpose behind adult criminal sentencing, to punish the ... ...
-
In re V. G.
...479 (1), 788 S.E.2d 84 (2016).15 In the Interest of M. F. , 298 Ga. at 145 (2), 780 S.E.2d 291 ; accord Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 753 (II), 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) ; In the Interest of S. O. C. , 332 Ga. App. at 746-47 (3), 774 S.E.2d 785.16 Floyd , 337 Ga. App. at 47......
-
Lego v. Twomey: the improbable relationship between an obscure Supreme Court decision and wrongful convictions.
...at 403 ("Quantified, the preponderance standard would be 50+ % Probable."). (44.) Addington, 441 U.S. at 423; see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 764 (1982) (discussing the correlation between the use of the preponderance standard and erroneous results, the Court observed in dictum: "A st......
-
Disputes Between Biological Parent and Third Parties
...fundamental rights of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of their children") See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L. Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982) (discussing 'the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, cu......
-
THE BURDENS OF THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE.
...2021), http://hopepolicy.org/manage/wp-content/uploads/Criminal-Justice-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/J52T-DHEU]. (193.) Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (194.) Id. at 756-59 (noting that proceedings that threaten a "stigma" require greater protection); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 41......
-
Adoption and foster care
...for the termination of parental rights on various grounds, including abuse, neglect, and abandonment). But see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982) (holding that parents’ fundamental interest in their children does not evaporate simply because they See Kyle S. Schroader, A Brief ......
-
PL 114-22, S 178 – Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015
...and convincing evidence standard satisfies due process for allegations to terminate or restrict parental rights in Santosky v. Kramer (455 U.S. 745 (7) Currently only 10 States have statutes allowing rape survivors to petition for the termination of parental rights of the rapist based on cl......
-
Act 128, SB 32 – CHILDREN: Provides relative to guardianship of children in need of care. (EN NO IMPACT GF EX See Note)
...substantial harm to the child, contact can be constitutionally eliminated. Troxelv. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In accordance with Ch.C. Art. 307, the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in child in need of care proceedings and cont......
-
Act 213, SB 2811 – Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights
...convincing evidence standard satisfies due process rights for proceedings to terminate or restrict parental rights, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) and the clear and convincing evidence standard is the most common standard for the termination of parental rights among all United Stat......