Sanville v. Town of Albany
| Citation | 2022 VT 22 |
| Decision Date | 13 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-AP-206 |
| Parties | Cindy Sanville v. Town of Albany |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Vermont |
On Appeal from Superior Court, Orleans Unit, Civil Division Mary Miles Teachout, J.
William L. Durrell of Bookchin & Durrell, P.C. Montpelier, for Cross-Claim Plaintiff-Appellee Buchanan.
Claudine C. Safar and Christian S. Chorba of Monaghan Safar Ducham PLLC, Burlington, for Cross-Claim Defendant-Appellant.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Carroll and Cohen, JJ., and Grearson, Supr. J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
¶ 1. The Town of Albany appeals from an order granting summary judgment to a surviving relative of the grantors who had quitclaimed undeveloped property to the Town subject to certain conditions. The civil division found that the deed was ambiguous, considered extrinsic evidence to discern the grantors' intent, and concluded that a logging operation overseen by the Town violated the deed. We conclude that the deed is unambiguous and the logging was not a violation. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
¶ 2. The following facts are undisputed. Brothers Bruce Buchanan and R.O. Buchanan each held a one-half interest in a forty-acre parcel of land near Hartwell Pond (the parcel) in the Town. Both were involved in 4-H during their lives.[1] Bruce Buchanan served as the Southern Regional Director of 4-H Vermont and ran Camp Waubanong, a 4-H camp in southern Vermont. R.O. Buchanan was a professor at University of Vermont and led the Green Mountain Club's Long Trail Patrol. After Bruce Buchanan's death, his one-half interest was conveyed to his widow, Emma Buchanan. In April 1955, Emma Buchanan and R.O. Buchanan conveyed the parcel to the Town by quitclaim deed. The relevant language provides:
It is expressly understood and agreed, that in the event the grantee shall use or suffer the use of said lands for any other purpose than as a memorial 4-H forest for use by young people in particular, and for 4-H recreational and forestry purposes, this conveyance shall thereupon become void and the title to said premises on demand shall revert to the grantors, their successors and assigns, and they shall have the right to re-enter and repossess themselves of the same.
¶ 3. From 1955 to 2018, the Town did not use the land for any purpose. In January 2018, the Town's selectboard decided to develop the parcel as a public recreation area. The plan included a parking area, a trail to Hartwell Pond, and other infrastructure consistent with recreational use. In August 2018, the Town selectboard hired a logger to harvest sections of the parcel, including clearcutting a portion of an eleven-acre softwood tree plantation, as part of the recreation development project. The logging began in October 2018.
¶ 4. Cindy Sanville also owns land on Hartwell Pond. Sanville filed a complaint against the Town in October 2018 seeking a declaration regarding the ownership of the parcel and a preliminary injunction to stop the logging. She argued that the deed language quoted above contains a reversionary clause, meaning the parcel would automatically revert to the grantors' successors in interest if the Town "use[d] or suffered the use of said lands for any other purpose" than those expressed in the deed. Sanville contended that the logging operation violated the deed, which triggered the reversionary clause. As a result, according to Sanville, the parcel automatically reverted to the grantors' successors in interest.
¶ 5. In November 2018, the civil division ordered Ralph Buchanan, a relative of the grantors, joined to the case as an indispensable party under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 19. In the same order, the court granted a preliminary injunction to stop the logging. By that point, approximately ten acres had been clearcut. Pursuant to the contract with the logger, the Town received $32, 547.23, and placed those funds into an escrow account for use in further developing the property as a public recreation area.
¶ 6. In February 2019, Buchanan filed a cross claim against the Town, arguing that under the plain terms of the deed the parcel reverted to him when the logging began. Thereafter, he moved for partial summary judgment. He maintained that the deed was ambiguous regarding what ownership interests it created. Buchanan pointed to language he alleged created a determinable fee, and other clauses allegedly creating a fee simple subject to condition subsequent.[2] He contended that by applying a rule of construction favoring earlier over later clauses in ambiguous deed passages, the court should conclude that the deed created a determinable fee with a possibility of reverter. Consequently, he continued, the parcel either automatically reverted to him when the Town left the parcel unused or when it began to log the parcel.
¶ 7. The Town cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plain language of the deed created a fee subject to condition subsequent. The Town contended that the logging was not a condition subsequent because it was necessary to develop the infrastructure required to service recreational purposes, and that clearcutting was a valid logging method. During a September 2019 hearing on the motions, the court found the deed ambiguous regarding the type of estate the deed created and ordered the parties to produce extrinsic evidence to clarify the grantors' intent.
¶ 8. The civil division granted summary judgment to Buchanan. It first concluded that the deed created a fee subject to condition subsequent, with the grantors retaining a right of entry. It reasoned that deed language such as" 'this conveyance shall thereupon become void and the title to said premises on demand shall revert to the Grantors, and they shall have the right to re-enter and repossess themselves of the same'" indicated the grantors' "clear intent" to create a right of reentry. The court concluded that this interpretation was "consistent with the fact that the property was a 40 acre undeveloped parcel of land suitable for forestry," and that while there was a "forest existing on the property at the time of the deed," there was no "4-H recreational and forestry use at the time." It determined that it did not make sense to create a determinable fee because "most likely [development for 4-H purposes] would take a period of time" to implement.
¶ 9. The court then held that the logging constituted a condition subsequent because it "was unrelated to 4-H forestry activities[, ] . . . had no connection with any 4-H forestry activities[, ] and was done by the Town for its own purposes." The court opined that the deed's "emphasis on use exclusively for defined 4-H people and purposes is unmistakable." The order did not expressly state that the court was also analyzing whether the logging violated the deed under an ambiguous standard; however, it found that Buchanan's extrinsic evidence "emphasiz[ed]" that the "exclusive purpose was not implemented by the Town" when it logged the parcel. It found that the grantors had been "actively involved in 4-H summer camps," that their "intent was that any forestry activities would be as part of a 4-H program involving young people in forestry activities," and the ultimate "goal was the establishment of a 4-H summer camp," "with the forest itself being a memorial related to 4-H." The court held that the Town's nonuse of the parcel "probably would have supported a claimed violation" but no Buchanan heir exercised their right of reentry. Buchanan exercised his right of reentry regarding the logging violation, the court concluded, when he filed his February 2019 cross-claim against the Town.
¶ 10. The Town filed a motion to reconsider, agreeing that the deed was ambiguous as to whether it prohibited the logging, but arguing that the weight of the extrinsic evidence regarding the grantors' intent showed that, in fact, no violation had occurred. The court denied the Town's motion to reconsider and granted its motion for interlocutory appeal on the single question of whether the logging violated the deed.
¶ 11. On appeal, the Town insists that the civil division's conclusion that the deed establishes an "unmistakable" emphasis on exclusive 4-H uses was incorrect because the deed unambiguously contemplates uses by the general public in addition to 4-H. The Town argues that the word "and" in "memorial 4-H forest for use by young people in particular, and for 4-H recreational and forestry purposes" indicates that the grantors intended the parcel to be used either as a memorial 4-H forest or for 4-H recreational and forestry purposes. (emphasis added). It submits that the phrase "for use by young people in particular" provides further evidence of the grantors' intention for nonexclusive use of the parcel. The Town cites dictionary definitions of "memorial" and "forest" to argue that the logging did not violate the plain terms of the deed. It asserts that the extrinsic evidence regarding the grantors' intent "is even stronger than the language of the deed," and points to the grantors' various outdoor recreational commitments as evidence that they intended nonexclusive use of the parcel. The Town finally contends that its future development plans for the parcel do not violate the deed.
¶ 12. Buchanan counters that the logging was not "in memory of 4-H," and was instead "designed to provide funding to develop the parcel as a campground and recreational area open to the public," which constituted a violation. He also renews his argument that the deed created a determinable fee rather than a fee subject to condition subsequent and the parcel automatically reverted to him once the logging began. In the alternative, he insists that nonuse by the Town constituted an independent violation which caused the parcel to...
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