Sanville v. Williams, 293-78

Decision Date21 July 1980
Docket NumberNo. 293-78,293-78
Citation418 A.2d 860,138 Vt. 498
CourtVermont Supreme Court
PartiesDorothy SANVILLE v. Robert and Nancy WILLIAMS.

Rexford, Kilmartin, Chimileski & White, Inc., Newport, for plaintiff.

Charity A. Downs of Conley & Foote, Middlebury, for defendants.

Before BARNEY, C. J., and DALEY, LARROW, BILLINGS and HILL, JJ.

BARNEY, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff had a bad fall on the premises of the defendants and sued to recover for her injuries. The jury found for the defendants, and the plaintiff appeals, seeking a new trial. All claims of error are based on the instructions given the jury.

The defendants operated a tree business, selling cut Christmas trees at the appropriate season and trees for transplanting at other times. One of the people the defendants hired on a day-to-day basis when the work justified shared the plaintiff's residence with her. Plaintiff Sanville had been in the habit of taking him to and from work for about four years, since he did not drive. The accidental fall took place on an occasion when the plaintiff came to the defendants' premises to pick the employee up.

The place where the fall occurred was the basement of the defendants' home. The first floor had the family living quarters and the usual type of entrance. Their residence was also used as a base of operations for the business, and contained a basement garage. The basement had a large garage door which had a smaller door cut into it so that entry could be gained to the cellar without opening the big door. In the cement floor of the cellar there was a pit arrangement formed of two fifty gallon drums imbedded on end. It was into one of these the plaintiff stepped or fell and broke her leg.

On the day in question the plaintiff came to the door and sought to be admitted. Mrs. Williams was at home but was working with the stereo on and did not hear her. She had temporarily wired shut or locked the front door since she had just done her floors and did not want her children, who were outside, or anyone else, to come in to disturb them. The plaintiff then went around the house and down to the garage door. The large door was closed but, according to her testimony, the smaller door was ajar. She pushed it open and went in, closing it behind her.

She testified that, although she knew where the light switches were, she did not see the need to turn any on, since there was already a light on at the rear of the cellar. In crossing toward the rear she walked to one side to avoid the pit area, but fell in.

It was the plaintiff's testimony that she had been in the cellar from upstairs several times and knew the layout, and had, on occasion, helped to clean it as well as to stack wood there. However, she had never seen the pit area without a plywood cover, and had come in through the outside cellar door only twice before: once when the full door was standing open, and once when the smaller door was open. On one of these occasions the defendant, Mrs. Williams, directed her to go that way because of an obstruction on the porch. On the other, Mrs. Williams invited her in because she was working in the cellar.

With respect to the living area above the cellar the evidence was that the plaintiff frequently entered the house to wait for her passenger, and many times did so without knocking. The hours he worked tended to be irregular and quitting time was subject to a good deal of variation. When the plaintiff brought him in the morning they would frequently go in the house through the front door and start the coffee before the defendants were up. The plaintiff's interest in standing by at that time related to finding out when she should come back to get her passenger.

The case was submitted to the jury with alternative duty concepts applying to the defendants. The trial court charged that if, on the evidence, the plaintiff was a trespasser when the fall occurred, the defendants' duties were limited by that status. On...

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7 cases
  • Poulin v. Ford Motor Co.
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • May 16, 1986
    ...and therefore they are precluded from raising it on appeal. Collette, supra, 141 Vt. at 374, 449 A.2d at 937; Sanville v. Williams, 138 Vt. 498, 501, 418 A.2d 860, 862 (1980). Defendants argue, however, that this statement constitutes a "failure of justice" which requires reversal. See Perk......
  • Muir v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 84-479
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • January 9, 1987
    ...The court thereby did not have a fair opportunity to rule upon the claim, which precludes review by this Court. Sanville v. Williams, 138 Vt. 498, 501, 418 A.2d 860, 862 (1980). * Justice Gibson heard oral argument but did not participate in this decision.1 Upon motion by defendant Allstate......
  • Agency of Environmental Conservation v. Casella
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1983
    ...State even possesses insurance coverage which applies to this kind of activity is left entirely speculative. Cf. Sanville v. Williams, 138 Vt. 498, 501, 418 A.2d 860, 862 (1980). Moreover, this issue is governed by Lomberg v. Crowley, supra, 138 Vt. at 423, 415 A.2d at 1326, and could not, ......
  • Lanphere v. Beede, 292-81
    • United States
    • Vermont Supreme Court
    • April 6, 1982
    ...or it was hearsay. Contentions not raised or fairly presented to the trial court are not preserved for appeal. Sanville v. Williams, 138 Vt. 498, 501, 418 A.2d 860, 862 (1980). Matters raised for the first time on appeal are not considered on appellate review. Monti v. Town of Northfield, 1......
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