Sanzone v. Board of Police Com'rs of City of Bridgeport
| Decision Date | 11 June 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 14102,14102 |
| Citation | 219 Conn. 179,592 A.2d 912 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Louis SANZONE, et al. v. BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF the CITY OF BRIDGEPORT, et al. |
Robert R. Sheldon, with whom were Frank A. Bailey and, on the brief, T. Paul Tremont, Bridgeport, for appellants (plaintiffs).
John H. Barton, Associate City Atty., with whom was Carolyn C. Mihalek, Asst. City Atty., for appellees (defendants).
Before SHEA, GLASS, COVELLO, BORDEN and FRANCIS X. HENNESSY, JJ.
We are asked to determine the meaning and scope of a proviso contained within General Statutes § 52-557n, § 13 of the Tort Reform Act of 1986, No. 86-338 of the 1986 Public Acts. 1 That statute addresses the liabilities and immunities of political subdivisions, their employees, officers and agents. The trial court concluded that the proviso barred the plaintiffs' tort and indemnification claims against a city and its police officers arising out of an accident allegedly caused by a defective traffic light. It therefore granted the defendants' motion to strike and the plaintiffs' motion for judgment, from which the plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.
The plaintiffs 2 sued the city of Bridgeport, its board of police commissioners, the members of the board, the superintendent of police, and a police sergeant, all "acting as" the city's "traffic authority," for damages the named plaintiff's wife suffered when, according to the complaint, the car in which she was a passenger collided with another vehicle after the traffic light at an intersection simultaneously signalled green to both vehicles, one traveling north, the other traveling west. The plaintiffs alleged that this malfunction was caused because the defendants collectively had "failed to maintain" and inspect the traffic light as required by General Statutes § 14-314a 3 or because they had "disassembled" one half of the "traffic control" in violation of General Statutes § 14-314b. 4 The complaint contained five counts: count one, charging the board of police commissioners, the superintendent and the sergeant with negligence under § 52-557n and with nuisance; count two, claiming loss of consortium arising from the same tortious conduct; count three, charging the members of the police commission, the superintendent and the sergeant with misperformance or "violation" of their ministerial duties; count four, claiming loss of consortium arising from the same tortious conduct; and count five, seeking indemnity by the city, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 7-465(a), 5 for the damages sought in count three.
On the defendants' motion, the trial court struck the complaint in its entirety holding that § 52-557n made a defective highway claim under General Statutes § 13a-149, 6 commonly referred to as the "highway defect statute," a plaintiff's exclusive remedy against a municipality for damages resulting from a "highway defect." It held, further, that because § 7-465(a) required a municipality to indemnify its officers for their negligent acts, § 52-557n also barred an action against municipal officers for damages resulting from a highway defect. In their appeal, the plaintiffs claim that: (1) § 52-557n permits them to bring nuisance and negligence claims against a municipality whether or not they also have a valid claim under § 13a-149; (2) if it does not, § 52-557n is unconstitutional; and (3) even if § 13a-149 would be the exclusive remedy for a claim involving a highway defect, the plaintiffs' claims should not have been stricken prior to a determination at trial that the facts alleged would support a valid claim under § 13a-149.
Section 52-557n of the General Statutes was enacted as § 13 of the Tort Reform Act of 1986. The Tort Reform Act was drafted in response to rapidly rising insurance rates, which, some believed, would be curtailed if tort liability could be limited and systematized. 7 As finally enacted, the act represents a complex web of interdependent concessions and bargains struck by hostile interest groups and individuals of opposing philosophical positions.
Sections 13 and 14 of the act address municipal liability. Section 13, now § 52-557n, entitled "Liability of political subdivision and its employees, officers and agents," contains two subsections. Subsection (a) sets forth general principles of municipal liability and immunity, while subsection (b) sets forth nine specific situations in which both municipalities and their officers are immune from tort liability. Section 14 of the act modifies the required notice provision contained within § 13a-149, the highway defect statute, by removing language which previously had permitted a party to satisfy the statutory notice requirement, the condition precedent to recovery of damages from a municipality under that statute, by filing a complaint within the ninety day notice period. The act does not refer to § 7-465.
Section 52-557n(a), § 13(a) of the act, provides in pertinent part: (Emphasis added.) The defendants' motion to strike, and the trial court's decision, were based squarely upon the italicized proviso.
The plaintiffs countered by asserting, first, that the section as a whole was intended to codify the existing common law on municipal liability, using the phrase "except as otherwise provided" in subdivision (a)(1) as a catch-all savings clause designed to preserve any unenumerated causes of action; and second, that the proviso itself simply reaffirmed the continuing viability of claims brought pursuant to § 13a-149 or, alternatively, eliminated a plaintiff's rights to bring nuisance actions against a municipality while leaving alternative theories of liability, e.g., negligence, intact.
The guideposts of statutory construction are familiar. Our task is to find the expressed intent of the legislature, "that is, the intention of the legislative body 'as found from the words employed to make it manifest.' " Park Regional Corporation v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 144 Conn. 677, 682, 136 A.2d 785 (1957). We seek the intent of the legislature "not in what it meant to say, but in what it did say." Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 571, 512 A.2d 893 (1986). Thus, "[t]he actual intent, as a state of mind, of the members of a legislative body is immaterial, even if it were ascertainable." Park Regional Corporation v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, supra.
To determine the collectively expressed legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute itself. If that language is plain and unambiguous, we go no further. University of Connecticut v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 322, 328, 585 A.2d 690 (1991). If, however, the statute is ambiguous, e.g., either opaque or susceptible to alternative conflicting interpretations, we will seek guidance from "extrinsic aids," e.g., the legislative history. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, 200 Conn. 630, 637-38, 513 A.2d 52 (1986); State v. Ellis, 197 Conn. 436, 445, 497 A.2d 974 (1985). If the legislative history and purpose are also ambiguous, we may resort to "intrinsic aids," the technical rules of statutory construction. Farms Country Club, Inc. v. Carini, 172 Conn. 439, 443, 374 A.2d 1094 (1977); see also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n. 29, 91 S.Ct. 814, 821 n. 29, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.Sands) § 48.01. In applying these principles, we follow the "golden rule of statutory interpretation"; 2A J. Sutherland, supra, § 45.12, p. 54; that the legislature is presumed to have intended a reasonable, just and constitutional result. See Board of Education v. State Board of Labor Relations, 217 Conn. 110, 126, 584 A.2d 1172 (1991); Gentry v. Norwalk, 196 Conn. 596, 606, 494 A.2d 1206 (1985); Bridgeport v. Stratford, 142 Conn. 634, 644, 116 A.2d 508 (1955); Camp v. Rogers, 44 Conn. 291, 298 (1877); see also 2A J. Sutherland, supra, §§ 45.11, 45.12.
The meaning of § 52-557n(a) is far from plain. At a minimum, it is unclear whether the proviso modifies only subdivision (a)(1)(C) or (A) and (B) as well as (C); it is unclear what is intended by the words "Except as otherwise provided by law" that begin subsection (a) and, if they conflict with the words of the clause, "provided, no cause of action shall be maintained," which language prevails; and it is unclear whether the limitation on liability of political subdivisions contained in the section is intended to supersede the indemnification statute, § 7-465.
Unfortunately, the legislative history of § 52-557n is worse than murky; it is contradictory. The only explicit reference to the proviso in question sheds no...
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