Sanzotta v. Devor
| Decision Date | 06 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2021-L-041 |
| Citation | 2023 Ohio 348 |
| Parties | SEBASTIAN SANZOTTA, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD DEVOR, JR., et al., Defendants, SETH CHRISTENSEN, et al., Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, OLD REPUBLIC NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Third Party Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas Trial Court No. 2019 CV 001854
Stephen G. Thomas, (For Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-Appellants).
David L. Van Slyke, Plunkett & Cooney, PC, (For Third Party Defendant-Appellee).
{¶1} Appellants, third-party plaintiffs Seth and Bobbi Christensen, appeal the order of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, third-party defendant Old Republic National Title Insurance Company ("Old Republic").
{¶2} The Christensens raise five assignments of error contending that the Old Republic had a duty to defend the claims against the Christensens and that the trial court erred in finding no issue of material fact.
{¶3} After a review of the record and applicable caselaw, we find the Christensens' assignments of error to be without merit. While the Christensens argued that the claims against them were covered risks under the policy, none of the claims asserted against them in the underlying complaint were claims that affected title and were therefore not covered under the title insurance policy. Further, Old Republic had no duty to defend these claims merely because Old Republic had agreed to defend a separate cross-claim made against the Christensens. Finally, the claims involved in the underlying complaint related to an easement and the policy expressly excluded coverage for claims arising from it. Thus, the trial court appropriately awarded summary judgment to Old Republic as a matter of law. The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Substantive and Procedural History:
{¶4} This appeal stems from a title insurance policy between the Christensens and Old Republic. The trial court found that the policy does not cover the claims on which the Christensens had been sued. It therefore denied the Christensens' summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that the claims were covered and entered judgment for the Old Republic.
{¶5} Plaintiff Sebastian Sanzotta owned property on 6035 Collins Road in Mentor, Ohio. 6033 Collins Road holds an easement on Sanzotta's property for driveway access. The responsibility to maintain that easement rested with the owners of 6033 Collins Road. The Christensens bought 6033 Collins Road in 2014. At that time, a concrete driveway built by the previous owner, was present on the easement. The Christensens bought a title insurance policy from Old Republic at the time they bought the property.
{¶6} In April 2019, Sanzotta notified the Christensens of his nuisance and trespass claims arising from the easement. Sanzotta ordered a survey of the property and notified the Christensens of the results on June 12, 2019. The survey showed that part of the concrete driveway on the easement extended beyond the boundary of the easement and onto Sanzotta's property. On June 21, 2019, the Christensens transferred their property, including the easement, to Richard and Renee Devor. In November 2019, Sanzotta filed a complaint against the Christensens and the Devors alleging "ongoing trespasses and nuisances", and failure "to maintain the Dominant Estate [easement] across Plaintiffs property." Specifically, Sanzotta alleged that improper drainage and grading on the easement and negligent maintenance of the pavement had caused damage to his property. Sanzotta did not sue to quiet title or to terminate the easement.
{¶7} The Devors denied liability and filed a cross-claim against the Christensens seeking indemnification from the Christensens for Sanzotta's claims without articulating the basis for the alleged right to indemnification. The Christensens denied liability and filed a counterclaim against Sanzotta alleging frivolous conduct. The Christensens submitted a claim to Old Republic demanding that Old Republic defend and indemnify them for the claims alleged in the complaint and the cross-claim.
{¶8} Old Republic agreed to defend the Devors' cross-claim against the Christensens. However, Old Republic denied defense of Sanzotta's claims against the Christensens on the grounds that those claims were not covered by the policy's covered risks or were within the insurance policy's exclusions and exceptions from coverage.
{¶9} The Christensens filed a third-party complaint against Old Republic seeking a declaration that they were entitled to insurance coverage for Sanzotta's claims, and a claim for bad faith and attorney fees. Old Republic filed an answer denying the allegations. After discovery, the Christensens moved for Summary Judgment on their declaratory judgment claim against Old Republic. Old Republic opposed the motion and filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on the third-party complaint for declaratory judgment.
{¶10} The trial court denied the Christensens' Motion for Summary Judgment, granted Old Republic's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissed the entire third-party complaint. The court based its decision on the language of the insurance policy, holding that the policy did not cover claims for failures to maintain easements or for the nuisance and trespasses that Sanzotta had alleged. The Christensens timely filed this appeal.
Standard of Review:
{¶11} We review decisions awarding summary judgment de novo and independently review the trial court's decision without deference pursuant to the standards in Civ.R. 56(C). Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993); Northeast Ohio Apt. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 121 Ohio App.3d 188, 191, 699 N.E.2d 534 (8th Dist.1997).
{¶12} "Summary judgment is appropriate when (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists; (2) the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion adverse to the nonmoving party. Holliman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 86 Ohio St.3d 414, 415, 715 N.E.2d 532 (1999). The initial burden is on the moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating that no issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). "If the movant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial." Allen v. 5125 Peno, LLC, 2017-Ohio-8941, 101 N.E.3d 484, ¶ 6 (11th Dist.), citing Dresher at 292-293.
Review of Insurance Policies:
{¶13} A reviewing court generally interprets insurance policies "in accordance with the same rules as other types of contracts." Columbiana Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 130 Ohio App.3d 8, 15, 719 N.E.2d 561 (7th Dist.1998), citing Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 665, 597 N.E.2d 1096 (1992). When policy language is doubtful, uncertain, or ambiguous, the language will be construed liberally in favor of the insured. Faruque v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 31 Ohio St.3d 34, 38, 508 N.E.2d 949 (1987). This is particularly true in exclusions from liability, which "must be clear and exact in order to be given effect." Lane v. Grange Mut. Cos., 45 Ohio St.3d 63, 65, 543 N.E.2d 488 (1985).
{¶14} However, when the terms of an insurance policy are "clear and unambiguous, then its interpretation is a matter of law and there is no issue of fact to be determined." Inland Refuse Transfer Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Of Ohio, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 321, 322, 474 N.E.2d 271 (1984). Therefore, a court may use summary judgment to appropriately resolve insurance policy coverage issues. Id.
{¶15} To determine whether ambiguities exist, words and phrases in the policy will be given their plain and ordinary meaning absent specific contractual definitions. Watkins v. Brown, 97 Ohio App.3d 160, 164, 646 N.E.2d 485 (1994). An insurance company "is under no obligation to its insured, or to others harmed by the actions of an insured, unless the conduct alleged of the insured falls within the coverage of the policy," and does not fall within an exception to the policy. Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 34, 36, 665 N.E.2d 1115 (1996).
{¶16} Whether Old Republic owes the Christensens a duty to defend or indemnify the Christensens for Sanzotta's claims against them turns on the language of the insurance policy in question. (See Appendix, pages 40-41, for relevant contract language.) Summary judgment will be appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and when the moving party, Old Republic, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, even when viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the Christensens.
Title Insurance:
{¶17} Ohio Revised Code Chapter 3953 governs title insurance. Section 3953.01(A) defines "title insurance" as:
insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying owners of real property or others interested in real property against loss or damage suffered by reason of liens or encumbrances upon, defect in, or the unmarketability of the title to the real property, guaranteeing, warranting, or otherwise insuring by a title insurance company the correctness of searches relating to the title to real property, or doing any business in substance equivalent to any of the foregoing.
{¶18} Section 3953.01(C) defines a "title insurance company" as any of the following:
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