Sappington v. Bartee

• Decision Date: 23 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-41549,98-41549
• Citation: 195 F.3d 234
• Parties: (5th Cir. 1999) RICHARD LEE SAPPINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEX BARTEE, Etc., ET AL., Defendants, RUBEN GARCIA, Cuero City Police Officer, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 234

195 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999)

RICHARD LEE SAPPINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEX BARTEE, Etc., ET AL., Defendants, RUBEN GARCIA Cuero City Police Officer, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 98-41549

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

November 23, 1999

As Revised November 24, 1999.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges, and LEMELLE, District Judge.¹

PER CURIAM:

Ruben Garcia brings this interlocutory appeal of the denial of his motion for summary judgment. We agree with him that the summary judgment record establishes his entitlement to qualified immunity, and accordingly reverse and render judgment in his favor.

Appellee Richard Sappington brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Garcia and others had violated his constitutional rights in the course of their treatment of him on or about March 22, 1992. Sappington alleged that Garcia, a police officer, and other officers had approached him while he and his wife were parked on the side of a road. The officers allegedly took him to the county jail, where he was surrounded, sprayed with pepper spray, and beaten. Sappington alleged that the officers used excessive force and deprived him of liberty without due process of law.

Garcia moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity, and that Sappington's conviction for assaulting Garcia barred Sappington's 1983 suit. Sappington was convicted in Texas state court of assaulting Garcia on March 22, 1992. The jury assessed a 99-year sentence, and was undoubtedly influenced by Sappington's lengthy criminal record that included two prior convictions for aggravated assault of a peace officer. The conviction has not been overturned. The district court noted that one of Sappington's strategies at his criminal trial was to claim that he acted in self-defense. Dist. Ct. Opn. at 11 n.15 (citing criminal court record).

Garcia argues that Sappington's excessive force claim is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994). We agree. In Heck the Court held that

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. . . . Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Id. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (footnote omitted).

The denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable if the denial turns on an issue of law. Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1995). Qualified immunity attaches to individual defendants' actions "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982). However, before reaching the issue of qualified immunity, we must decide whether the plaintiff has stated a claim for a violation of a constitutional right. Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1404 (5th Cir. 1995). "Thus, if it becomes evident that the plaintiff has failed to state or otherwise to establish a claim, then the defendant is entitled to dismissal on that basis." Wells, 45 F.3d at 94. On this basis we have held that the denial of a summary judgment is reviewable and subject to reversal if the claim isbarred under Heck. Wells, 45 F.3d at 94-96.

In a case raising similar facts, we held that Heck barred a plaintiff's 1983 suit alleging excessive force. In Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868 (5th Cir. 1996), the plaintiff alleged that "he was brutally beaten during his arrest, that excessive force was used, and that these acts were unconstitutional." Id. at 871. The plaintiff Hudson had been convicted under Louisiana law of battery of an officer during the course of his arrest. We reasoned that his excessive force claim was barred because it necessarily implied the invalidity of his conviction:

Hudson was arrested and convicted of battery of an officer. In Louisiana, self-defense is a justification defense to the crime of battery of an officer. To make out a justification defense, the criminal defendant charged with battery of an officer must show that his use of force against an officer was both reasonable and necessary to prevent a forcible offense against himself. Because self-defense is a justification defense to the crime of battery of an officer, Hudson's claim that [defendants] used excessive force while apprehending him, if proved, necessarily would imply the invalidity of his arrest and conviction for battery of an officer. This is true because the question whether the police applied reasonable force in arresting him depends in part on the degree of his resistance, which in turn will place in issue whether his resistance (the basis of his conviction for assaulting a police officer) was justified, which, if it were, necessarily undermines that conviction. We conclude...