Saqr v. Univ. of Cincinnati
| Decision Date | 20 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 1:18-cv-542 |
| Parties | AHMAD SAQR, et al., Plaintiff, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Bowman, M.J.
On August 3, 2018, two brothers, Ahmad Saqr and Omar Saqr, filed suit against the University of Cincinnati and the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine (collectively "UC").1 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title VI as well as related state laws, when UC's Performance and Advancement Committee recommended Plaintiffs' respective dismissals from UC's medical school program and those recommendations were upheld by an appeal panel.
In lieu of an answer, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based upon a lack of federal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 6). Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to that motion, (Doc. 9), to which Defendants filed a reply. (Doc. 10). For the reasons that follow I now recommend that UC's motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Unlike a motion for summary judgment, a motion to dismiss is directed to the sufficiency of the pleadings, with the Court's review limited accordingly. Thus, in evaluating the pending motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is required to "accept all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 426 (6th Cir. 2007) (). A complaint must contain more than "labels and conclusions" under the standards established in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009). At the same time, Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth only a "notice pleading" standard and does not require detailed factual allegations. For that reason, all reasonable inferences are to be construed in favor of the plaintiffs, and a complaint generally will survive under Rule 12(b)(6) standards if it contains sufficient factual content "that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949).
Many of Plaintiffs' allegations and several claims focus on alleged discrimination related to Plaintiffs' status as Egyptian Muslim males. (See, e.g. Doc. 1 at ¶18, alleging that "100% of the students who were dismissed from Defendant's program in recent years were minority students."). However, three of the articulated claims focus on Plaintiffs' alleged learning disabilities. In Count I of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that UC deniedthem accommodations and discriminated against them in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). Although Plaintiffs fail to identify the precise provision of the ADA under which they proceed, the parties agree that the claims arise under Title II of the ADA. That provision provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
In its motion, UC argues that Plaintiffs' allegations are so conclusory as to be insufficient to state any claim under Title II and/or that Plaintiffs' ADA claims should be dismissed on the basis of UC's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The undersigned begins with an examination of whether - apart from the immunity issue - Plaintiffs' allegations are otherwise sufficient to state any claim under Title II.
Plaintiffs allege that prior to their respective dismissals from the medical school, UC's Performance and Advancement Committee ("PAC") learned that each Plaintiff had one or more disabilities and needed accommodations. Plaintiffs have alleged that they sought but were refused "proper accommodations" by UC.2 (Doc. 1, Complaint at ¶¶ 36, 49, 64). Plaintiff Ahmad more specifically alleges that he has ADHD and a general anxiety disorder, (Id. at ¶34), while Plaintiff Omar alleges that he suffers from anxiety, depression, and ADHD. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-49). Plaintiff Ahmad alleges that "[i]t was circulated that Ahmad passed his classes when he received support, but when [he] did not receive the same level [of] support of his classmates, it [led] to failure." (Id. at ¶30). Plaintiffs jointly assert that they "could have performed in the program had Defendant provided reasonableaccommodations," and that they "would not have been dismissed if they did not have a disability." (Id. at ¶67). Thus, as a result of their disabilities, Plaintiffs assert they were denied access to a program of education at the University of Cincinnati, College of Medicine and ultimately were dismissed from that program. (See id. at ¶¶ 34-40, 46-54, 59-68).
While conceding that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that they suffer from disabilities, UC argues that Plaintiffs have failed to "establish" the remaining elements of a Title II claim, such as demonstrating they were otherwise qualified to continue in medical school with or without reasonable accommodations, that they conveyed to UC officials their formal diagnoses, that they requested accommodations in a legally sufficient manner, and that the school failed to provide accommodations. See generally Kaltenberger v. Ohio College of Podiatric Medicine, 162 F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 1998). It is true that Plaintiffs' allegations are relatively conclusory, insofar as the allegations fail to identify specific individuals other than the "Defendant," UC's PAC, or UC's "Appeal Panel." At the same time, however, UC relies upon cases that were decided on summary judgment, not on a motion to dismiss. In so doing, UC misconstrues the notice pleading standard, which requires only allegations that give rise to reasonable inferences to support Plaintiffs' Title II claims.
The issue is undoubtedly close given the paucity of factual detail. However, in the context of the present motion, it is appropriate to give the Plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt. Thus, reviewing the allegations as a whole, the undersigned concludes that the allegations are not so deficient that dismissal is warranted but reasonably construes the allegations as stating claims by each Plaintiff under Title II of the ADA. Contrast Cooley v. Western Michigan University Cooley Law School, 2017 WL 4324944 (E.D. Mich. Sept.29, 2017) ().
UC urges this Court to consider further whether it is entitled to at least partial dismissal based upon a further parsing of Plaintiffs' claims. Title II case law reflects a variety of more specific legal theories beyond the intentional discrimination proscribed by the statutory language, including disparate treatment, disparate impact, and a failure to accommodate. Distinguishing among those legal theories, UC argues in its motion that Plaintiffs' Title II claim should be dismissed based upon a failure to state a "failure to accommodate" claim. In its reply brief,3 UC additionally argues that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently identify similarly situated individuals in a manner that would support a "disparate treatment" claim under the ADA. (Doc. 10 at 9). Contrast generally James v. Hampton, 592 Fed. Appx. 449, 461 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2015) ().
Plaintiff's complaint contains only one ADA "discrimination" claim, and Sixth Circuit case law does not wholly support the presumption that each legal theory of liability can or should be viewed as a separate claim under Title II. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has not defined whether, or to what extent, a plaintiff is required to further identify the legal theories under which he proceeds, once he has included sufficient allegations to state aclaim of intentional discrimination under Title II. The parameters of the theories of liability arguably overlap one another, and the distinctions between theories are often poorly defined. Nevertheless, some ADA cases have "distinguished intentional discrimination claims from disparate-impact and reasonable-accommodation claims." United States Society for Augmentative v. Lyon, 2016 WL 6563422, at *2 (E.D. Mich., Nov. 4, 2016) (citing Everson v. Leis, 412 Fed. Appx. 771, 784 n.6 (6th Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting)). In light of the undersigned's conclusion that Plaintiffs have adequately stated the essential elements of a Title II claim, and the lack of controlling case law requiring further delineation of the legal theories upon which that claim is based, the undersigned declines UC's invitation to dismiss based on a "failure to accommodate" claim and/or theory of recovery under Title II. See generally Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 357 (6th Cir. 2015) ().
Having determined that Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded Title II claims against UC, the Court must next determine whether UC is immune from suit for those claims. States are entitled to sovereign immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution. See Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, ...
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