Saracco v. Lyttle, A--694

• Decision Date: 18 January 1951
• Docket Number: No. A--694,A--694
• Citation: 11 N.J.Super. 254,78 A.2d 288
• Parties: SARACCO v. LYTTLE et al.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 254

11 N.J.Super. 254

78 A.2d 288

SARACCO v. LYTTLE et al.

No. A--694.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued Dec. 18, 1950.

Decided Jan. 18, 1951.

Charles C. Carroll, Clifton, argued the cause for the appellant (Dominic Cavaliere, Paterson, attorney).

Charles C. Stalter, Paterson, attorney for and of counsel with defendants-respondents, argued the cause.

Before Judges FREUND, PROCTOR and ROGERS.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PROCTOR, J.A.D.

The plaintiff's suit was against defendant, Samuel Lyttle, as owner, and defendant, Dominick Padula, as driver of an automobile which collided with the automobile of the plaintiff. At the end of the entire case the court granted defendant Lyttle's motion for judgment and sent the case against defendant Padula to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against Padula. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered in favor of the defendant Lyttle.

On July 23, 1949, at 4:35 P.M., Lyttle parked his car, unlocked and with the key in the ignition switch, on a public street in a residential area in front of the home of the Padula family. He entered the Padula home for a brief visit and while there fell asleep. Co-defendant, Dominick Padula, age 17, came home and on seeing the car unlocked, started it and drove off. After travelling several blocks he collided with plaintiff's vehicle. Lyttle was unaware that his car had been taken until he was informed of it five or ten minutes after the collision.

It is the plaintiff's contention that the question of Lyttle's negligence should have been submitted to the jury.

The applicable test in the present situation is that set forth in Barbanes v. Brown, 110 N.J.L. 6, 7, 163 A. 148, 149 (Sup.Ct. 1932): 'The general rule is that a person who leaves an automobile in a public street unattended is under a duty to exercise such care in doing so as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in the circumstances; and failure to exercise such care, whereby the machine by force of gravity, or by some other cause reasonably to be anticipated or guarded against, gets under way and inflicts injury, renders such person liable therefor in an action for damages.'

No claim was made that Lyttle violated any provision of a statute or ordinance. See Note, 158 A.L.R. 1374.

Under the facts of the present case, it was not reasonably to be anticipated that an intermeddler would not only drive the car away but also would later negligently operate it. The leaving of the automobile unlocked afforded an opportunity for the unlawful taking by Padula, but this was merely a circumstance and not the proximate cause of the collision. Responsibility for an accident cannot attach to one unless his act or failure to act was the proximate cause of the injury. The proximate cause of the collision was the unskillful handling of the car by Padula. The negligence of the intermeddler, in driving into the vehicle of plaintiff, was an intervening efficient cause interrupting the chain of causation between defendant Lyttle's act in leaving his key in the ignition switch (whether or not such act in itself constitutes negligence) and the damage to the plaintiff. See Restatement, Torts, §§ 447, 448; Cuff v. Newark and New York Railroad Company, 35 N.J.L. 17 (Sup.Ct. 1870), affirmed 35 N.J.L. 574 (E. & A. 1871); Morril v. Morril, 104 N.J.L. 557, 142 A. 337, 60 A.L.R....