Sarah Fall v. Elizabeth Eastin
Decision Date | 01 November 1909 |
Docket Number | No. 24,24 |
Citation | 215 U.S. 1,30 S.Ct. 3,54 L.Ed. 65 |
Parties | SARAH S. FALL, Plff. in Err., v. ELIZABETH EASTIN |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Charles J. Greene, Ralph W. Breckenridge, and Thomas H. Matters for plaintiff in error.
No brief was filed for defendant in error.
The question in this case is whether a deed to land situate in Nebraska, made by a commissioner under the decree of a court of the state of Washington in an action for divorce, must be recognized in Nebraska under the due faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States.
The action was begun in Hamilton county, Nebraska, in 1897, to quiet title to the land and to cancel a certain mortgage thereon, given by E. W. Fall to W. H. Fall, and to cancel a deed executed therefor to defendant in error, Elizabeth Eastin.
Plaintiff alleged the following facts: She and E. W. Fall, who was a defendant in the trial court, were married in Indiana in 1876, Subsequently they went to Nebraska, and, while living there, 'by their joint efforts, accumulations, and earnings, acquired jointly and by the same conveyance' the land in controversy. In 1889 they removed to the state of Washington, and continued to reside there as husband and wife until January, 1895, when they separated. On the 27th of February, 1895, her husband, she and he then being residents of King county, Washington, brought suit against her for divorce in the superior court of that county. He alleged in his complaint that he and plaintiff were bona fide residents of King county, and that he was the owner of the land in controversy, it being, as he alleged, 'his separate property, purchased by money received from his parents.' He prayed for a divorce and 'for a just and equitable division of the property.'
Plaintiff appeared in the action by answer and cross com- plaint, in which she denied the allegations of the complaint, and alleged that the property was community property, and 'was purchased by and with the money and proceeds of the joint labor' of herself and husband after their marriage. She prayed that a divorce be denied him, and that the property be set apart to her as separate property, subject only to a mortgage of $1,000, which she alleged was given by him and her. In a reply to her answer and cross complaint, he denied that she was the 'owner as a member of the community in conjunction' with him of the property, and repeated the prayer of his complaint.
Plaintiff also alleges that the Code of Washington contained the following provision:
She further alleges that that provision had been construed by the supreme court of the state, requiring of the parties to an action for divorce to bring into court all of "their property, and a complete showing must be made," and that it was decided that § 2007 conferred upon the court "the power, in its discretion, to make a division of the separate property of the wife or husband," She further alleges that a decree was entered, granting her a divorce, and setting apart to her the land in controversy as her own separate property forever, free and unencumbered from any claim of the plaintiff thereto, and that he was ordered and directed by the court to convey all his right, title, and interest in and to the land within five days from the date of the decree.
She also alleges the execution of the deed to her by the commissioner appointed by the court, the execution and recording of the mortgage to W. H. Fall, and the deed to defendant; that the deed and mortgage were each made without consideration, and for the purpose of defrauding her, and that they cast a cloud upon her title derived by her under the decree of divorce and the commissioner's deed. She prays that her title be quieted, and that the deed and mortgage be declared null and void.
W. H. Fall disclaimed any interest in the premises, and executed a release of the mortgage made to him by E. W. Fall. Defendant answered, putting in issue the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and, in addition, set forth the fact of the loan of $1,000 to E. W. Fall, the taking of a note therefor signed by him and William H. Fall, the giving of an indemnity mortgage to the latter, and the execution subsequently of a deed by E. W. Fall in satisfaction of the debt. No personal service was had upon E. W. Fall, and he did not appear. A decree was passed in favor of plaintiff, which was affirmed by the supreme court. 75 Neb. 104, 106 N. W. 412. A rehearing was granted and the decree was reversed [75 Neb. 120, 121 Am. St. Rep. 767, 113 N. W. 175], Judge Sedgwick, who delivered the first opinion, dissenting.
There is no brief for defendant in this court, but the contentions of the parties and the argument by which they are supported are exhibited in the opinions of the supreme court.
The question is in narrow compass. The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States is invoked by plaintiff to sustain the deed executed under the decree of the court of the state of Washington. The argument in support of this is that the Washington court, having had jurisdiction of the parties and the subjectmatter, in determination of the equities between the parties to the lands in controversy, decreed a conveyance to be made to her. This conveyance, it is contended, was decreed upon equities, and was as effectual as though her 'husband and she had been strangers, and she had bought the land from him and paid for it, and he had then refused to convey it to her.' In other words, that the decree of divorce in the state of Washington, which was made in consummation of equities which arose between the parties under the law of Washington, was 'evidence of her right to the legal title of at least as much weight and value as a contract in writing, reciting the payment of the consideration for the land, would be.'
The defendant, on the other hand, contends, as we gather from his petition for a rehearing in the supreme court of the state, and from the opinions of the court, that 'the Washington court had neither power nor jurisdiction to affect in the least, either legally or equitably,' lands situated in Nebraska. And contends further that, by the provision of chap. 25, p. 276, Comp. Stat. (Neb.) 1901, a court had no jurisdiction to award the real estate of the husband to the wife in fee as alimony, and a decree, in so far as it attempts to do so, is void and subject to collateral attack. For this view are cited Cizek v. Cizek, 69 Neb. 800, 96 N. W. 657, 99 N. W. 28; 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 464; Aldrich v. Steen, 71 Neb. 33, 98 N. W. 445, 100 N. W. 312.
The contentions of the parties, it will be observed, put in prominence and as controlling, different propositions. Plaintiff urges the equities which arose between her and her husband, on account of their relation as husband and wife, in the state of Washington, and under the laws of that state. The defendant urges the policy of the state of Nebraska, and the inability of the court of Washington, by its decree alone or the deed executed through the commissioners, to convey the land situate in Nebraska. To the defendant's view the supreme court of the state finally gave its assent, as we have seen.
In considering these propositions, we must start with a concession of jurisdiction in the Washington court over both the parties and the subject-matter. Jurisdiction in that court is the first essential, but the ultimate question is, What is the effect of the decree upon the land, and of the deed executed under it? The supreme court of the state concedes, as we under- stand its opinion, the jurisdiction in the Washington court to render the decree. The court said:
But Fall, not having executed a deed, the court's conclusion was, to quote its language, that 'neither the decree nor the commissioner's deed conferred any right or title upon her.' This conclusion was deduced, not only from the absence of power generally of the courts of one state over lands situate in another, but also from the laws of Nebraska providing for the disposition of real estate in divorce proceedings. The court said:
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