Sarbak v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.

• Citation: 354 F.Supp.2d 531
• Decision Date: 21 December 2004
• Docket Number: Civil No. 03-CV-4043(JLL).
• Parties: Gailene SARBAK, Plaintiff, v. CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS, INC., f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., and Bhikku Pai, individually, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

Page 531

354 F.Supp.2d 531

Gailene SARBAK, Plaintiff, v. CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS, INC., f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., and Bhikku Pai, individually, Defendants.

Civil No. 03-CV-4043(JLL).

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

December 21, 2004.

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Randall J. Peach, Esq., Alpert Butler Sanders, Norton & Bearg, P.C., West Orange, NJ, for Plaintiff.

John Michael Riordan, Esq., Bressler, Amery & Ross, Florham Park, NJ, Defendants.

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER¹

LINARES, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.'s and Bhikku Pai's (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Defendants") motion to compel arbitration and stay this proceeding. Plaintiff commenced this action upon allegations of discrimination based on national origin, ancestry and sex. Oral argument was heard on November 30, 2004. For the reasons set forth below, this Court concludes that Defendants' motion should be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND FACTS

The relevant facts are not in dispute. On July 6, 1997, Plaintiff Gailene Sarbak, a female of Jamaican/West-Indian national origin and ancestry, attended an orientation for new employees of Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. (hereinafter, "Smith Barney"), prior to commencing employment. Plaintiff signed three separate documents at this orientation, including: (1) the Employment Application; (2) Salomon Smith Barney's Principles of Employment; and (3) the Employee Handbook (Employee Acknowledgment Form).

The Employment Application provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

I understand that the Company has adopted alternative dispute procedures to resolve any dispute related to my employment or termination of employment. I agree to comply with Travelers Group Dispute Resolution Procedures and Travelers Group Employment Arbitration Policy in any such dispute with the Company, its employees or agents.

(Santangelo Aff., Ex.A). The Principles of Employment, also signed July 7, provides, in relevant part:

[Y]ou agree to follow our dispute resolution/arbitration procedures for employment disputes.... These procedures include all employment disputes (including termination of employment) that you may have with Travelers Group.... Our procedures are divided into two parts. First, an internal dispute procedure, the "Dispute Resolution Procedure," which allows you to seek review of any decision regarding your employment or termination of your employment which you think is unfair. Second, in the unusual situation when this procedure does not fully resolve an employment related dispute, you and we agree to waive any applicable statute of limitations and to submit the dispute, within one year of the date it arose, to binding arbitration, before the arbitration facilities of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. in accordance with the arbitration rules of that body then in effect and as supplemented by Travelers Group arbitration policy.

(Id., Ex.B). The Employee Handbook states, in pertinent part:

I agree that any controversy or claim arising out of or otherwise relating to my employment or termination of employment shall be resolved through binding arbitration.... The disputes to be arbitrated include ... claims, demands or actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964[and] any other federal state or local statute or regulation regarding employment, discrimination in employment, or the termination of employment, and the common law of any state.

(Id., Ex.C). The Employee Handbook further provides:

[A]rbitration [shall be] conducted under the auspices of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"). If, however, the NASD declines the use of its arbitration facilities, the arbitration shall then be conducted under the auspices of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA").

* * * * * * The Policy makes arbitration the required and exclusive forum for the resolution of all employment disputes based in legally protected rights (i.e., statutory, contractual or common law rights) that may arise between an employee or former employee and [Salomon Smith Barney] ... including without limitation claims, demands or actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1991 ... and all amendments thereto, and any other federal, state or local statute, regulation or common law, regarding employment, discrimination of employment, the terms and conditions of employment, termination of employment, breach of contract, defamation, whistle blowing or any claims arising under any Citigroup, Inc. Separation Pay Plan.

(Id.).

Plaintiff began her employment with Smith Barney on or about July 7, 1997. Her academic credentials qualified her as an Associate Programmer. Initially, she worked out of Defendants' offices located in New York, New York. In March of 1998, Plaintiff was transferred to the East Rutherford, New Jersey office where she worked under the supervision of Selvaraj Pichaiyan. Shortly after her transfer, Pichaiyan promoted Plaintiff to the position of Programmer Analyst, which gave her an increased salary as well as additional responsibilities.

In the summer of 1999, Plaintiff became pregnant. As a result of pregnancy complications, Plaintiff sought another position with Smith Barney in a Programmer Assistant capacity in its Global Management Reporting Systems Group. Plaintiff secured the position, and she started working in that capacity in or about September of 1999. Plaintiff alleges that during her employment under Defendant Pai's supervision, she was subjected to a hostile work environment based upon her origin, ancestry and sex, which allegedly resulted in her constructive discharge. Consequently, Plaintiff ended her employment on August 31, 2001. Plaintiff maintains that during the exit interview she questioned Human Resources representative, Casey Curcio, as to whether she could bring a legal action for her discrimination complaints. According to Plaintiff, Curcio replied "yes." (Sarbak Aff. at 6).

On or about January 20, 2002, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights, and thereafter with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on or about February 1, 2002. Plaintiff received a Notice-of-Right-to-Sue from the EEOC on or about July 25, 2003. Subsequently, on August 26, 2003, Plaintiff initiated the within action. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and discriminated against her in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.

Defendants presently move before this Court to compel arbitration, arguing that Plaintiff has knowingly waived her right to pursue a claim in court. Accordingly, Defendants maintain that they are entitled to an Order compelling arbitration of all of the claims set forth in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and to stay this proceeding pending the conclusion of arbitration.²

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard for Arbitration

Defendants filed the instant petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Section 4 of the FAA provides in, relevant part:

A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.

9 U.S.C. § 4. The Act dictates that any agreement to settle a dispute by arbitration "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA permits a district court to compel, or enjoin, arbitration as circumstances may require. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3,4; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Olick, 151 F.3d 132, 137 (3d Cir.1998). The FAA "establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). These provisions evidence a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Id. at 24, 103 S.Ct. 927. In order for the FAA to apply, the district court must find that the contract with the arbitration provision "evidenc[es] a transaction involving [interstate] commerce." Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2). This is not a rigorous inquiry; in fact, the contract "need have only the slightest nexus with interstate commerce." Crawford v. West Jersey Health Systems (Voorhees Div.), 847 F.Supp. 1232, 1240 (D.N.J.1994) (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has ruled that the FAA requires enforcement of arbitration agreements in the employment context. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991); see also Crawford, 847 F.Supp. at 1242-43 (enforcing arbitration of Title VII and NJLAD claims). In Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 227 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 915, 118 S.Ct. 299, 139 L.Ed.2d 230 (1997), the Third Circuit explained that "employees were not included within the class of those excepted from the operation of the FAA, and hence were required to arbitrate their disputes...."

In addressing a motion to compel arbitration, a court must determine: (1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) the scope of that agreement; and (3) whether Congress intended the asserted federal claims to be nonarbitrable. Parker v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp., 2001 WL 797247, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2001) (citing Hooters of...