Sargent v. S. Cal. Edison 401(k) Sav. Plan
| Decision Date | 02 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-1296-MMA (RBB) |
| Parties | MILISSA ANN SARGENT, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON 401(k) SAVINGS PLAN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Milissa Ann Sargent ("Plaintiff") seeks relief under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). Doc. No. 1 ("Compl.").1 Defendants Edison 401(k) Savings Plan ("Plan"), Southern California Edison Company Benefits Committee ("Committee"), Plan Administrator of the Edison 401(k) Savings Plan ("Plan Administrator"), and Southern California Edison Company ("Company" or "SEC") (collectively, "Defendants")2 move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See Doc. No. 18. Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants' motion, and Defendants replied. See Doc. Nos. 20, 21. The Court found the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 22. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion.
Plaintiff's action arises from "the wrongful denial of benefits due and owing to her under the Plan." Compl. ¶ 5.
When Plaintiff and Greg Sargent's ("Mr. Sargent") marriage dissolved in 2008, they entered into a marital settlement agreement ("MSA"). Id. ¶ 12; see also id. ¶ 2. Pursuant to the MSA, "Plaintiff was awarded and is entitled to a portion of Mr. Sargent's benefits under the Plan." Id. ¶ 13. In March 2008, Mr. Sargent provided a copy of the MSA to the Plan Administrator, who accepted the MSA as a "valid qualified domestic relations order ('QDRO')." Id. ¶ 14.4 Defendants did not notify Plaintiff that the MSA was accepted as a QDRO or that "a purported 'domestic relations order' had been submitted to them for division of Mr. Sargent's benefits under the Plan dictating that aportion thereof to be assigned to Plaintiff." Id. ¶ 15. Further, Defendants did not notify Plaintiff of the Plan's "written procedures for determining the 'qualified' status of a domestic relations order" or notify Plaintiff "how she would like to elect her awarded portion of the benefits under the Plan to be paid and/or distributed to her." Id. ¶¶ 16, 17.
Based on the MSA, Plaintiff filed a claim for benefits under the Plan on March 20, 2019. Id. ¶ 19; Doc. No. 8-1 at 26 (claim request). The Committee denied Plaintiff's claim on June 17, 2019. Compl. ¶ 20; Doc. No. 8-2 at 44-53 (claim denial). Plaintiff subsequently appealed the Committee's denial, and the Committee denied the appeal on December 3, 2019. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22; Doc. No. 8-2 at 72-76 (appeal denial). In issuing its denial of Plaintiff's claim and appeal, the Committee asserted that "the benefits awarded Plaintiff have already been paid and/or distributed in some manner to Plaintiff." Compl. ¶ 23. However, Plaintiff alleges that the Committee failed to provide any proof that the benefits were paid or distributed to Plaintiff, and none of the benefits awarded to Plaintiff under the Plan have been paid or distributed to Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 23-34.
Plaintiff filed this action on July 10, 2020. See generally id. Plaintiff brought three causes of action against Defendants: (1) an ERISA claim for benefits pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); (2) an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1132(a)(3); and (3) declaratory relief. See id. ¶¶ 27-56. Defendants moved to dismiss each cause of action under contractual or statutory limitations grounds pursuant to ERISA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Doc. No 8. The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion. See Doc. No. 16. In particular, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's § 1132(a)(1)(B) benefits claim without leave to amend because it was time-barred. See id. at 12, 20. Plaintiff's § 1132(a)(3) breach of fiduciary duty and its derivative declaratory relief claim remained. Id. at 20. The parties did not argue whether Plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to sustain a plausible § 1132(a)(3) claim, so the Court refrained from addressing the issue. See id. at 19. Defendants then filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. See Doc. No. 17.
Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See Doc. No. 18. Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under ERISA and, thus, the remaining causes of action should be dismissed. See id. at 2, 8-9.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). In assessing a Rule 12(c) motion, courts accept the complaint's allegations as true and treat the answer's allegations that contradict the complaint's allegations as false. See Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d at 1301 n.2. In reviewing a Rule 12(c) motion, courts must construe factual allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. See id. "Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (brackets omitted) (quoting Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009)). "Analysis under Rule 12(c) is 'substantially identical' to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, 'a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.'" Id. (quoting Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., No. C 10-04341 CRB, 2011 WL 6140912, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011)).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The plausibility standard demands more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,550 U.S. at 555, 557). Instead, the complaint "must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting W. Min. Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). Similarly, "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).
In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, courts generally may not look beyond the complaint for additional facts. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003). "A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 908; see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002). "However, [courts] are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint." Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing In re Stac Electronics Securities Litigation, 89 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Where dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant leave to amend unless the plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiff's remaining two causes of action are (1) an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim against the Committee, the Plan Administrator, and the Company and (2) a derivative declaratory relief claim. Compl. ¶¶ 38-50. The Court considers each claim in turn.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for injunctive relief because Plaintiff's claim fails to allege irreparable harm, inadequate relief at law, and future harm. See Doc. No. 18 at 11-13; see also Doc. No. 20 at 8-9. Defendants further assert that Plaintiff's sought injunctive relief claim fails because it is a duplicative remedy to Plaintiff's dismissed § 1132(a)(1)(B) claim. See Doc. No. 18 at 13-14; see also Doc. No. 21 at 2-3, 6. Similarly, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's claim for equitable monetary relief is duplicative in light of the Court's dismissal of her § 1132(a)(1)(B) claim. See Doc. No. 18 at 15, 18. Additionally, rebutting Plaintiff's argument that Defendants concealed facts about the distribution of Plan benefits, see Doc. No. 20 at 7, 13, 15, 15 n.8, Defendants reply there are no allegations of...
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