Sargent v. S. Cal. Edison 401(k) Sav. Plan
| Decision Date | 14 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-1296-MMA (RBB) |
| Parties | MILISSA ANN SARGENT, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON 401(k) SAVINGS PLAN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Milissa Ann Sargent ("Plaintiff") alleges three causes of action: (1) an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") claim for benefits pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B); (2) an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1132(a)(3); and (3) declaratory relief. Doc. No. 1 ("Compl.").1 Defendants Edison 401(k) Savings Plan ("Plan"), Southern California Edison Company Benefits Committee ("Committee"), Plan Administrator of the Edison 401(k) Savings Plan ("Plan Administrator"), and Southern California Edison Company ("Company" or"SEC") (collectively, "Defendants")2 move to dismiss all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Doc. No. 8. Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants' motion, and Defendants replied.3 See Doc. Nos. 11, 12. The Court found the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 14. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion.
Plaintiff's action arises from "the wrongful denial of benefits due and owing to her under the Plan." Compl. ¶ 5.
When Plaintiff and Greg Sargent's ("Mr. Sargent") marriage dissolved in 2008, they entered into a marital settlement agreement ("MSA"). Id. ¶ 12; see also id. ¶ 2. Pursuant to the MSA, "Plaintiff was awarded and is entitled to a portion of Mr. Sargent's benefits under the Plan." Id. ¶ 13. In March 2008, Mr. Sargent provided a copy of the MSA to the Plan Administrator, who accepted the MSA as a "valid qualified domesticrelations order ('QDRO')." Id. ¶ 14.5 Defendants did not notify Plaintiff that the MSA was accepted as a QDRO or that "a purported 'domestic relations order' had been submitted to them for division of Mr. Sargent's benefits under the Plan dictating that a portion thereof to be assigned to Plaintiff." Id. ¶ 15. Further, Defendants did not notify Plaintiff of the Plan's "written procedures for determining the 'qualified' status of a domestic relations order" or notify Plaintiff "how she would like to elect her awarded portion of the benefits under the Plan to be paid and/or distributed to her." Id. ¶¶ 16, 17.
Based on the MSA, Plaintiff filed a claim for benefits under the Plan on March 20, 2019. Id. ¶ 19; Doc. No. 8-1 at 26 (claim request). Committee denied Plaintiff's claim on June 17, 2019. Compl. ¶ 20; Doc. No. 8-2 at 44-53 (claim denial). Plaintiff subsequently appealed the Committee's denial, and Committee denied the appeal on December 3, 2019. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22; Doc. No. 8-2 at 72-76 (appeal denial). In issuing its denial of Plaintiff's claim and appeal, Committee asserted that "the benefits awardedPlaintiff have already been paid and/or distributed in some manner to Plaintiff." Compl. ¶ 23. However, Plaintiff alleges that Committee failed to provide any proof that the benefits were paid or distributed to Plaintiff, and none of the benefits awarded to Plaintiff under the Plan have been paid or distributed to Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 23-34.
Plaintiff filed this action on July 10, 2020. See generally id. Plaintiff brings three causes of action against Defendants to receive the sought Plan benefits and equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to ERISA. See id. ¶¶ 27-56. Defendants move to dismiss each cause of action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff's "claims are barred by contractual or statutory limitations periods" under ERISA. Doc. No. 8 at 2.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The plausibility standard demands more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Instead, the complaint "must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting W. Min.Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). Similarly, "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).
In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, courts generally may not look beyond the complaint for additional facts. See Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 907-08. "A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Id.; see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2002). "However, [courts] are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint." Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing In re Stac Electronics Securities Litigation, 89 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Where dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant leave to amend unless the plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiff alleges three causes of action: (1) an ERISA benefits claim; (2) an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim; and (3) declaratory relief. Compl. ¶¶ 27-50. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's three claims are time-barred and, thus, request the Court to dismiss the entire action with prejudice. See Doc. No. 8 at 8-9. The Court considers each claim in turn.
Plaintiff's first cause of action is an ERISA claim for benefits pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Compl. ¶¶ 27-37. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim is time barred because of the Plan's contractual 180-day limitations period. See Doc. No. 8at 10-12; see also Doc. No. 12 at 2-5. Defendants note that the Committee denied Plaintiff's appeal on December 3, 2019 and that Plaintiff responded that she received the appeal denial letter on December 18, 2019, the very latest date when the limitations period began. See Doc. No. 8 at 11 (). Given that Plaintiff filed her Complaint on July 10, 2020, see Compl., Defendants assert that the 205 days between Plaintiff receiving the appeal denial letter and Plaintiff filing suit exceeds the Plan's 180-day limitations period. See Doc. No. 8 at 11-12.
Plaintiff responds that Defendants' calculation of the 205 days is correct but asserts that Defendants fail to consider the COVID-19 global pandemic prevented Plaintiff from filing suit within the contractual 180-day limitations period. See Doc. No. 11 at 9. Plaintiff argues that the "doctrine of equitable tolling" tolled the contractual limitations period. See id. at 9-10. Plaintiff relies upon the March 19, 2020 California Stay-at-Home Order, which limited movement outside of one's residence and was not relaxed until May 8, 2020 "and even then most businesses were required to remain closed." Id. at 11; see also Doc. No. 11-2 at 2-3 (Executive Order N-33-20, Executive Department, State of California, March 19, 2020); 11-3 at 2-4 ().6 Plaintiff further points to several Orders of the Chief Judge of this district, which declared a state of judicial emergency and provided modifications to civil cases. See Doc. No. 11 at 12; see also Doc. No. 11-4 at 2-4 (Order of the Chief Judge No. 18, March 17, 2020); Doc. No. 11-5at 2-3 (Order of the Chief Judge No. 18-A, March 23, 2020); Doc. No. 11-6 at 2-3 (Order of the Chief Judge No. 34, August 14, 2020).
Plaintiff asserts that she has "diligently pursued her rights." Doc. No. 11 at 13; see also Sargent Decl. ¶¶ 8-11, Doc. No. 11-7. After receiving the appeal denial, Plaintiff informed Committee that she would pursue legal action if it did not supply the desired documentation, and she claims that she began to investigate options to recover the benefits within the 180-day limitations period. See Doc. No. 11 at 13; see also Doc. No. 8-2 at 79; Sargent Decl. ¶ 8, Doc. No. 11-7. Despite these efforts, Plaintiff states that the COVID-19 pandemic thwarted her effort to find counsel and file her action. See ...
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