Sargoy v. Resolution Trust Corp.
Decision Date | 12 August 1992 |
Docket Number | No. B054757,B054757 |
Citation | 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 889,8 Cal.App.4th 1039 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Joan McLaughlin SARGOY, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Kollender & Sargoy, Kenneth J. Sargoy and Timothy T. Tierney, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Fleming & Ingalls, Donald R. Ingalls, Jerome P. Doctors, Hancock, Rothert & Bunshaft, Aubin K. Barthold, Robert V. Richter and Michael L. Challgren, Van Nuys, for defendants and respondents.
The sole issue on appeal is whether a Savings and Loan Association that offers higher interest rates to senior citizens engages in arbitrary discrimination violative of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
This appeal followed an order of dismissal after respondent's demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. The purpose of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a complaint by raising questions of law. (Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271, 275 Cal.Rptr. 684.) Furthermore, the court is to accept as true all allegations of fact contained in the complaint. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58.) When a demurrer is sustained the reviewing court must determine whether the complaint states sufficient facts to state a cause of action. (Ibid.) The lower court will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion if there is a reasonable possibility that the complaint could have been cured by an amendment. (Ibid.)
On March 26, 1990, appellant entered Valley Federal's Encino branch and sought to open a "PrimePlus" account. Appellant was informed that because she was under the age of 55, she did not qualify for the "PrimePlus" program.
Valley Federal's "PrimePlus" program enables persons age 55 and older to earn slightly higher interest rates on their deposit accounts than those afforded to persons under age 55. For instance, at the time complained of herein, a "PrimePlus" passbook account earned 7.00 percent interest, while a regular passbook account earned 5.25 percent interest.
On March 26, 1990, the very same day appellant was refused a "PrimePlus" account, appellant filed this class action alleging Valley Federal violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act by refusing to allow her to receive the "PrimePlus" interest rate offered to senior citizens for her deposit account. Lomeli was individually named as a defendant for allegedly aiding Valley Federal in its unlawfully discriminatory practice. In addition, appellant alleged that she represented an entire class of similarly situated individuals under the age of 55 who also were ineligible for the senior citizen "PrimePlus" deposit accounts.
On May 9, 1990, appellant filed a first amended complaint alleging the same one cause of action. Appellant sought damages of $250 for every non-senior deposit account holder of Valley Federal who did not receive the "PrimePlus" "interest bonus."
Appellant further sought an injunction to prohibit Valley Federal from offering the higher "PrimePlus" interest rates to senior citizens in the future.
On October 5, 1990, the trial court, relying on Koire v. Metro Car Wash, supra, 40 Cal.3d 24, 219 Cal.Rptr. 133, 707 P.2d 195, sustained the demurrer of respondents without leave to amend, finding that Valley Federal's practice of offering higher interest rates to senior citizens did not violate the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Axiomatically, the court found that since Valley Federal had not violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, no liability could possibly attach to respondents.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
The trial court's decision is consistent with established California statutory law and case precedent.
Appellant argues that the Unruh Civil Rights Act bars every type of age-based preference regardless of the socially beneficial effects or justifiable interests supporting such favorable treatment. That, however, is not what the Unruh Civil Rights Act proscribes. Neither the language of Unruh itself nor the interpretation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act by the California courts have held that all distinctions based on age are unlawful. Rather, the California Supreme Court has held that Unruh prohibits only arbitrary, invidious or unreasonable discrimination. (In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 216-217, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992.)
California courts have uniformly found discriminatory treatment to be reasonable, and thus nonarbitrary, where a strong public policy exists in favor of such treatment. (Koire v. Metro Car Wash, supra, 40 Cal.3d 24, 219 Cal.Rptr. 133, 707 P.2d 195; Starkman v. Mann Theatres Corp. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1491, 278 Cal.Rptr. 543; Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115.) For instance, in Koire and Starkman, the California Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, respectively, recognized that age-based price discounts for the elderly are justified by social policy considerations and thus did not constitute arbitrary or invidious forms of discrimination. In each instance, the courts found that such age-based price preferences were not prohibited by the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
In Koire v. Metro Car Wash, supra, 40 Cal.3d 24, 219 Cal.Rptr. 133, 707 P.2d 195, the California Supreme Court considered whether a car wash and nightclub that offered free admission on certain nights to women but not to men violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The defendants argued that their sex-based discounts were analogous to permissible age-based discounts. The Supreme Court rejected that argument and distinguished age-based price discounts from sex-based discounts, discussing at length the permissibility and desirability of offering discounts to senior citizens.
The Supreme Court observed:
Similarly, in Starkman v. Mann Theatres Corp., supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 1491, 278 Cal.Rptr. 543, the court recently considered whether the Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits the offering of discount theater tickets to senior citizens and children. In that case, the trial court granted a motion for summary adjudication of the issues in favor of the large theater chain which offered such discounts, and the plaintiff appealed. Drawing heavily upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in Koire, the appellate court agreed with the trial court...
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