Saridakis v. United Airlines
| Citation | 166 F.3d 1272 |
| Decision Date | 03 February 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-17354,97-17354 |
| Parties | 160 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2390, 137 Lab.Cas. P 58,577, 8 A.D. Cases 1808, 14 NDLR P 106, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 937, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1174 Spero SARIDAKIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED AIRLINES, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
William M. Simpich and Matthew Siegel, Oakland, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.
William J. Dritsas and Amy Gustafson, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, San Francisco, California, for the defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District court for the Northern District of California; william H. Orrick, Jr., District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-97-00628-WHO.
Before: FARRIS, REINHARDT, and MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
Spero Saridakis ("Saridakis"), a former United Airlines ("United") mechanic, appeals the district court's dismissal, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, of his claims against United under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 ("ADA"), California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, § 12940 ("FEHA"), wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and spoliation of evidence. Saridakis alleges United's decision to terminate him after a drug test revealed the presence of a drug legally prescribed to him for his disability constitutes discrimination.
In 1984, United hired Saridakis as an airframe maintenance mechanic, a position classified as safety-sensitive. 1 Between 1988 On January 27, 1993, Saridakis tested positive for cocaine during a random drug test administered pursuant to United's federally mandated drug testing program and the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between United and the union. Instead of firing Saridakis as permitted by the CBA, United offered and Saridakis accepted a rehabilitation and continued employment agreement on February 26, 1993 (hereinafter "last chance agreement"). Under this agreement, Saridakis agreed to abstain from taking medically unauthorized or illegal drugs and to submit to random drug tests for five years. 2 Saridakis's failure to comply with the conditions of the last chance agreement or to pass a drug test allowed United to terminate him without considering any mitigating factors.
and 1993, Saridakis sustained a number of non-work related injuries, including an injury to his anterior cruciate ligament which required surgery and a loss of work for six months. Saridakis suffers from resulting acute bursitis, knee complications, recurrent rectal fissures and insomnia.
At about the same time, Saridakis's physician began prescribing him Marinol, a synthetic drug which contains THC (tetrahydrocannabinol), the active ingredient in marijuana, for his pain and insomnia stemming from his injuries. The physician elected to prescribe Marinol because Saridakis had suffered from side effects with other drugs. Saridakis then began submitting to a series of drug tests under his agreement with United and tested negative. On each occasion, for approximately two and one-half years, Saridakis told United's medical review officer that he was taking Marinol pursuant to a doctor's prescription. Neither United nor any of its medical review officers ever advised Saridakis to discontinue using Marinol or informed him that the drug was "medically unauthorized." On one occasion when a drug test came back positive for THC, Saridakis explained that he used Marinol for a medical condition, and the medical review officer declared the test negative.
In the fall of 1995, Saridakis returned to work after surgery, was placed in a non-safety-sensitive position, and continued to submit to drug tests. In the tests that followed, Saridakis reported his Marinol use, the results were negative, and he was not instructed to discontinue Marinol. In November 1995, Saridakis's drug test came back positive. When he informed United's medical review officer, Dr. Richard Jensen, of his Marinol prescription, Dr. Jensen refused to reverse the positive result because he found the use of Marinol for insomnia and pain "unauthorized." On May 7, 1996, United discharged Saridakis. It stated that his Marinol use was unauthorized and that he had failed to comply with the terms of the last chance agreement.
After termination, Saridakis filed suit against United alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 ("ADA"), California's Fair Employment and Housing Act, CA Code § 12940 ("FEHA"), wrongful discharge, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and spoliation of evidence. 3 In response to Saridakis's first amended complaint, United filed a Rule 12 motion to dismiss. Without reaching the merits of his complaint, the district court dismissed all of Saridakis's claims as preempted by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151.
We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de
novo. See Ward v. Mgt. Analysis Co., 135 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.1998); Farr v. United States, 990 F.2d 451, 453 (9th Cir.1993). In evaluating such a motion, we construe the complaint's allegations in the light most favorable to the pleader. See Mason v. Unkeless, 618 F.2d 597, 598 n. 2 (9th Cir.1980). Because the district court dismissed the complaint before reaching the merits, we confine our independent review to the jurisdictional issue. See Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc. and HBO Video, 839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir.1988). 4
We must address a narrow issue: United's contention that the RLA preempts the ADA. The touchstone of preemption is the presence of a state law claim. Congress's preemption power is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). State law is preempted when it conflicts with federal law, would frustrate a federal scheme, or where Congress clearly intended to occupy the field. Id. The preemption doctrine per se does not govern questions relating to the compatibility of two or more federal laws. See Felt v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 60 F.3d 1416, 1418-19 (9th Cir.1995). Nevertheless, we must determine whether Congress intended the RLA's mandatory arbitration scheme to preclude Saridakis from bringing an independent action under the ADA. Id. at 1419. Like the preemption question, this inquiry centers on congressional intent. Id.
Congress enacted the RLA to "promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes." Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 253, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). This framework includes "a mandatory arbitral mechanism for 'minor' [and major] disputes." Id. Major disputes relate to "the formation of the collective bargaining agreements or efforts to secure them." Felt, 60 F.3d at 1419. In contrast, minor disputes "involve controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation." Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 253, 114 S.Ct. 2239.
Since they often depend on particularized facts, minor disputes resist a rigid definition. To be sure, though, "[m]inor disputes seek to enforce contractual rights ... [and] may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing CBA." Id.; see also Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (). In Hawaiian Airlines, the Supreme Court stated that a minor dispute "does not involve rights that exist independently of the [collective bargaining agreement]." 512 U.S. at 265, 114 S.Ct. 2239. Likewise, we have found that "a minor dispute cannot involve rights that emanate from sources outside the agreement." Felt, 60 F.3d at 1419.
While we have yet to squarely address the intersection of the ADA and the RLA, we have held that rights created by other anti-discrimination statutes such as Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Acts are independent of a CBA and thus claims brought pursuant to these acts are not minor disputes. See Espinal v. Northwest Airlines, 90 F.3d 1452, 1456-58 (9th Cir.1996) (); Felt, 60 F.3d at 1419 (); Jimeno v. Mobil Oil Corp., 66 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir.1995) (); Ackerman v. Western Electric Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir.1988) (same). 5 Similarly A stated purpose of the ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)(2)(4). As with Title VII rights, the rights emanating from the ADA exist independently of any employment rights granted by a CBA. Here, while the CBA, like the ADA, contains an anti-discrimination clause and provides a dispute resolution mechanism, the CBA does not define the rights that exist under the ADA. Saridakis's ADA claim cannot be "conclusively resolved" by interpreting the CBA. Felt, 60 F.3d at 1419. Instead, whether his ADA claim is meritorious ultimately depends on the application of the ADA standards, not the CBA. Thus, a dispute under the ADA is not minor and the RLA does not preclude Saridakis's independent litigation of his ADA rights. 6
the ADA provides an "extensive and broad[ ] ground for relief, specifically oriented towards the elimination of discriminatory employment practices." Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d 1108, 1115 (8th Cir.1995).
United contends...
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... ... No. 01-55937 ... United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit ... Argued and Submitted December 2, 2002 ... Filed ... `so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.'" Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir.1999) ... We find that our ... ...
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... ... No. 01-55937 ... United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit ... Argued and Submitted December 2, 2002 ... Filed ... `so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.'" Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir.1999) ... We find that our ... ...