Sarit v. Drug Enforcement Admin.
Decision Date | 30 January 1991 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 90-0296P. |
Citation | 759 F. Supp. 63 |
Parties | Jorge SARIT and Denny Espaillat, Plaintiffs, v. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
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David N. Cicilline, Providence, R.I., for plaintiffs.
Michael P. Iannotti, Asst. U.S. Atty., Providence, R.I., and Sherri L. Thornton, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
On July 28, 1989, the individual defendants in this case, Federal Drug Enforcement Agents Henry P. Roy and John Adams, in the midst of an investigation, entered the residence of the plaintiffs, Jorge Sarit and Denny Espaillat, conducted a search and then seized $41,448.00 in United States currency. Since then, the plaintiffs have tried, in a number of ways, to have that money returned to them.
On August 21, 1989, the plaintiffs moved for return of the money pursuant to Fed.R. Crim.P. 41(e) alleging that the currency was seized in a warrantless search. At that time, the government had already attempted to forfeit the same pursuant to Title 21 U.S.C. Section 881(d) and 19 U.S.C. Section 1602 et seq. This Court declined, therefore, on equitable grounds to rule on the 41(e) motion and determined that the constitutional issue should be addressed in the context of the forfeiture proceeding. See Order of October 13, 1989, Misc. No. 89-0112P. Plaintiffs next filed a motion for reconsideration. When the government filed its objection, the plaintiffs learned that their property had already been forfeited administratively. On December 29, 1989, after learning of the forfeiture, plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the forfeiture based on lack of notice from the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), the other defendant in the instant action. On June 14, 1990, this Court denied that motion based on a lack of jurisdiction. See Order June 14, 1990, Misc. No. 89-0112. In that order, I noted that the issues previously raised by the plaintiffs would be addressed "if a proper complaint were filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331." See U.S. v. Mosquera, 845 F.2d 1122, 1126 (1st Cir.1988). With that, we arrive at the motions now before this Court.
Plaintiffs have filed a civil rights action against the DEA and its agents, Roy and Adams, seeking the return of $41,448.00 which was allegedly, unlawfully seized in violation of the plaintiffs' fourth and fifth amendment rights. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) for lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b), (c) for failure to state a cognizable constitutional claim or in the alternative for summary judgment in their favor pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. For the reasons outlined below, defendants' motions are denied.
The government first argues that the instant case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because plaintiffs may not bring this action against the United States (or the Drug Enforcement Agency) as the United States has not consented to suit. They contend, therefore, that the case must be dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds. The defendants argue that such dismissal is justified because the plaintiffs' complaint does not fall within the consent provided for in the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). They contend that the FTCA "does not comprehend federal constitutional torts." (emphasis added). Moreover, the government argues that "while the plaintiffs have not alleged jurisdiction under the FTCA ... in so far as plaintiffs seek to recover damages it is the only waiver of sovereign immunity even potentially offered." The government, however, has apparently misapprehended plaintiffs' claim. The plaintiffs, in their memorandum in support of their objection to defendants' motion to dismiss explain that they are seeking jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. As discussed, infra, it is by way of the APA that the plaintiffs intend to overcome sovereign immunity.
Because plaintiffs' complaint does present facts which establish that substantive rights may have been violated through the final agency action of forfeiture, see infra, this Court agrees that plaintiffs failure to articulate jurisdiction, under the APA is not fatal to the complaint. Moreover, because the government, although given ample time and opportunity to reply has not chosen to do so, I will go on to consider whether plaintiffs have overcome the sovereign immunity hurdle by way of the APA.1
Section 702 of the APA provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that any agency or any officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party. Id.
As I noted above, the government has not chosen to reply to plaintiffs' arguments regarding jurisdiction under the APA. This Court, in its research, however, has discovered a recent case, similar to the instant case, in which the government apparently did make arguments regarding the applicability of the APA to an administrative forfeiture proceeding. Because the court's opinion in that case, Sterling v. U.S., et al., 749 F.Supp. 1202 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), not only articulates the government's possible arguments but also responds to those arguments in an extremely well-reasoned and organized fashion, I quote extensively from Sterling as to the applicability of the APA.
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