Sarmiento v. Perry

• Docket Number: Civil Action 1:25-cv-01644-AJT-WBP
• Decision Date: 19 January 2026
• Citation: Sarmiento v. Perry, Civil Action 1:25-cv-01644-AJT-WBP (E.D. Va. Jan 19, 2026)
• Parties: BRAYAN LOPEZ SARMIENTO, et. al., Petitioners, v. PAUL PERRY, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

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BRAYAN LOPEZ SARMIENTO, et. al., Petitioners, v. PAUL PERRY, et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01644-AJT-WBP

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division

January 19, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Anthony J. Trenga, United States District Judge

On January 8, 2026, the Court granted Petitioner Axel Eduardo Martinez Ucles' request for immediate release from immigration detention [Doc. No. 49] and in further support of that Order, issues this Memorandum Opinion.

Within the context of their Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, [Doc. No. 27] one of the Petitioners, Axel Eduardo Martinez Ucles (“Ucles”), filed a request that the Court order his immediate release from immigration detention and require that any re-detention be based on “changed circumstances” relative to those that existed when he was released to his mother in 2018 from the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) after it was determined that he was not a “danger to self, danger to the community, and risk of flight,” [Doc. No. 18-1] ¶ 82; 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A), and then granted on April 19, 2023, Special Immigrant Juvenile (“SIJ”) status, with “deportability” and “inadmissibility” waived, while he applied for adjustment of status, together with parole into the community, eligibility to seek work authorization, and deferred action on removal for four years (the “Motion”).^[1]The Court held hearings on the Motion on December 17, 2025, and January 8 2026, following which it granted the Motion in part and ordered that Petitioner Ucles be released immediately from custody and further enjoined his re-detention absent a pre-deprivation hearing in which Respondents carry the burden of establishing changed circumstances justifying Ucles' re-detention based on his flight risk or danger to the community. [Doc. No. 49].

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Petitioner Plaintiffs Brayan Josue Lopez Sarmiento, Jhonatan Alex Rodriguez Argueta, and Josue Antonio Rodriguez Argueta, filed this putative class action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated individuals, arguing that their ongoing detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (Count I); the bond regulations (Count II), the Administrative Procedures Act (Count III), and the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution (Count IV). [Doc. No. 4]. After the Court ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner-Plaintiffs individualized bond hearings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),^[2] Petitioners filed an Amended Complaint, in which they added Ucles as a named petitioner-plaintiff, added additional claims, and redefined the proposed class as two separate proposed classes. [Doc. No. 18]. On December 3, 2025, the Court ordered Respondents to “provide Petitioner Axel Martinez Ucles with the same relief provided to the remaining named PetitionerPlaintiffs,” [Doc. No. 26].

On December 8, 2025, Petitioners filed the present Motion, requesting, inter alia, the Court to order Petitioner Ucles' immediate release from custody. [Doc. No. 27]. On December 9, 2025, Petitioners informed the Court that Petitioner Ucles was denied bond on December 8, 2025, purportedly based on a finding that he was a flight risk, because Ucles had previously failed to appear at prior court hearings, and filed a Motion to Expedite Briefing Schedule on the Motion. [Doc. No. 30] at 4.^[3]

The Court held a hearing on December 17, 2025 on Petitioners' request for Ucles' immediate relief, following which it ordered Plaintiffs to provide supplemental briefing focused on three issues: (1) what is legally required before the government can revoke Ucles' deferred action as an individual with SIJ status; (2) the legal basis for Petitioner-Plaintiffs' claim that the government should bear the burden of showing “changed circumstances” by clear and convincing evidence prior to Ucles' re-detention; and (3) the proper remedy for the Motion, beyond the § 1226(a) bond hearing the Court already provided. Following the submission of supplemental briefing on these issues, [Doc. Nos. 37, 38, 39], the Court held its January 8, 2026 hearing, at which it granted the Motion in part and ordered that Petitioner Ucles be released immediately from custody and further enjoined his re-detention absent a pre-deprivation hearing in which Respondents carry the burden of establishing changed circumstances justifying Ucles' re-detention based on his flight risk or danger to the community. [Doc. No. 49].

B. Relevant Factual Background

Petitioner-Plaintiff Ucles is a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the United States in 2018. [Doc. No. 18-1] ¶ 81. Following his arrival in 2018, he was served a Notice To Appear (“NTA”) to commence removal proceedings, but subsequently designated an “unaccompanied minor” and placed into the custody of the ORR and released to his mother in Manassas, Virginia, upon ORR's determination that Ucles was not a “danger to self, danger to the community, and risk of flight.” Id. ¶ 82; 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A).^[4] On April 19, 2023, Ucles was granted deferred action as an SIJ for a period of four years, which rendered him eligible to apply for employment authorization, and notified him that, as an act of “administrative convenience,” deferred action “gives some cases lower priority for removal from the United States.” [Doc. No. 18-4] at 6. As a result of his deferred action, the government dismissed all pending immigration charges against him. Id. at 7.

In July 2025, Ucles was re-apprehended by immigration officials without prior notice or a pre-deprivation hearing and on July 23, 2025, while detained, was issued a new NTA, which despite his having been paroled into the United States, see infra at III.B.i, charged him under 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as a noncitizen “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” Id. at 8.^[5]In a letter dated July 28, 2025, USCIS terminated Ucles' deferred action, stating that the agency “has individually reviewed your case and exercised discretion to terminate your period of deferred action ....” Id. at 9. Then in September 2025, DHS added against Ucles an additional charge under 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).^[6][Doc. No. 18-1] ¶ 86. Petitioner's SIJ status has not been revoked or modified as of the time of Petitioners' filings.

In November 2025, Ucles joined this litigation as a named Plaintiff-Petitioner in the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), in which Petitioners assert eight claims challenging various aspects of the Government's mandatory detention policy, three of which are at issue in Ucles' request for emergency relief: (1) Count III alleging that Respondents' termination of his deferred action without providing any rationale is arbitrary and capricious; (2) Count V alleging that Respondents violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause by re-detaining him without a pre-deprivation hearing to establish changed circumstances justifying the loss of his previously granted liberty, and by terminating his period of deferred action without notice or an opportunity to contest it; and (3) Count VI alleging that Respondents' decision to rearrest and re-detain him on charges that had already been dismissed is arbitrary and capricious and violates the Accardi doctrine by failing to comply with Respondents' own binding rules and regulations.^[7]

On December 8, 2025, following the Court's order to grant Ucles the same relief provided to the other named Petitioners, the immigration court denied bond, concluding, without explanation, that Ucles “is a flight risk based on multiple failure to appears.” [Doc. No. 30-2] at 1.^[8]

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

For a plaintiff to obtain a temporary restraining order a plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) that the balance of equities tip in plaintiff's favor; and (4) that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is in the public interest. See HIAS, Inc. v. Trump, 985 F.3d 309, 318-319 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Winter v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). When the government is the opposing party, the third and fourth factors merge. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

As an initial matter, Respondents contend that the Court is deprived of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and 1252(g).

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), “judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). But where a petitioner is “not asking for review of an order of removal” or “challenging any part of the process by which their removability will be determined . . . § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018); see also Hasan v. Crawford, 800 F.Supp.3d 641, 650 (E.D. Va. 2025) (“Section 1252(b)(9) does not insulate detention orders from judicial review because they are separate and apart from orders of removal.”) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, Petitioner does not challenge any removal order and in fact, no order of removal has yet been entered against him. Rather, he challenges the lawfulness of his detention and the policies related to it; and this Court does not lack jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).

Next Respondents argue that “section 1252(g), as amended by the REAL ID Act, specifically deprives courts of jurisdiction, including habeas corpus jurisdiction, to review ‘any cause or claim...