Sarro v. Cornell Corrections, Inc., C.A. No. 00-011-T.
| Decision Date | 27 February 2003 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 00-011-T. |
| Parties | George A. SARRO III, v. CORNELL CORRECTIONS, INC., Wyatt Detention Center, Victor Liburdi, Captain Lorenzo, J. Carroll, J. Maguire and Jennifer Egan. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
William M. Dolan III, Esq., Angel Taveras, Esq., Brown, Rudnick, Berlack & Israels, LLP, Providence, RI, Michele Elisa O'Brien, Esq., Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.
George A. Sarro III, Pro se.
Dennis T. Grieco II, Esq., Gidley, Sarli & Marlusak, Providence, RI, for Defendant.
George A. Sarro III, acting pro se, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and/or Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), against various parties associated with the Donald Wyatt Detention Center, a privately-operated facility in which federal prisoners awaiting trial are incarcerated. Sarro seeks money damages for claimed violations of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights when prison guards allegedly failed to protect him from attack by fellow inmates and failed to provide him with adequate medical treatment for his injuries.
The case is before the Court for consideration of Sarro's objection to a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate judge has recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of the defendants on the ground that they are neither state actors for the purposes of § 1983 nor federal actors for the purposes of Bivens; and, therefore subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.
Because I find that none of the defendants acted under color of state law; the individual defendants acted under color of federal law; and the corporate defendants cannot be held liable under Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001), the Recommendation is rejected with respect to the Bivens claim against the individual defendants and the Recommendation is accepted in all other respects.
In 1991, Rhode Island enacted the Municipal Detention Facility Corporations Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-54-1, et seq., which authorized municipalities to create public corporations that would own and operate detention facilities. See Lawson v. Liburdi, 114 F.Sup.2d 31, 33 (D.R.I.2000). The dual purposes of the act were to promote economic development and to provide a facility in which the United States Marshals Service could house federal pretrial detainees. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-52-2(b); Lawson, 114 F.Sup.2d at 33.
Pursuant to that statutory authorization, the City of Central Falls (the City) created the Central Falls Detention Facility Corporation (CFDFC) to build and own such a facility. CFDFC's Board of Directors consists of five unpaid members who are appointed by the mayor. The corporation is not a part of the City. Rather it is "an instrumentality and agency of the municipality, but has a distinct legal existence from the municipality". R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-54-1. Financing to construct the facility, later named the Donald F. Wyatt Detention Center (Wyatt), came from bonds issued by the Rhode Island Port Authority. See City of Central Falls v. Central Falls Del Facility Corp., C.A. No. 94-3939, 1997 WL 839936, at *1 (R.I.Super. June 23,1997).
The CFDFC contracted with the U.S. Marshals Service to house federal pretrial detainees at Wyatt. The CFDFC also contracted with Cornell Corrections, Inc.1 (Cornell), a private corporation, to operate the facility and employ the staff. See Huguenin v. Ponte, 29 F.Sup.2d 57, 60 (D.R.I.1998). Under the terms of that contract, Cornell has the exclusive use of the facility and the exclusive authority to operate it.
In 1997, Sarro was awaiting trial on federal criminal charges and was being detained at Wyatt. Sarro alleges that, after a fight between another white inmate and a black inmate, Sarro reported to defendant Lorenzo that he had received numerous threats from black inmates and he requested to be placed in protective custody. Sarro further alleges that his request was denied and that, subsequently, defendant Carroll, another guard, left him unattended during a fire drill at which time he was viciously beaten by several black inmates. Finally, Sarro alleges that defendant Egan, the programs director at Wyatt, refused to provide him proper medical treatment for his injuries.
On January 7, 2000, Sarro, acting pro se, filed a complaint against Wyatt, Cornell, and various employees working at Wyatt, including Lorenzo, Carroll, and Egan. Sarro seeks compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to Bivens and § 1983 for what he alleges were violations of his Eighth and Fifth Amendment rights resulting from the individual defendants' "deliberate indifference" to his "health and safety."
On June 21, 2000, Cornell moved to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2), (4), (5) and Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for alleged deficiencies in process and the service of process, and, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. That motion was referred to a magistrate judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
The magistrate judge sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and ordered the individual defendants to file affidavits stating whether they were employed by any governmental entity, state or federal. The defendants submitted an affidavit, stating that, at all relevant times, the individual defendants were employed by Cornell Corrections of Rhode Island, Inc. Sarro submitted a letter, stating his belief that because he was a federal prisoner in the custody of the U.S. Marshal, the individual defendants were employed by the federal government.
The magistrate judge recommended that the claims against Wyatt be dismissed on the ground that there was no such legal entity. He also recommended that the motion to dismiss with respect to the remaining defendants be denied to the extent that it was based on alleged insufficiencies in process and the service of process. There has been no objection to either of those recommendations. The magistrate judge treated the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as a motion for summary judgment and recommended that it be granted on the ground that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because the defendants had not acted under color of federal law within the meaning of Bivens or state law within the meaning of § 1983.
Sarro objected and, because of the importance and complexity of the issues presented and because no court has yet decided whether a guard at a privately-operated facility housing federal prisoners is amenable to suit under Bivens, this Court appointed counsel to represent Sarro. This Court also granted the American Civil Liberties Union leave to file an amicus brief.
While the objection was pending, Sarro's counsel filed an amended complaint adding CFDFC as a defendant and asserting claims for negligence. While that complaint is not, now, the subject of the Court's consideration, it will be affected by the rulings made with respect to the magistrate judge's Report & Recommendation.
Recommendations by a magistrate judge are reviewed de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Since the recommendation, here, is that summary judgment be entered, the applicable standard of review is found in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 56(c) provides for the entry of summary judgment when the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Material facts are those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1995). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court views the evidence and all inferences that may fairly be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 29.
Although the Supreme Court has held that a private corporation operating a prison is not subject to suit under Bivens, Malesko, 534 U.S. at 73, 122 S.Ct. 515 no Court has yet addressed whether a federal prisoner incarcerated at a privately-operated facility may maintain a Bivens action against guards and other individuals employed at that facility; and, at first blush, the decisions of the Supreme Court that bear on that issue appear to be irreconcilable.
The Supreme Court has held that a federal officer...
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