Saslaw v. Rosenfeld
| Decision Date | 09 February 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 2268.,2268. |
| Citation | 148 A.2d 311 |
| Parties | George SASLAW, Appellant, v. Philip ROSENFELD, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Before ROVER, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.
Suit was brought against appellant by one Keyser for the balance due on a promissory note. Appellant answered denying the indebtedness and brought appellee into the case as a third-party defendant alleging, that as his attorney. amen ce had without consent permitted Keyser to apply payments made on the note to an open account which appellant denied owing.
Appellee moved for summary judgment on the ground that the third-party action was barred by a release. Through affidavits and documents submitted in support of his motion, appellee established that prior to the present litigation, he filed a suit against appellant to recover for legal services rendered. An answer and counterclaim containing the same allegations as those in the present third-party action were prepared by an attorney for appellant and these were mailed to counsel for appellee together with a letter suggesting the possibility of settlement. The answer and counterclaim were never filed with the court as a settlement was ultimately effected between the parties. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, appellant executed a release discharging all "* * * causes of actions, sums of money, accounts, contracts, controversies, damages, claims and demands whatsoever in law or in equity * * *" which he had or might have as of the date of the release.
The court granted the motion for summary judgment and in this appeal the propriety of that order is challenged on the grounds: (1) that the release was limited to claims arising out of the suit for legal fees; and (2) that issues of fact are raised as to fraud and misrepresentation in the third-party action.
The construction of a release is governed by the intent of the parties as manifested in the language of the instrument. The release involved here employs general terms and follows the standard form. Its provisions permit no exceptions or limitations and no reference is made to the legal claim which motivated its execution. We think it is indisputable that, by this instrument, appellant relinquished all rights to sue on any claim which he might have had against ap...
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Dyer v. Bilaal, No. 07-CV-1057.
...In other words, absent ambiguity, we enforce written contracts according to their terms. See Sutton, 686 A.2d at 1048; Saslaw v. Rosenfeld, 148 A.2d 311, 312 (D.C. 1959) ("The construction of a release is governed by the intent of the parties as manifested in the language of the instrument.......
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Bolling Fed. Credit v. Cumis Ins. Soc.
...56(c). A release is a form of contract. The parties' intentions are paramount to construction of the instrument. Saslaw v. Rosenfeld, 148 A.2d 311, 312 (D.C.1959); see generally COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 60:18 (Rev. ed. 1983). If the release is facially unambiguous, we must rely solely upon i......
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Derzavis v. Security Storage Co. of Wash.
...the release prior to the effective dates listed therein. See Bolling Fed., supra note 1, 475 A.2d at 385; see also Saslaw v. Rosenfeld, 148 A.2d 311, 312 (D.C.Mun.App.1959). Therefore, Derzavis is barred from asserting a claim for breach of contract or negligence against Security for damage......
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Rexrode v. Vinson
...release, as a settlement instrument, is not contra to public policy and must be given effect according to its terms. Saslaw v. Rosenfeld, 148 A.2d 311 (D.C.Mun.App. 1959); Randolph v. Ottenstein, 122 U. S.App.D.C 414, 355 F.2d 839 (1965). It is important to note that in this action there is......