Sass v. Mta Bus Co.

• Decision Date: 04 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 10–CV–4079 (MKB).,10–CV–4079 (MKB).
• Parties: Gary SASS, Plaintiff, v. MTA BUS COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

6 F.Supp.3d 238

Gary SASS, Plaintiff,

v.MTA BUS COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 10–CV–4079 (MKB).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed Aug. 4, 2014.

Aaron N. Solomon, The Law Office of Michael G. O'Neill, Michael G. O'Neill, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Renee Lucille Cyr, Law Office of Steve S. Efron, Steve S. Efron, Steve S. Efron, New York, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge.

Plaintiff Gary Sass commenced the above-captioned action against his former employer Metropolitan Transportation Authority Bus Company (“MTA Bus”) for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (“NYSHRL”) and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–107 (“NYCHRL”). After a jury trial, on June 20, 2013, the jury found Defendant liable and awarded damages in the amount of $358,300. Plaintiff moved for equitable relief and attorneys' fees. (Docket Entry No. 47.) Four days after the verdict, on June 24, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar changing the standard of proof necessary to establish a retaliation claim pursuant to Title VII. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). Based on Nassar, Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a new trial. (Docket Entry No. 50.) By Memorandum and Order dated February 14, 2014, the Court granted Defendant's motion for a new trial, and denied as moot Plaintiff's motion for damages and attorneys' fees. (Docket Entry No. 60.) Plaintiff moved for reconsideration on the ground that the Court's order did not address Plaintiff's claim under the New York City Human Rights Law, since Nassar did not change the standard for establishing liability on a retaliation claim brought under that statute. (Docket Entry No. 61.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is granted. Upon reconsideration, the Court (1) adheres to its prior ruling granting Defendant's motion for a new trial as to Plaintiff's Title VII claim, (2) finds that Defendant is entitled to a new trial as to Plaintiff's NYSHRL claim, (3) denies Defendant's motion for a new trial as to Plaintiff's NYCHRL claim, and (4) grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff's motion for equitable relief, damages, attorneys' fees and costs.

I. Background

The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case as set forth in the Court's earlier decisions. See Sass v. MTA Bus Co., 6 F.Supp.3d 229, 234–36, 2014 WL 585418, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2014); Sass v. MTA Bus Co., No. 10–CV–4079, 2012 WL 4511394, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2012). The Court summarizes the facts necessary to the resolution of the instant motion.

According to Plaintiff, he was terminated from his position as a bus maintenance supervisor at MTA Bus in retaliation for telling MTA Bus investigators that he previously reported to his supervisor that he found a bus roster with Nazi symbols superimposed on it, and that his supervisor failed to take any action. On June 17, 2013, the Court commenced a jury trial on Plaintiff's retaliation claim. After the presentation of all the evidence, the Court instructed the jury that in order to establish liability on Plaintiff's retaliation claim, Plaintiff had to prove that “one or more of his protected activities played an important role in [D]efendant's decision to terminate [P]laintiff,” and that “[P]laintiff's participation in protected activities were more likely than not a motivating factor in [D]efendant's termination of [P]laintiff.” (Trial Transcript (“Trial Tr.”), Docket Entry Nos. 57–59, 586:16–24.) On June 20, 2013, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The jury awarded $0 in compensatory damages, $252,300 in back pay, and $106,000 in front pay. ( Id. at 618:3–15; see also Jury Verdict Sheet, Docket Entry No. 46.) Plaintiff subsequently moved for reinstatement, pension contributions, back pay and attorneys' fees. (Docket Entry No. 47.)

On June 24, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision in Nassar holding that “Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation,” expressly rejecting the motivating-factor standard. Nassar, 570 U.S. at ––––, 133 S.Ct. at 2533. Based on the Supreme Court's Nassar decision, Defendant renewed its motion pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment as a matter of law. Defendant also moved, in the alternative, for an order vacating the verdict and granting a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant argued that Nassar applied retroactively to the pending case, and that the charge to the jury that provided for a finding of liability if retaliation was a motivating factor in Plaintiff's termination was therefore erroneous. (Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (“Def. Rule 50 Mem.”), Docket Entry No. 50, 13–14.) Defendant acknowledged that while the jury's verdict could arguably be upheld under the NYCHRL as claims under NYCHRL are to be given a liberal construction, independent of Title VII, ( id. at 14), because there is textual and substantive similarity between NYCHRL and Title VII, the Court should find that the new standard for establishing causation announced in Nassar applies to Plaintiff's NYCHRL claim as well. ( Id. at 14–15.)

Plaintiff opposed Defendant's motion on the grounds that (1) Defendant failed to object to the jury instruction on Plaintiff's retaliation claim, (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (“Pl. Rule 50 Opp'n”), Docket Entry No. 55, at 4–5), (2) even assuming that Nassar applied retroactively, any error in the jury instruction was harmless, as the jury would have found that Plaintiff's protected activity was the but-for cause of his termination, ( id. at 6–7), and (3) under the prevailing interpretation requiring employment discrimination claims brought pursuant to NYCHRL to be analyzed separately from claims brought pursuant to federal law, the standard for assessing causation in retaliation claims under NYCHRL would likely remain unaffected by Nassar, ( id. at 9–10). Plaintiff argued that the Court should reject Defendant's argument that New York courts would likely interpret NYCHRL consistently with the revised interpretation of Title VII mandated by Nassar. ( Id. at 10.)

The Court denied Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that the evidence presented at trial could support a finding of liability for retaliation even under the more stringent standard announced in Nassar.See Sass, 6 F.Supp.3d at 235–36, 2014 WL 585418, at *4. The Court granted Defendant's motion for a new trial, finding that “the new standard for retaliation [announced by Nassar] applies retroactively to all cases still open on direct review, including the case before this Court,” and that the mixed-motives instruction to the jury at trial was contrary to the new standard. Id. at 237, 2014 WL 585418, at *6. The Court did not address Plaintiff's claim regarding Nassar's applicability to NYCHRL. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, noting that the Court did not directly address Plaintiff's argument with respect to his NYCHRL claim. (Pl. Mem. 1.)

II. Discussion

a. Standard of Review

i. Reconsideration

The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration “is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995); see also Local Civ. R. 6.3 (The moving party must “set[ ] forth concisely the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the Court has overlooked.”); Smith v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 524 Fed.Appx. 730, 734 (2d Cir.2013). It is thus “well-settled” that a motion for reconsideration is “not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a ‘second bite at the apple.’ ” Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.1998)), as amended (July 13, 2012). A motion for reconsideration is “neither an occasion for repeating old arguments previously rejected nor an opportunity for making new arguments that could have previously been made.” Simon v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., –––F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2014 WL 1257780, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In order to prevail on a motion for reconsideration, “the moving party must demonstrate that the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before the Court on the underlying motion.” Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Grp. Inc., 28 Fed.Appx. 73, 75 (2d Cir.2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

ii. Rule 59

Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] court may grant a new trial ‘for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court....’ ” Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1)(A)), cert. denied,568 U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 789, 184 L.Ed.2d 582 (2012). Grounds for granting a new trial include verdicts that are against the weight of the evidence, Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237, 245 (2d Cir.2003), substantial errors in the admission or rejection of evidence, O & G Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 537 F.3d 153, 166 (2d Cir.2008), and...