Sasse v. King County, 26975.

Citation196 Wash. 242,82 P.2d 536
Decision Date08 September 1938
Docket Number26975.
PartiesSASSE v. KING COUNTY et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; James B. Kinne, Judge.

Action by A. H. Sasse against King County and others to establish a right of redemption of real estate from a sale wherein the county was the purchaser under tax foreclosure proceedings and to set aside a resale of the property subsequently made by the county. From an adverse decree, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Henry W. Parrott, of Seattle, for appellant.

B. Gray Warner and Lloyd W. Shorett, both of Seattle, for respondent King County.

Ray M Wardall and Jerry Finch, both of Seattle, for respondent Thuesen.

STEINERT Chief Justice.

Plaintiff appearing in a dual capacity, brought this action seeking (1) to establish a right of redemption of real property from a sale wherein King county was the purchaser under tax foreclosure proceedings and (2) to set aside a resale of the property subsequently made by the county to its correspondents. Trial by the court without a jury resulted in a decree denying plaintiff relief and quieting title to the property in the purchaser at resale, free from any claim of either the plaintiff or the county. Thereupon plaintiff appealed.

The property involved in this action consists of a quarter section of green timber land located in a steep, hilly area near the middle fork of the Snoqualmie river in King county. According to the records of the assessor's office, the county cruise shows that the timber consists of six million, four hundred eighty thousand feet of fir, cedar, hemlock and larch, and that over a period of many years prior to 1932 the land had an assessed valuation of $4,310 with a resulting annual tax of from $250 to $300. A road suitable for logging purposes is under construction and will be extended to a point about a half mile south of the southerly line of the land. Appellant acquired the property in 1928, in trade for his equity in a Seattle apartment house. The conveyance to him was subject to general taxes for 1927 amounting to $190.51 and delinquent taxes from 1922 to 1926, inclusive, amounting to $793.23, and to delinquent assessments for forest fire protection over the same period, amounting to $42.40.

After receiving his deed appellant paid the current taxes for several years, his last payment being made in 1931; but he has never paid any of the delinquent taxes. It also appears that appellant had not at any time, either preceding or during the trial, ever seen this land.

In 1932 the county instituted proceedings under the statute to foreclose its tax lien, and pursuant thereto the property was sold at public auction on April 30 of that year. For lack of other bidders the county became the purchaser and received the usual form of deed. The county then held the property until the summer of 1936 when, by order of the county commissioners dated June 8, the county treasurer was directed to sell the property upon bids in amount not less than $160. On July 11, 1936, the property was sold by the county treasurer to respondent Thuesen for that amount, upon terms of $40 to be paid at the time of sale and the balance to be paid within thirty days. A deed was issued to Thuesen on July 21, 1936.

In the meantime, that is on June 26, 1936, appellant, for some reason or other, decided to pay up the delinquent taxes, but he was unaware at that time of the tax foreclosure and the proceedings subsequent thereto. After an unsuccessful attempt to redeem the land, he began this action in May, 1937, which resulted, as already stated, in a decree adverse to him. Further details concerning appellant's attempted redemption will appear later herein.

The assignments of error may be discussed under two general heads.

Appellant contends, first, that, although the statutory period of redemption of the land had expired, nevertheless his right to redeem was established and became fixed both by his offer to pay up the delinquent taxes in full followed by the county's acceptance of such offer, and by the county's contemporaneous offer to allow him to redeem, which latter offer, he alleges, was fraudulently, deceitfully and wrongfully withdrawn by the county.

The facts upon which this twofold contention is based are as follows:

On June 8, 1936, the county commissioners held a regular meeting, and in the minutes of that meeting appears an entry to the effect that at that time application to purchase the land was made by Thuesen and that the treasurer was thereupon directed to advertise the property and to accept no bid less than $160. The fact is, however, that the application to purchase was not made until June 9. The clerk of the board having charge of writing up the minutes testified that she had been directed to include the application made June 9 in the minutes of June 8; she also testified that this was irregular, but that it was often done. The record does not disclose the identity of the person who directed her to do this.

On June 26, 1936, appellant and his attorney, without knowledge of the preceding events, called on the county treasurer to ascertain the amount of delinquent taxes on the land. It was appellant's intention to pay these taxes out of the proceeds of a loan which he was then negotiating on the property. At that time, however, there was an outstanding unpaid mortgage thereon of $3,612.29 which appellant himself had executed. The treasurer advised appellant of the tax foreclosure sale made to the county in 1932 and also told him that the county presently had a tax investment in the property amounting to about $1,900. The treasurer further stated that so far as his office was concerned he would be glad to allow appellant to redeem, but that the matter was entirely in the hands, and under the full control, of the county commissioners.

Appellant then called at the office of the commissioners and told a clerk there of his desire to redeem and pay the sum of $1,900, the amount indicated by the treasurer. The clerk responded by saying that the commissioners 'would be glad to allow the redemption and would accept' appellant's offer. The clerk then obtained from appellant a description of the property, but, after examining the records, advised appellant that the property had already been sold and that the offer would therefore have to be withdrawn. The fact is, as stated above, that the property had not yet then been sold. The reason why the clerk so reported to appellant is that, according to the practice and custom in the King county commissioners' office, properties acquired by the county through tax foreclosure are marked 'sold,' on the records of that office, as soon as an order of sale is entered by the commissioners; from that point the treasurer has charge of the proceedings. Upon the occasion of appellant's visits on June 26, he made no actual tender and apparently he had not yet completed his negotiations for the funds out of which the redemption payment was to be made. No further request or demand was ever made by appellant upon the county commissioners.

On July 15, 1936, appellant and his attorney again called on the treasurer for the purpose of ascertaining the name of the purchaser at the resale, with a view of instituting proceedings to attack the original tax foreclosure because of a slight defect in the description of the property. They then learned from the treasurer that the property had been sold, not on Jund 8 as they had been formerly advised by the clerk of the county commissioners, but on July 11, at which time Thuesen had purchased it for $160. The significance of this, presumptively, is that, if appellant had known on June 26 that the sale was to be made on July 11, he might have attended and bid on the property.

Considering all of these facts and considering, also, what is lacking in the record in point of fact, we are compelled to hold against appellant's first contention.

Rem.Rev.Stat. § 11280, gives a former owner of real property the right to redeem at any time Before , but not after, the issuance of a tax deed, upon payment, in legal money, of the amount for which the property was sold, together with a prescribed rate of interest thereon.

Boards of county commissioners have only such powers as have been granted to them, expressly or by necessary implication, by the constitution and statutes of the state, and when the board goes beyond the scope of its authority its acts are void and not binding upon the county. Martin v. Whitman County, 1 Wash. 533, 20 P. 599; State ex rel. Spring Water Co. v. Monroe, 40 Wash. 545, 82 P. 888; State ex rel. Potter v. King County, 45 Wash. 519, 88 P. 935; McElwain v. Abraham, 58 Wash. 26, 107 P. 832; Green v. Okanogan County, 60 Wash. 309, 111 P. 226, 114 P. 457; State ex rel. Wauconda Inv. Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Wash. 660, 124 P. 127, Ann.Cas.1913E, 1076; Osborne, Tremper & Co. v. King County, 76 Wash. 277, 136 P. 138; Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 141 P. 892; Northwestern Imp. Co. v. McNeil, 100 Wash. 22, 170 P. 338. By the test of this rule, the board had no power to allow a redemption not permitted by statute, and any agreement to that effect would have been ultra vires and not legally binding upon the county.

Assuming, however, that, under certain...

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19 cases
  • Strand v. State
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 6 Enero 1943
    ...court has held that the acquisition and sale of real property through tax foreclosure sales are governmental functions, Sasse v. King County, 196 Wash. 242, 82 P.2d 536; Commercial Waterway Dist. No. 1 v. King County, 197 Wash. 441, 85 P.2d 1067; State ex rel. King County Water Dist. v. Sta......
  • City of Walla Walla v. State, 27192.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 22 Diciembre 1938
    ...which the land lies. Gustaveson v. Dwyer, 78 Wash. 336, 139 P. 194; Shelton v. Klickitat County, 152 Wash. 193, 277 P. 839; Sasse v. King County, Wash., 82 P.2d 536. If county, after purchasing the property at such foreclosure proceeding, subsequently sells it to a third party, a new title ......
  • Mitchell v. Consol. School Dist. No. 201, 28898.
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    • 15 Marzo 1943
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    • 7 Febrero 1940
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