Sataki v. Broad. Bd. of Governors

Decision Date07 July 2010
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 10-534 (CKK)
Citation733 F.Supp.2d 22
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
PartiesElham SATAKI, Plaintiff, v. BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS, et al., Defendants.

Larry E. Klayman, Klayman Law Firm, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Robin Michelle Meriweather, Assistant United States Attorney, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge.

Presently pending before the Court are Plaintiff Elham Sataki's [11] Motion for a Preliminary Injunction 1 and Plaintiff's [41]Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's order denying her request for a temporary restraining order. This case stems from allegations that Plaintiff was sexually harassed and assaulted by a co-worker at the Persian News Network ("PNN") and that her employer, the Broadcasting Board of Governors ("BBG"), 2 as well as several members and employees of the BBG, unlawfully facilitated the alleged sexual harassment, actively attempted to cover up the incidents of harassment, interfered with the investigation of her administrative complaint, and retaliated against her for complaining about her co-worker's harassing conduct as well as for criticizing BBG's management and mission. As a result of this alleged conduct, Plaintiff claims that she has suffered both mental and physical injuries and is presently unable to continue working near or around those responsible for the alleged harassment and retaliation. Consequently, Plaintiff has not returned to work since approximately February of 2010.

Plaintiff has filed a series of administrative and legal complaints seeking review of her allegations of harassment and retaliation. She initially filed suit against her alleged harasser on March 1, 2010, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. That case was subsequently removed to this Court on March 19, 2010, and remains pending at this time. See Sataki v. Falahati, Civ. Act. No. 10-466(CKK). Thereafter, on March 25, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint with BBG's Office of Civil Rights, which complaint also remains pending before the agency. Finally, on April 2, 2010, approximately one week after filing her administrative complaint, Plaintiff filed the above-captioned lawsuit. She has named as Defendants in this action BBG and several members and employees of the BBG, both in their official as well as their individual capacities ("Individual Defendants") (collectively with BBG, "Defendants"). As set forth in Plaintiff's initial complaint, she alleges that Defendants violated her constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. 3 Plaintiff seeks a final award of monetary damages in the form of all back pay and benefits owed to her for the period of her absence from work as well as punitive damages and a permanent injunction ordering BBG to permit Plaintiff to perform her work from Los Angeles, California.

Approximately one month after filing the present lawsuit, Plaintiff amended her complaint in this matter to add a claim for interim injunctive relief pursuant to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 566 (D.C.Cir.1987). As set forth therein, Plaintiff asks the Court to issue interim injunctive relief awarding her monetary damages in the form of all back pay and benefits owed to her for the period of her absence from work and a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction requiring that BBG permit Plaintiff to work from Los Angeles, California, during the pendency of her administrative and legal proceedings. Such relief is nearly identical to the ultimate relief requested in this lawsuit and is at the heart of the motions now pending before the Court, in which Plaintiff seeks issuance of a preliminary injunction and also asks the Court to reconsider its prior decision denying her motion for a temporary restraining order. The Court has thoroughly considered Plaintiff's pending motions and the parties' respective briefing, the relevant case law and statutory authority, and the record of this case as a whole. Despite Plaintiff's repeated claims that she is seeking only interim injunctive relief to preserve the status quo, it is patently clear that Plaintiff in fact seeks an order affirmatively altering the status quo during the pendency of the administrative proceedings below. The Court's jurisdiction to issue such relief is far from clear. Well-established precedent further counsels that this Court should be reluctant to interfere with the personnel decisions of the federal government. Nonetheless, even if the Court were to conclude that it had the authority to issue the relief sought, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the requested relief is either appropriate or warranted in this case. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, the Court shall DENY Plaintiff's [11] Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and shall also DENY Plaintiff's [41] Motion for Reconsideration.

I. BACKGROUND

Much ink has been spilled with respect to Plaintiff's request for interim injunctive relief, with the result that the record now before the Court has become voluminous and, at times, unwieldy. This is largely the result of the shifting nature of Plaintiff's legal arguments and factual claims, which have necessitated several rounds of additional briefing by the parties. Ultimately, the Court finds that many of the issues raised by the parties in their present briefing are immaterial to resolution of Plaintiff's request for interim injunctive relief. Nonetheless, given the numerous factual issues raised by Plaintiff in her pending motions and her oft-repeated-although wholly inaccurate-assertions that the Court has failed to consider all evidence relevant to the pending dispute, the Court sets forth below a comprehensive discussion of the factual background of this case. The Court does so in order to ensure that the record, as well as the Court's findings with respect to those issues raised by Plaintiff, is clearly and concisely set forth and that the issues raised by Plaintiff are each addressed, either explicitly or in summary form. As many of these issues ultimately prove immaterial to the resolution of the pending motions, however, the Court has limited its legal discussion below solely to those factual and legal issues that are directly relevant to the merits of Plaintiff's pending request for interim injunctive relief and which the Court has relied upon in denying Plaintiff's motions. With that understanding in mind, the Court turns now to its discussion of the factual background of the claims in this litigation.

A. Factual Background

The Court first addresses Plaintiff's repeated requests for an evidentiary hearing on her pending Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. It is well established in this Circuit that courts have discretion to resolve a preliminary injunction motion on the basis of the parties' briefing without a hearing, when appropriate. See LCvR 65.1(d). Further, even when a hearing is held, "[t]he practice in this jurisdiction is to decide preliminary injunction motions without live testimony where possible." Id. Plaintiff nonetheless asserts that an evidentiary hearing is required so that she may present the live testimony of her treating clinical psychologist, see Pl.'s Notice, Docket No. [20], and so that she may cross-examine Defendants' declarants on the substance of their testimony submitted in opposition to Plaintiff's motion, see Pl.'s Supp. Reply at 4.

The Court has determined in its discretion, upon careful review of the parties' legal memoranda and attachments, that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary. While the parties unquestionably dispute many of the facts underlying Plaintiff's substantive claims in this action, the Court finds that none of these disputes are material to or directly affect the Court's resolution of Plaintiff's request for interim injunctive relief. As indicated below, the Court has accepted the statements of Plaintiff's treating clinical psychologist as well as her treating psychiatrist for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion. Moreover, although Plaintiff generally alleges that the declarations attached to Defendants' memoranda "must [be] treat[ed] as suspect," see Pl.'s Supp. Reply at 4, her conclusory assertions on this point are insufficient to create a dispute of material fact absent specific evidence directly contravening the particular statements she seeks to challenge. Where Plaintiff has in fact proffered such evidence, the Court has noted as much and, where appropriate, has found for the reasons set forth below that such disputes are not material to the merits of Plaintiff's request for interim injunctive relief and therefore need neither be resolved at this time nor relied on. Where, however, Plaintiff has failed to either dispute specific statements made by Defendants or introduce any contradictory evidence into the record, the Court has accepted Defendants' statements as undisputed for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion. The Court emphasizes that no disputed facts asserted by Plaintiff and/or Defendants, material or otherwise, have been relied upon in reaching the ultimate decision below that Plaintiff is not entitled to the requested interim injunctive relief. No evidentiary hearing is therefore required.

1. Plaintiff's Work History at BBG

The Broadcasting Board of Governors is a federal agency responsible for the U.S. Government's international broadcasting. See Grosdidier v. Chairman, BBG, 560 F.3d 495, 496 (D.C.Cir.2009). It manages a network of individual broadcasting services, including the International Broadcasting Bureau, which carries out government-sponsored nonmilitary international broadcasting through the Voice of America ("VOA") and other entities. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6202, 6204, 6206. The Persian News Network, which is under the VOA,...

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