Satkar Hospitality Inc. v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review
| Decision Date | 02 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10 C 6682 |
| Parties | SATKAR HOSPITALITY INC., SHARAD K. DANI, and HARISH DANI, Plaintiffs, v. COOK COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Plaintiffs Satkar Hospitality, Inc., Sharad K. Dani, and Harish Dani have sued the Cook County Board of Review. Plaintiffs claim that the Board revoked their property tax reduction without providing due process and in violation of other constitutional prohibitions. The Board has moved for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the motion.
The present decision assumes familiarity with the Court's previous decisions in this case [docket nos. 98, 114, 118, and 143]. For purposes of resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court "view[s] the facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Danis own and operate Satkar, which owns a hotel in Schaumburg, Illinois. Satkar appealed the hotel's 2007 property tax assessment to the Board, whichconsiders appeals of real estate valuations made by the Cook County Assessor for property tax purposes. The Board lowered the assessment, saving Satkar $40,000 annually in property taxes.
In 2009, the local Fox Television affiliate ran several news stories suggesting that plaintiffs had received the lowered assessment corruptly. The news story stated that plaintiffs had given large campaign contributions to Illinois State Representative Paul Froehlich in exchange for his promise to arrange the lower assessment. Similar stories appeared on the Illinois Review blog. Plaintiffs deny that they ever engaged in corrupt or improper dealings with Froehlich.
Plaintiffs allege that in response to the media reports, the Board required them to appear on June 18, 2009 to discuss their assessment. Instead of asking questions about the assessment or the value of the property, however, plaintiffs allege that the Board only asked questions about their relationship with Froehlich. The Board then rescinded the reduction in property taxes it had awarded shortly before. Plaintiffs allege that the chief deputy commissioner of the Board stated that the reason plaintiffs lost the reduced assessment was because of their relationship with Froehlich and that the new assessment did not reflect the value of the hotel property. Plaintiffs appealed to the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB), but they allege that any review of their case will take many years and will be, in any event, essentially meaningless.
Plaintiffs also allege that they brought another appeal before the Board in 2010, but it was first delayed and then denied. Plaintiffs allege that a commissioner for the Board told their attorney that the second appeal was also denied because of plaintiffs' relationship with Froehlich and not because of the merits of their appeal. Thecommissioner also allegedly stated that the Board would not grant any appeal by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs allege that they do not have any effective means of appeal from the decisions of the Board, because of the significant length of time before any PTAB decision and the fact that the Board has "red-flagged their case with PTAB." Am. Compl. ¶ 53. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have the right to seek review in the Cook County Circuit Court, but allege that they could not receive any meaningful review there because many of the Circuit Court judges are politically beholden to politically influential members of the Board. The Board does not challenge these allegations for purposes of the present motion.
On October 17, 2010, plaintiffs sued the Board, its three commissioners, and three other employees of the Board for violations of their rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom of speech. They also sued the Fox television station, the Illinois Review, and individuals associated with each for defamation and false light under state law.
On May 20, 2011, the Court dismissed the claims against the Board commissioners and employees, holding that they had absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Satkar Hospitality Inc. v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, 819 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732-33 (N.D. Ill. 2011); see Heyde v. Pittenger, 633 F.3d 512, 522 (7th Cir. 2011). The Court noted, however, that the Board had not sought to dismiss the claims against it on the grounds of quasi-judicial immunity. Satkar Hospitality, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 733. On September 21, 2011, the Court dismissed the claims against Fox, Illinois Review, and the remaining individual defendants, finding that they were barred by the Illinois CitizenParticipation Act. Satkar Hospitality Inc. v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, No. 10 C 6682, 2011 WL 4431029, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2011). That decision is currently on appeal. The only remaining defendant is the Board.
When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court "view[s] the facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and will grant the motion only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief." Buchanan-Moore, 570 F.3d at 827 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Board contends that it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings for two reasons. First, it claims that, like its commissioners and employees, it is protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Second, the Board claims that it is protected by sovereign immunity as an arm of the State of Illinois.
The Board contends that it is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity when it is performing judicial functions. In the briefing and at oral argument, neither plaintiffs nor the Board cited any binding case law addressing the application of quasi-judicial immunity to entities. The Board has cited several out-of-circuit cases in which courts have accorded absolute immunity to individuals and entities simultaneously without discussion of any differences. E.g., Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 925-26 (9th Cir. 2004); Brossette v. City of Baton Rouge, 837 F. Supp. 759, 763 (M.D. La. 1993). In addition, at least two decisions by other judges in this district have heldthat entities were absolutely immune because they were performing judicial and prosecutorial functions. Goluszek v. H.P. Smith Paper Co., No. 93 C 5329, 1993 WL 358160, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1993); Jackson v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., No. 93 C 4690, 1993 WL 339292, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 1993).
After oral argument, however, the Court's research turned up a Seventh Circuit decision in which that court definitively stated that entities are not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. In Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006), Hernandez sued the Cook County Sheriff for actions by his deputies. Id. at 774. The sheriff attempted to invoke quasi-judicial immunity, because the deputies were carrying out a judge's order to detain Hernandez. Id. at 776. The court rejected this argument, stating:
Official immunities (judicial, legislative, absolute, qualified, quasi, and so on) are personal defenses designed to protect the finances of public officials whose salaries do not compensate them for the risks of liability under vague and hard-to-foresee constitutional doctrines. That justification does not apply to suits against units of state or local government, which can tap the public fisc. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), holds that governmental bodies whose own policies are unconstitutional cannot obtain a derivative benefit from the qualified immunity that may protect their employees. That decision did not entail a claim of "quasi-judicial immunity," but we cannot see any reason why a governmental entity would be entitled to one kind of immunity but not another.
Id. at 776. Although the Seventh Circuit held in favor of the sheriff on other grounds, id. at 776-78, the quoted discussion makes clear that entities are not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The Court accordingly declines to grant judgment in the Board's favor on this basis.
The Board also contends that it is immune from suit because it is a state agency. Tucker v. Williams, 682 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
To determine if a particular entity is a state agency, i.e., an arm of the state, courts look at: (1) the extent of the entity's financial autonomy from the state; and (2) the general legal status of the entity. Of the two, the entity's financial autonomy is the most important factor. In evaluating that factor, we consider the extent of state funding, the state's oversight and control of the entity's fiscal affairs, the entity's ability to raise funds independently, whether the state taxes the entity, and whether a judgment against the entity would result in the state increasing its appropriations to the entity.
Id. at 659 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
There is nothing to indicate that Illinois has any financial control over the Board. Illinois statutes provide that the commissioners of the Board "shall receive compensation fixed by the county board, which shall be paid from the county treasury." 35 ILCS 200/5-5(c). The same is true for other employees of the Board. 35 ILCS 200/5-15. An Illinois statute also provides that "[t]he county shall provide suitable office space for the board of review." 35 ILCS 200/5-5(c). The Board does not contend that any of its funding comes from Illinois or that Illinois exerts any oversight of control of the Board's...
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