Satterlee v. Internal Revenue Serv.

• Decision Date: 11 February 2022
• Docket Number: 6:21-cv-03046-RK
• Parties: RONALD LEROY SATTERLEE, Plaintiff, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

RONALD LEROY SATTERLEE, Plaintiff, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendant.

No. 6:21-cv-03046-RK

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Southern Division

February 11, 2022

ORDER

ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.

Now before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 36.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 37 42, 43.)^[1] After careful consideration and for the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.^[2]

I. Background

Plaintiff filed this complaint against Defendant on February 8, 2021, asserting claims under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552a. (Doc. 1.)^[3]

In October 2019 and November 2020 Plaintiff sent two requests seeking documents and records from Defendant under FOIA/the Privacy Act. In his first request, dated October 21, 2019, Plaintiff requested:

• “an exact copy of THE Certification(s) (Described below and required by Federal Regulations) for years ending 1998 through 2018 complete with all certifications and signatures”; and

• The “‘Proof of Claim' and ‘Verification of Debt' . . . for each year ending 1998 through 2018[.]”^[4]

Additionally, on November 5, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a second request for a number of records and documents, including:

• “the name and address of the original creditor”;

• “the Sworn and Attested ‘Ratification of Commencement' specifically identifying Foundation of Cause of Action against [Plaintiff] stating specific violations of the Federal Regulation (C.F.R.) for which 26 U.S.C. 6702 provides authority.... That is: ‘proof of claim' made under oath and pain and penalty of perjury, Notarized and the Claimant purporting to have the same to be Legally and Specifically identified by name; and that identified person must provide ‘proof of claim' made under oath and pain and penalty of perjury, otherwise that person does NOT HAVE A CLAIM against [Plaintiff]”;

• “Copies of Sworn and Attested Oath of Office of Claimant(s)”;

• “Copies of IRS agent TAMARA D. FETTEROLF Duty Assignments, Delegations of Authority showing Office Assignments of Claimant(s) and/or stating and stipulating Authority to enforce Title 27 Code of Federal Regulations for which 26 U.S. Code 6334 and § 6331 provides authority”;

• “an exact copy of the Demand for Payment which IRS Agent TAMARA D. FETTEROLF (ID. 1000594202) referenced on IRS Form 668(Y)(c) ‘Notice of Federal Tax Lien' (417704920 and 417705020)”;

• “an exact copy of the ‘Levy' which IRS TAMARA D. FETTEROLF (ID. 1000594202) alleges on reverse side of IRS Form 668W(ICS) ‘Notice of Levy on Waves, Salary, and Other Income' dated 10-13-2020” which states, “A levy was served on the person named on the front of this form”;

• “the IRS assessment proclaimed by IRS Agent TAMARA D. FETTEROLF (ID. 1000594202) on IRS Form 668(Y)(c) ‘Notice of Federal Tax Lien' (417704920 and 417705020) which is required to be made by the appropriate TTY Officer in accordance with Title 27 CFR Part 70 for which 26 U.S.C. 6201 provides authority”;

• “all Evidences of Judgment, Judgment(s) as Debtor, of Levy, of Garnishee, of Lien”; • “forward the Contract, Agreement, Negotiable Instrument, or waiver with signature of [Plaintiff] in Blue/Blue Black ink stipulating agreement to pay any amounts in excess of that stated on lawfully filed 1040 tax return for year ending 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008 or any hear IRS alleged debt”;

• “a copy of the valid UCC-1 Form filed, upon which is shown the alleged debtor's signature and the creditor's signature”;

• “the financing statement/security agreement signed by the alleged debtor and the secured party”; and

• “the valid court order, based on a court judgment wherein the alleged debtor has had due process opportunity to contest the alleged debt.”

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant was not responsive to his two FOIA requests, has failed to conduct an adequate search for records as required by the law, and otherwise improperly withheld certain agency records.

On June 23, 2021, the Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for lack of jurisdiction, finding Plaintiff had demonstrated Defendant received both FOIA requests and therefore Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies. (See Doc. 21.) On October 29, 2021, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Defendant argues (1) it has conducted a reasonable search responsive to Plaintiff's FOIA requests and has released responsive records it located, and (2) it has otherwise properly withheld certain personnel records pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). On October 28, 2021, 217 pages of documents were released to Plaintiff in response to his various requests.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, Defendant submitted a sworn declaration from Kevin Cummiskey, an attorney for the Internal Revenue Service with the Office of Associate Chief Counsel for Procedure and Administration. (See Doc. 37-1.) In his declaration, Attorney Cummiskey states that part of his official duties is to “assist[] the Department of Justice (DOJ) with [Defendant]'s views on defending against claims made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, ” and which duties “require that [he has] knowledge of the procedures and requirements for making FOIA requests.” (Id. at 1, ¶ 1.) Further, Attorney Cummiskey states that he “assisted DOJ in searching for and obtaining responsive records” to Plaintiff's two requests, and “personally reviewed these records.” (Id. at ¶ 2.) In addition, Attorney Cummiskey states that pursuant to “I.R.M. 11.3.13.3.10(4), ”^[5] Plaintiff's requests were “processed under FOIA instead of the Privacy Act” to ensure “greater access to the records plaintiff requests.” In answering Plaintiff's requests, Attorney Cummiskey states in the sworn declaration the responses fall into three categories: (1) either responsive documents or the most responsive documents (i.e., a certificate of assessment and/or notices of federal tax lien) were discovered and produced to Plaintiff; (2) requested records do not exist; or (3) response to Plaintiff's requests were withheld as exempt from disclosure under § 552(b)(6).

II. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. “[A] dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court does not weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, or attempt to discern the truth of any factual issue.” Morris v. City of Chillicothe, 512 F.3d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “Once the movant fulfills its responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, identifying the portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmovant must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Hess v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 898 F.3d 852, 857 (8th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Summary judgment is available in a FOIA action where an agency demonstrates that it has fully discharged its obligations under the FOIA. Mo. Coalition for Env't Found. V. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 542 F.3d 1204, 1209 (8th Cir. 2008). An agency meets the burden for summary judgment when the agency proves “that each document that falls within the class requested either has been produced, is unidentifiable, or is wholly exempt from the Act's inspection requirements.” Miller v. Dep't of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1383 (8th Cir. 1985). “[T] burden remains on the government to demonstrate that it has thoroughly searched for the requested documents where they might reasonably be found . . . once the agency has shown by convincing evidence that its search was reasonable, i.e., that it was especially geared to recover the documents requested, then the burden is on the requester to rebut that evidence by a showing that the search was not in fact in good faith.” Id. “An agency may prove the reasonableness of its search through affidavits of responsible agency officials so long as the affidavits are relatively detailed, nonconclusory, and submitted in good faith.” Id. (citing Goland v. C.I.A., 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). Affidavits may be relied on to establish either that all documents have been produced, that documents are unidentifiable, or that identified documents are exempt from disclosure. Id.

III. Discussion

Before reaching the merits of Defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court must make clear the limited scope of the instant proceeding. This case concerns only Plaintiff's claim under FOIA and the Privacy Act based upon his requests for production of certain documents or records from Defendant. This case does not include to any extent the validity or lawfulness of any contemporaneous tax-related enforcement or on-going dispute that may exist between Plaintiff and Defendant. In much of his summary judgment briefing in response, Plaintiff presents substantive argument whether Defendant has acted lawfully or with proper legal authority regarding various apparent tax-related disputes in which Plaintif...