Saucon Valley Manor, Inc. v. Miller

• Citation: 392 F.Supp.3d 554
• Decision Date: 06 June 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-2568
• Parties: SAUCON VALLEY MANOR, INC., Nimita Kapoor-Atiyeh, Plaintiff, v. Teresa MILLER, Jacqueline Rowe, Matt Jones, Michele Moskalczyk, at Home, Inc. d/b/a at Home Health Service and at Home Health and Hospice, and Patrick R. Stonich, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

392 F.Supp.3d 554

SAUCON VALLEY MANOR, INC., Nimita Kapoor-Atiyeh, Plaintiff,

v.Teresa MILLER, Jacqueline Rowe, Matt Jones, Michele Moskalczyk, at Home, Inc. d/b/a at Home Health Service and at Home Health and Hospice, and Patrick R. Stonich, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-2568

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Filed June 6, 2019

William T. Hangley, Rebecca Santoro Melley, Adam N. Schupack, Hangley Aronchick Segal Pudlin & Schiller, Claire Blewitt, James J. Eisenhower, Dilworth Paxson LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Blake C. Marles, Stevens & Lee, Allentown, PA, for Plaintiff.

Matthew R. Skolnik, Kathy Le, Office of the Attorney General, Philadelphia, PA, Frederick J. Stellato, Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus PA, Allentown, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Smith, District Judge

In late 2014, emergency room staff raised concerns of caregiver neglect after they treated an elderly resident of the plaintiffs' personal care home. The Pennsylvania Department of Human Services ("DHS") received a report about this claim of neglect and, thereafter, investigated the personal care home. This investigation culminated in DHS identifying several violations and temporarily revoking the plaintiffs' "regular" personal care home license. The plaintiffs—displeased with DHS's investigation, including that it involved complaints brought to DHS's attention by a competitor—brought the instant civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the DHS parties and the plaintiffs' competitor violated their federal civil rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the DHS parties denied them procedural and substantive due process in violation of the Due Process Clause, violated the Equal Protection Clause by conducting a biased investigation, and used the investigation to retaliate against them in violation of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs also alleged that DHS employees conspired with the plaintiffs' competitor to deprive them of their "regular" license.

After a lengthy period of discovery, the defendants separately moved for summary judgment and said motions are currently before the court. While the defendants raised numerous arguments as to why all the plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of law, the court grants the competitor's motion in total, and grants summary judgment in favor of the DHS parties as to the plaintiffs' claims for violations of procedural due process (denial of a predeprivation hearing and bias only), substantive due process, and equal protection. The court denies the DHS parties' motion for summary judgment as to the claim that the DHS parties denied the plaintiffs postdeprivation process due to delay and the claim for First Amendment retaliation. Lastly, as to all defendants, the court grants summary judgment in their favor on the plaintiffs' section 1983 civil conspiracy claim.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiffs, Saucon Valley Manor, Inc. and Nimita Kapoor-Atiyeh ("Atiyeh"), filed a complaint against Theodore Dallas ("Dallas") in his official capacity as the Secretary of the DHS,¹ Jacqueline Rowe ("Rowe") in her official capacity as the Director of the Bureau of Human Services Licensing ("BHSL") of the DHS's Office of Administration, Matt Jones ("Jones") in his individual and official capacity as a DHS representative, Michele Moskalczyk ("Moskalczyk") in her individual and official capacity as licensing administrator in the Northeast Region Office of the BHSL, and At Home, Inc. d/b/a At Home Health Service and At Home Health and Hospice, and Patrick Stonich ("Stonich") on June 7, 2017.² Doc. No. 1. The complaint asserted four causes of action under section 1983 : (1) violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause against the DHS Defendants; (2) violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause against the DHS Defendants; (3) First Amendment retaliation against Jones and Moskalczyk; and (4) civil conspiracy against the At Home Defendants, Jones, and Moskalczyk. Compl. at 15–18, Doc. No. 1. The At Home Defendants and the DHS Defendants separately moved to dismiss the complaint on July 5, 2017, and July 27, 2017, respectively. Doc. Nos. 11, 14. On September 8, 2017, the court heard oral argument on the motions. Doc. No. 18. On January 10, 2018, the court denied the motions to dismiss in their entirety. Doc. No. 21.

In February 2018, the At Home Defendants and the DHS Defendants separately filed answers and affirmative defenses to the complaint and the case proceeded through a lengthy period of discovery.³ Doc. Nos. 28, 29. On February 19, 2019, the DHS Defendants and At Home Defendants separately moved for summary judgment, filed statements of undisputed material facts, and submitted exhibits in support of the motions. Doc. Nos. 87–90, 92–93. The plaintiffs filed responses in opposition to the motions, responses to the plaintiffs' statements of undisputed material facts, their own statements of additional facts, and exhibits in support of their opposition on March 20, 2019. Doc. Nos. 96–100, 103–10. The At Home Defendants and DHS Defendants separately filed responses to the plaintiffs' opposition to their motions for summary judgment on April 3, 2019. Doc. Nos. 112–14. After receiving the court's permission, the plaintiffs filed a sur-reply brief on April 10, 2019. Doc. No. 116.

The motions for summary judgment are ripe for disposition.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review – Motions for Summary Judgment

A district court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Additionally, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ " Wright v. Corning , 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police , 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) ). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id.

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden "of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party must counter with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that "[a] party asserting that a fact ... is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record ...; or ... [by] showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence ... of a genuine dispute"). The non-movant must show more than the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" for elements on which the non-movant bears the burden of production. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Fireman's Ins. Co. v. DuFresne , 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982) (indicating that party opposing motion for summary judgment may not "rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions"); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E. , 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that "speculation and conclusory allegations" do not satisfy non-moving party's duty to "set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor"). Additionally, the non-moving party "cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial." Jones v. United Parcel Serv. , 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, it is not enough to "merely [ ] restat[e] the allegations" in the complaint; instead, the non-moving party must "point to concrete evidence in the record that supports each and every essential element of his case." Jones v. Beard , 145 F. App'x 743, 745–46 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). Moreover, arguments made in briefs "are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey , 772 F.2d 1103, 1109–10 (3d Cir. 1985).

"When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Wishkin v. Potter , 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). The court must decide "not whether ... the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial’ " and the court should grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, when one p...