Sauey v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Docket No. 6239-86.

Decision Date02 May 1988
Docket NumberDocket No. 6239-86.
Citation90 T.C. 824,90 T.C. No. 55
PartiesNORMAN O. SAUEY, JR. AND CARLA M. SAUEY, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
CourtU.S. Tax Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Petitioner, a noncorporate taxpayer, leased an airplane to a related corporation in 1976. In 1979, petitioner and the corporation entered into a second lease agreement which provided that petitioner would continue leasing the airplane to the corporation for a term of 3 years. In 1981, petitioner and the corporation terminated the 1979 lease, and petitioner traded in the airplane and purchased a new one having a useful life of 6 years. In September of 1981, petitioner and the corporation entered into a written lease agreement that did not contain an option to renew and provided that petitioner would lease the new airplane to the corporation for a stated term of 2 years. In 1983, petitioner and the corporation terminated the 1981 lease before it expired and petitioner leased the airplane that had been subject to the lease to a different related entity for a term of 2 years. Respondent introduced no facts that contravened the written agreements. Accordingly,

HELD, (1) the 1981 lease of the airplane satisfied the 50- percent requirement of sec. 46(e)(3)(B), I.R.C. 1954, and (2) the leases of the two airplanes need not be aggregated under sec. 1.46-4(d)(4), Income Tax Regs. Consequently, with respect to the airplane that was subject to the 1981 lease, petitioners are entitled to an investment credit under sec. 38, I.R.C. 1954. Jerome H. Kringel and James E. Schacht, for the petitioners.

Ronald J. Long, for the respondent.

OPINION

STERRETT, CHIEF JUDGE: *

By notice of deficiency dated December 18, 1985, respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners' Federal income tax for the calendar year 1981 in the amount of $8,635. Due to concessions by both parties, the only issue presented in this case is whether petitioners are entitled to an investment credit under section 38 1 with respect to an airplane that petitioner Norman O. Sauey, Jr. purchased and leased to a related corporation in 1981.

The parties submitted this case fully stipulated pursuant to Rule 122. The stipulation of facts and exhibits attached thereto are incorporated herein by this reference.

Petitioners Norman O. Sauey, Jr. and Carla M. Sauey, husband and wife, resided in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, at the time they filed their petition in this case. They filed their joint Federal income tax return for the year in issue with the Office of the Internal Revenue Service in Kansas City, Missouri.

On December 16, 1976, Norman O. Sauey, Jr. (hereinafter petitioner), leased a 1977 Beechcraft King Air E90 airplane (hereinafter the old airplane) to Portage Industries Corporation (hereinafter the corporation). On March 6, 1979, petitioner and the corporation entered into a second lease agreement which provided that petitioner would continue leasing the old airplane to the corporation for a period of 3 years.

In 1981 petitioner and the corporation terminated the March 6, 1979 lease. Petitioner then traded in the old airplane and purchased a new 1981 Beechcraft King Air B200 airplane (hereinafter the airplane). The airplane had a useful life of 6 years and cost $1,716,400. Petitioner obtained full recourse financing for the entire cost of the airplane from Michigan National Bank of Detroit, an unrelated creditor.

On September 11, 1981, petitioner entered into a written lease agreement with the corporation which provided that petitioner would lease the airplane to the corporation for a stated term of 2 years. This lease did not contain an option to renew, provided that petitioner retained all risk of loss with respect to the airplane, and required the corporation to pay petitioner a minimum monthly rental of $18,000 per month. The rent payable under this lease was the fair rental value of the airplane.

The corporation, a custom plastic manufacturer, leased the airplane from petitioner to satisfy the travel needs of its business. The corporation elected to lease rather than purchase an airplane because it wanted to avoid having additional debt appear on its balance sheet. In 1981 petitioner served as the president of the corporation and owned 94 percent of the corporation's common stock.

On January 18, 1983, petitioner and the corporation terminated the 1981 lease of the airplane. The following day, petitioner and Profile Industries Corporation (hereinafter Profile) entered into a written lease agreement which provided that petitioner would lease the airplane to Profile for a stated term of 2 years. The rent payable under this lease was $12,000 per month. During 1983 petitioner owned all of the stock of Profile.

Other than the airplane, the old airplane, and some real property that petitioner leased to the corporation in 1981, petitioner did not lease any other real or personal property to the corporation or to any other individual or entity during the years 1976 through 1983.

On their joint 1981 Federal income tax return, petitioners claimed an investment credit with respect to the airplane in the amount of $133,902. Petitioners used $9,149 of this credit in 1981 and carried the remaining $124,753 of the credit forward to succeeding years. In his notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed the credit, asserting that it is not allowable under section 46(e)(3)(B).

The question we face is whether petitioners are entitled to an investment credit with respect to the airplane under section 38. Section 38 allows a credit against income tax for qualified investments in certain depreciable property. However, when a noncorporate taxpayer such as petitioner acquires and leases property that is eligible for the investment credit, an investment credit is allowable with respect to the property only if the taxpayer satisfies one of two tests set forth in section 46(e)(3). That section provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(e) Limitations with Respect to Certain Persons.

* * *

(3) Noncorporate Lessors. — A credit shall he allowed by section 38 to a person which is not a corporation with respect to property of which such person is the lessor only if —

(A) the property subject to the lease has been manufactured or produced by the lessor, or

(B) the term of the lease (taking into account options to renew) is less than 50 percent of the useful life of the property, and for the period consisting of the first 12 months after the date on which the property is transferred to the lessee the sum of the deductions with respect to such property which are allowable to the lessor solely by reason of section 162 (other than rents and reimbursed amounts with respect to such property) exceeds 15 percent of the rental income produced by such property. * * *

The parties have stipulated that the airplane is depreciable property that is eligible for the investment credit, that petitioner did not produce or manufacture the airplane, and that, during the first 12 months after the date on which the airplane was transferred to the corporation in 1981, the sum of the deductions with respect to the airplane allowable to petitioner solely by reason of section 162 exceeded 15 percent of the rental income produced by the airplane. The parties disagree, however, over whether the 1981 lease of the airplane satisfied the 50-percent requirement of section 46(e)(3)(B). Whether the 1981 lease satisfied this requirement is a question of fact, and petitioners bear the burden of proof with respect to this issue. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). 2

While it is possible that the majority's rule of shifting the burden of going forward on showing of a 2-year lease term and no option might be appropriate where the lessor and lessee are unrelated, it is not, in my judgment appropriate in a case such as this. 2

For the foregoing reasons I would hold that the petitioners have failed to carry their burden of proof in this case.

PARKER, CLAPP, GERBER, and WILLIAMS, JJ., agree with this dissent.

* By order of the Chief Judge, this case was reassigned to the Chief Judge for opinion and decision.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all sections referred to are sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended and in effect during the year in issue, and all rules referred to are rules of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

2 See Harvey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-381.

The 1981 lease of the airplane contained a fixed and definite term of 2 years, which was less than 50 percent of the useful life of the airplane, and did not contain an option to renew. Thus, on its face, the lease satisfied the 50-percent requirement of section 46(e)(3)(B). Accordingly, with this evidence in the record of this stipulated case, the burden of going forward should be viewed as shifting to respondent.

Respondent's argument that the facts and circumstances of this case reveal that it was reasonably certain at the inception of the lease that the corporation would continue leasing the airplane beyond the term stated in the lease is accepted as an effort to carry that burden. He contends that we should disregard the stated term of the lease and find that the actual term of the lease was of indefinite duration and therefore not less than 50 percent of the useful life of the airplane. Respondent also argues, in the alternative, that the leases of the old airplane in 1976 and 1979 and the leases of the airplane in 1981 and 1983 were successive leases of the same or substantially similar property that must be aggregated under section 1.46-4(d)(4), Income Tax Regs., and treated as one lease for purposes of section 46(e)(3)(B). Respondent then contends that the aggregate term of these combined leases is not less than 50 percent of the combined useful lives of the airplanes.

Petitioners contend, of course, that the stated term of the 1981 lease should control, arguing that there are no facts in this case that...

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