Saulsbury v. Wismer and Becker, Inc.
| Citation | 644 F.2d 1251 |
| Decision Date | 15 May 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-2855,77-2855 |
| Parties | 23 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 287, 25 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1285, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,996, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,839 Lura Lee SAULSBURY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WISMER AND BECKER, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Mary K. Gillespie, Santa Barbara, Cal., argued for plaintiff-appellant; Burton D. Fretz, Washington, D. C., Willard Hastings, Jr., Santa Barbara, Cal., on brief.
J. Michael Phelps, San Francisco, Cal., argued for defendant-appellee; Robert M. Lieber, Alan B. Carlson, J. Michael Phelps, Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy, San Francisco, Cal., on brief.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before SNEED and TANG, Circuit Judges, and JAMESON, * District Judge.
This appeal arises from the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant Wismer & Becker, Inc. in an action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that Saulsbury had not timely filed with the appropriate state agency, because she had not filed a verified complaint with the California Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) within 180 days of her discharge. In the alternative, the court held the complaint in the district court not timely because it was filed less than 180 days after the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) assumption of jurisdiction. We hold that Saulsbury timely filed her complaint with both the FEPC and the EEOC, and that her suit in district court was also timely filed. We, therefore, reverse the district court.
Lura Lee Saulsbury was employed as a general construction laborer by Wismer & Becker from November 20, 1974 until she was discharged on May 2, 1975. She had been the only woman working in that position at the construction site of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant.
On May 13, 1975, Saulsbury sent a letter to the FEPC alleging she had been discharged on account of her sex. On July 17, 1975, the FEPC received a letter from her stating she had written to Mr. Connelly of the FEPC two months before but had not been advised about the status of her case. On July 31, 1975, Simon Connelly, an FEPC consultant wrote to Saulsbury and stated:
(T)o enable us to prepare a formal complaint for your signature we need more detailed information.
A "pre-complaint form" was enclosed and Connelly wrote:
If you will complete it carefully and in detail and return it to us, we should be able to proceed at that time.
On August 7, 1975, Connelly again wrote Saulsbury. Apparently she had not received the letter of July 31. The new letter contained a copy of the original letter and a pre-complaint form.
At the top of the pre-complaint form appeared the following statement:
The information requested on this form will help us to help you. There is no guarantee that the information submitted will constitute the basis for filing a formal complaint.
Saulsbury filled out the form and returned it to the FEPC. According to an affidavit filed by the attorney for the defendants, Connelly took no further action regarding the information submitted by Saulsbury because "he believed that the FEPC at that time had no jurisdiction over the matter therein." Nothing in the record indicates that Saulsbury was given any notification of this determination or that she was informed the FEPC would not proceed with the action.
On the pre-complaint form, Saulsbury indicated she wished a copy of the complaint forwarded to the EEOC. Nothing in the FEPC files shows this was done, nor do the EEOC files reflect receipt of the complaint. However, after Saulsbury contacted an attorney and when Connelly later transmitted copies of the FEPC file to the attorney, it was noted by Connelly that his file contained only photostatic copies, and "(t)his fact reinforces my memory and belief that at some point all of the correspondence between Ms. Saulsbury and this office was forwarded to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission."
On January 28, 1976, 271 days following her discharge, the attorney wrote to the EEOC enclosing a formal discrimination charge and noting that the complaint had been lodged with the FEPC since May 1975 and that the FEPC had indicated its willingness to defer jurisdiction to the EEOC. A right-to-sue letter was requested. On the same date, the attorney also wrote to the FEPC, enclosing a copy of the charge filed with the EEOC and requesting FEPC assistance in deferring the complaint to the EEOC pursuant to an earlier discussion.
The charge sent to the EEOC was marked received on February 11, 1976, 285 days after discharge. On March 3, 1976, the EEOC deferred jurisdiction to the FEPC. On March 16, 1976, Saulsbury then filed a formal verified complaint with the FEPC. On March 25, 1976, the FEPC indicated to the EEOC that it would process the charge. On April 26, 1976, the FEPC waived jurisdiction at Saulsbury's attorney's request. The EEOC assumed jurisdiction on May 3, 1976, and filed the charge. On May 6, 1976, Saulsbury's counsel requested a right-to-sue notice, and the EEOC issued the requested notice on May 20, 1976. On June 4, 1976, the defendant signed the receipt showing notification of the charge. Saulsbury then filed suit on June 11, 1976.
Wismer & Becker moved for summary judgment on two grounds. First, it asserted that the charge was untimely because Saulsbury had failed to file any charge of discrimination within 180 days of the alleged act of discrimination. Second, it contended that suit was untimely because it had been filed only 38 days after the EEOC had assumed jurisdiction of the charge.
The district court granted the defendant's motion after finding that no FEPC complaint had been filed, although the documents noted above had been sent and received. The court held that:
A 'complaint of employment discrimination' under the State of California Fair Employment Practice Commission (FEPC) must be in writing, signed and 'verified' (i. e., sworn or notarized), and filed with the FEPC, and an informal contact or pre-complaint form filed by a complaining individual is not sufficient to constitute an FEPC complaint. California Labor Code § 1422; 8 Cal.Administrative Code § 302(b); Bennett v. Borden, 56 Cal.App.3d 706, 128 Cal.Rptr. 627 (3d Dist. 1976).
The court further found that the "undisputed facts" showed that no complaint had been filed within 180 days of the date of the alleged discriminatory act, and that the court therefore had no jurisdiction.
Next, the court held that
It is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a private civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., for a charging party to wait at least 180 days following the EEOC's assumption of jurisdiction over the EEOC charge before filing a complaint in federal court based on said EEOC charge."
Because Saulsbury did not wait 180 days, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction. Summary judgment was granted to the defendant. Saulsbury took this appeal.
The district court found because Saulsbury's contacts with the FEPC in mid-1975 did not constitute the filing of a complaint under state law, they had not initiated proceedings with the state agency for § 706(e) purposes and, therefore, that the time for filing with the EEOC was not extended from 180 to 300 days under § 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 1 Former California Labor Code § 1422, as it was in effect during the period in question, stated that a person wishing to file a complaint of an unlawful employment practice must file a verified complaint in writing with the FEPC within one year of the date of the alleged unlawful practice. 2
The specific question we must address is whether the failure to file a verified complaint with the FEPC bars Saulsbury from claiming the benefits of the extended period for filing with the EEOC. We hold that her contacts sufficiently "initially instituted" proceedings with the state agency to extend the time from 180 to 300 days for filing with the EEOC.
The term "initially instituted" is not defined in § 2000e-5(e). Recently, however, the Supreme Court and other circuits have indicated that the institution of proceedings with state agencies need be neither formal nor effectual to trigger the extended filing periods under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The Supreme Court's decision in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979), made clear that once an ADEA complainant has timely filed his or her notice of intent to sue with the Secretary of Labor within 300 days of the violation, the requirement that state proceedings be "commenced" is satisfied by a filing with the state agency even if the filing was made after expiration of the state statute of limitation and would, therefore, not be acted upon the state agency. Thus, the Court concluded that "commencement" need not include actual investigation or action by the state agency. 99 S.Ct. at 2073-74.
In Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 807, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980), the Second Circuit addressed the issue of when state proceedings were commenced in a Title VII case where the plaintiff had written to the EEOC 291 days after discharge. The EEOC forwarded the letter to the state deferral agency on June 15, within 300 days of discharge, and upon request by the state agency, a formal complaint was filed with it on August 12, more than 300 days after discharge. The court found that for purposes of Title VII the state proceedings had commenced on June 15,
when Silver's letter was forwarded to NYSDHR (state agency) by the EEOC. That a state law may require formal filing becomes...
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