Saunders v. Boston & Maine R.R.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1934
• Parties: SAUNDERS v. BOSTON & MAINE R. R.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

287 Mass. 56

191 N.E. 381

SAUNDERS

v.BOSTON & MAINE R. R.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 25, 1934.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Bishop, Judge.

Action by Robert Saunders against the Boston & Maine Railroad. The trial judge directed a verdict for defendant and reported the case.

Judgment for defendant.

E. R. Greenhood, of Boston, for plaintiff.

F. P. Garland and J. DeCourcy, both of Boston, for defendant.

RUGG, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff in this action of tort seeks to recover compensation for personal injuries received in April, 1929, while in the employ of the defendant and alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant acting through its agents. The pleading sets out an action at common law and not under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 51-59). Dewing v. New York Central Railroad, 281 Mass. 351, 352, 183 N. E. 754. There was testimony tending to show these facts: The plaintiff, about thirty-two years of age, had been working for about six months for the defendant in its baggage room in the North Station in Boston. The kind of work he did was handling the baggage, trunks, mail, cans of milk, and everything that came in crates, some going in the state and some out of the state. He loaded small trucks with articles of this description, brought them to the trains, and put them into the cars. He had always been supplied with help, when he had a heavy shipment, to put it on the train. On the occasion in question he had to load nine milk cans, each about two feet in height, eighteen inches broad, containing forty quarts and weighing about one hundred pounds. Although he requested a helper, none was furnished him, and he was told by his superior to hurry up and ‘get the cans on the best way he could because the train would leave in two or three minutes and the cans had to go on that train.’ He then put the cans on the train without help and as a result was caused to have a double hernia. The train in question was going from Boston, stopping at way stations in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine, and eventually arriving at Portland in Maine. The particular shipment of milk came from West Somerville and was destined for Haverhill, both within the commonwealth. Mail, baggage and other merchandise on the train were destined to places outside this commonwealth. All these, as well as the cans of milk, had to be loaded on the train before it could start. The defendant was not insured under the Workmen's Compensation Act (G. L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 152). The jury found, in answer to questions submitted, in effect (1) that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, (2) that there was failure of duty on the part of the defendant to furnish assistance to the plaintiff, (3) that at the time of his injury the plaintiff was not handling any freight destined for a point outside the commonwealth, (4) that at the time of his injury the plaintiff was handling only freight destined for a point within the commonwealth, and (5) that the plaintiff sustained damages to the amount of $2,300. The trial judge thereupon directed a verdict in favor of the defendant and reported the case for our determination.

The question to be decided is whether the plaintiff in respect to his injury was within the scope of the Federal Employers' Liability Act concerning interstate commerce. 35 U. S. Sts. at Large, part 1, 65, c. 149; 36 U. S. Sts. at Large, part 1, 291, c. 143 (45 USCA §§ 51-59). Interstate commerce is not used in that act with any narrow or technical meaning but in a practical sense. The true ‘test of employment in such commerce in the sense intended is, Was the employee, at the time of the injury, engaged in interstate transportation, or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it?’ Shanks v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad, 239 U. S. 556, 558, 36 S. Ct. 188, 189, 60 L. Ed. 436, L. R. A. 1916C, 797. In New York Central Railroad v. Carr, 238 U. S. 260, at pages 262, 263, 35 S. Ct. 780, 59 L. Ed. 1298, it was pointed out that, while the scope of the act is so broad as to cover indisputably a wide field not open to discussion, yet ‘owing to the fact that, during the same day, railroad employees often and rapidly pass from one class of employment to another, the courts are constantly called upon to decide those close questions where it is difficult to define the line which divides the state from the interstate business,’ and that ‘the matter is not to be decided by considering the physical position of the employee at the moment of injury.’ Numerous cases have been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, which must be followed in the interpretation and application of a federal statute. In Erie Railroad v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170, 37 S. Ct. 556, 61 L. Ed. 1057, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 662, the work of the employee was to be in charge of an engine switching freight cars about the yard. Many cars were moved in a day. In some the freight was interstate, in others intrastate, and in still others of both classes. At the end of the day he placed his engine where it was to remain for the night and started to leave the yard. While crossing some of the tracks in the yard he was injured. It was held that, since his day's work was in both interstate and intrastate commerce, he was likewise employed in both in leaving the yard, and that therefore he plainly was engaged in interstate commerce. In Philadelphia & Reading Railway v. Di Donato, 256 U. S. 327, 41 S. Ct. 516, 518, 65 L. Ed. 955, the employee was a flagman signaling both intrastate and interstate trains. It was said that the ‘service of a flagman concerns the safety of both commerces [interstate and intrastate] and to separate his duties by moments of time or particular incidents of its exertion would be to destroy its unity and commit it to confusing controversies.’ These general principles have been reaffirmed. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177, 180, 36 S. Ct. 517, 60 L. Ed. 941;Illinois Central Railroad v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473, 34 S. Ct. 646, 58 L. Ed. 1051, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 163;Erie Railroad v. Welsh, 242 U. S. 303, 37 S. Ct. 116, 61 L. Ed. 319;Lehigh Valley Railway v. Barlow, 244 U. S. 183, 37 S. Ct. 515, 61 L. Ed. 1070;New York Cent. Railway v. Porter, 249 U. S. 168...