Saunders v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 October 1894
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
• Parties: SAUNDERS, Plaintiff and appellant, v. CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY CO., Defendant and respondent.

6 S.D. 40, 60 N.W. 148 (1894)

SAUNDERS,

Plaintiff and appellant,

v.CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY CO.,

Defendant and respondent.

South Dakota Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hyde County, S.D.

Hon. H. G. Fuller, Judge

Affirmed

L. E. Matcher,

Gaffy & Gunderson

Attorneys for appellant.

William B. Sterling, A. W. Burtt

Attorneys for respondent.

Opinion filed Oct. 2, 1894

KELLAM, J.

This was an action to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by appellant while a passenger on respondent’s train. At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, on motion of defendant the trial court directed a verdict for defendant, upon which judgment was entered. From this judgment, plaintiff appealed.

The gist of the action was negligence, and as the correctness of the trial court’s decision, aside from the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence, must depend upon whether the testimony tended to show negligence, or such facts and circumstances as would raise a presumption of negligence against defendant, the safer way will be to reproduce all the evidence bearing upon that point. It all came from the plaintiff and was as follows:

“I purchased the ticket (from Pierre to Highmore) … at Pierre, got in the cars, and when I heard the train whistle at Highmore I put on my overcoat, and started leisurely towards the door. When I did this, and when I found I was near the door, I saw the train passing the station platform at Highmore; and then I saw Mr. Titus Price coming out of the car in front of me, and I thought to speak to him, and I went to the door and opened the door. By that time Mr. Price had turned his back, and was gone or going into the other car, and at that time there was a fearful shock, and there my memory ceased, right on the threshold of the door, the end door, the east end, and front door of the car. Mr. Price came out of the car in front of me. The next I knew was some 24 hours afterwards. I found myself lying in the American Hotel, in bed. When I stepped into the door of the train, the train was passing the turntable rapidly, and was about four or five hundred feet, I think, east of the depot. …”

On cross-examination he testified:

“I saw Mr. Price, as I have stated, coming out of the rear door of the smoker, and at the time of the accident was at the front door of the ladies’ car. I left my seat when the train whistled for the station at Highmore. I got up, and put on my overcoat, and walked toward the door. Did not open the door immediately. I stood there a little while. When I went to the door the train was passing the east end of the platform at the station. I knew they were passing the station before I opened the door. I pulled the door back, and stepped out into the opening. I remained there only a moment and that is the end of my memory. There was no one else at the door besides me. No conductor, no brakeman. I had hold of the nob of the door, or the door. Am not sure which. I was standing about on the threshold in the open door, and the train was some three or four hundred yards beyond the station, I think. Am not sure as to the distance. I fell somewhere near the lock on the switch. It was a cold frosty morning, and dark. There were plenty of seats inside the car, and four passengers in the car. As I was standing in the front door, holding the door for only a moment, I felt the shock, and a kind of a stoppage of the car, as if it had struck something. It was running smoothly before. I don't know whether it struck anything or not.”

Appellant contends, and states his contention in the terms of a headnote to Kentucky & I. Bridge Co. v. Quinkert (Ind. App.) 28 NE 338, that “an injury to a passenger while on a railroad train is prima facie negligence, whether caused by defects in the machinery, or by the acts of the servants in operating the machinery.” While respondent argues that this proposition, thus broadly stated, cannot be maintained, we are not, for the purpose of this case, disposed to criticise either its language or its doctrine. It simply asserts that whenever the injury is shown to have been caused either by defective machinery, or by the acts of the company’s servants in operating the machinery, negligence will be presumed; but no case has ever held that a railroad company is responsible for an injury to a passenger, simply because it occurs on its train. The gravamen of the cause of action is always negligence, and it must be either proved, or such facts shown as will support an imputation of negligence. There surely must be some circumstances shown tending to connect the company with the cause of the injury. Ordinarily, the immediate cause of the injury, and the circumstances under which it occured, are in evidence; and, if the cause is such as would not probably have occurred or existed with suitable machinery and proper management, the fact of the accident will under the Kentucky case, raise a presumption of negligence, and the burden of proof is thus shifted to the defendant. But this presumption, with its consequences, comes from the nature of the accident or cause of injury. It does not follow, and should not, from the simple and unexplained fact of an accident, regardless of its cause or character. The presumption arises, not from the fact of the injury, but from its cause, or the circumstances attending it. Evidence simply that a passenger on a moving train fell against the stove, and was injured, would not raise a presumption of negligence against the...