Saunders v. City of Chi.
| Decision Date | 17 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case Nos. 12-cv-09158,12-cv-09184,12-cv-09170 |
| Citation | 146 F.Supp.3d 957 |
| Parties | Michael Saunders, Plaintiff, v. City of Chicago, et al., Defendants. Vincent Thames, Plaintiff, v. City of Chicago, et al., Defendants. Harold Richardson, Plaintiff, v. City of Chicago, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
John C. Benson, Stuart Jay Chanen, Valorem Law Group LLC, Rachel Steinback, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, Alexandra L. Lampert, Danielle Hamilton, Nick J. Brustin, Peter J. Neufeld, Neufeld Scheck & Brustin, New York, NY, Anna Benvenutti Hoffmann, Neufeld Scheck & Brustin, LLP Pro Hac, Vice, for Plaintiff.
James Gus Sotos, Andrew Joseph Grill, Elizabeth A. Ekl, Jeffrey Neil Given, Jeffrey Robert Kivetz, The Sotos Law Firm, P.C., Itasca, IL, Eileen Ellen Rosen, Catherine Macneil Barber, John Joseph Rock, Silvia Mercado Masters, Stacy Ann Benjamin, Rock Fusco & Connelly, LLC, Donald J. Pechous, Lisa Marie Meador, Patricia Campbell Bobb, Patricia C. Bobb & Associates, David Robert Nordwall, Law Office Of David R. Nordwall LLC, Lisa Marie Meador, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Robert M. Dow, Jr.
Plaintiffs Michael Saunders, Harold Richardson, and Vincent Thames were wrongfully convicted of the rape and murder of Nina Glover, each spending more than 16 years in prison before being exonerated by DNA evidence. Plaintiffs filed separate civil rights lawsuits against the City of Chicago and various individuals seeking to recover for their wrongful convictions under state and federal law.
On October 13, 2013, the Court issued an identical Memorandum Opinion and Order in each of the three above-captioned cases (12-cv-9158 [121]; 12-cv-9170 [84]; 12-cv-9184 [81] ), ruling on Defendants' then-pending motions to dismiss filed in each of those cases. Now before the Court are Plaintiffs' motions to reconsider (12-cv-9158 [185]; 12-cv-9170 [131]; 12-cv-9184 [119] ) the Court's dismissal of Count I of their respective complaints, which the Court previously dismissed as time-barred. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motions (12-cv-9158 [185]; 12-cv-9170 [131]; 12-cv-9184 [119] ) are granted, and the Court reinstates Count I in its entirety in each of Plaintiffs' complaints.
Also before the Court is Defendant City of Chicago's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery and trial of Plaintiffs' municipal-liability claims, filed in each of the three cases (12-cv-9158 [207]; 12-cv-9170 [149]; 12-cv-9184 [137] ). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant City of Chicago's motions (12-cv-9158 [207]; 12-cv-9170 [149]; 12-cv-9184 [137] ) are granted.
As an administrative matter, in the Thames case, 12-cv-9170, the docket shows Individual Defendants' motion to depose incarcerated witnesses [144] as a pending motion, but Magistrate Judge Finnegan granted that motion on July 8, 2015 [See 146]. The Clerk is instructed to strike that motion [144] as an active motion on the Court's docket.
The Court set forth the factual history of this case in detail in its previously-issued memorandum opinion and order (12-cv-9158 [121]; 12-cv-9170 [84]; 12-cv-9184 [81] ) ruling on Defendants' motions to dismiss. Because the motions currently before the Court mostly relate to procedural issues, the Court offers only a brief reiteration of the relevant background here.
After bench trials that commenced in November 1997, Plaintiffs Saunders and Richardson were convicted of the rape and murder of Nina Glover, and each was sentenced to 40 years in prison. After seeing the results of those trials, Plaintiff Thames elected to plead guilty and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. Plaintiffs allege that their convictions and sentences were based entirely on Defendants' use of self-incriminating statements that Defendant Officers obtained from Plaintiffs through the use of unconstitutional interrogation methods. See 12-cv-9158 (Saunders) ( ) ]; 12-cv-9184 (Richardson) ; 12-cv-9170 (Thames) .
In May of 2011, based on DNA samples taken during the original investigation and with the use of the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database, the Illinois State Police linked convicted felon Johnny Douglas—whom Defendant Officers had met, but failed to subsequently investigate, at the crime scene on November 7, 1994—to the rape and murder of Ms. Glover. Based on these findings, on November 16, 2011, the Circuit Court of Cook County granted Plaintiffs' joint petition to vacate their convictions, and Plaintiffs were released from prison. The State of Illinois granted Plaintiffs certificates of innocence on September 14, 2012.
On November 15 2012, Plaintiffs Saunders, Thames, and Richardson each filed a complaint in this case. On November 20, 2012, Thames filed a first amended complaint. Each operative complaint contains eleven counts and names the City of Chicago and various individuals (both known and unknown) as Defendants, including police officers and Assistant State's Attorneys.
Relevant here, in Count I of their operative complaints, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
by coercing confessions from Plaintiffs and then using Plaintiffs' self-incriminating statements against them in their respective criminal cases. On November 13, 2013, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' operative complaints, dismissing Count I as time-barred. Now before the Court are Plaintiffs' motions to reconsider the dismissal of Count I in light of subsequently-issued Seventh Circuit opinions regarding the accrual of Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claims.
Also relevant here, Plaintiffs seek to hold the City of Chicago liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
pursuant to Monell v. New York Department of Social Services , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), for the City's alleged pattern and practice of using unconstitutional means to obtain confessions from suspects and arrestees, the City's alleged policy and practice of fabricating statements, the City's alleged practice of not recording interrogations, and the City's alleged failure to adequately train, supervise, and discipline officers who engaged in the alleged constitutional violations. These so-called Monell claims survived Defendants' motions to dismiss. Now before the Court are Defendants' motions to bifurcate Plaintiffs' Monell claims against the City of Chicago, where Defendants seek to stay discovery and trial on those claims pending resolution of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the individual Defendants.
Because the Court's November 13, 2013 order did not dispose of this case in its entirety, Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)
:
[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.
. Under this rule, a district court has inherent authority to reconsider its own orders entered prior to final judgment. See Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 12, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (); Diaz v. Indian Head, Inc. , 686 F.2d 558, 562–63 (7th Cir.1982) (); Mintz v. Caterpillar Inc. , 788 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir.2015) .
“Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Conditioned Ocular Enhancement, Inc. v. Bonaventura , 458 F.Supp.2d 704, 707 (N.D.Ill.2006)
(quoting Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc. , 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir.1996) ).
In regard to the “manifest error” prong, a motion to reconsider is proper only when “the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.” Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc. , 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.1990)
; see also Wiegel v. Stork Craft Mfg., Inc., 891 F.Supp.2d 941, 944 (N.D.Ill.2012) (); Oto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. , 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir.2000) (). With respect to the second prong, a motion to reconsider is appropriate if there has been “a change in, or clarification of, law...
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